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Abstract 
During the past century, Europe has experienced significant political, social and economic 
changes. The European countries have successfully joined together to form a union aimed 
at prosperity and peace across the continent. In 2012, the European Union received the 
Nobel Peace Prize for human rights advancements. The 28 current members are united 
under common European symbols and institutions, whilst they maintain their national 
character. It has been posited that national identity is built around language and 
geographical borders. Yet, the EU’s borders change continually with the accession of new 
members and the EU recognises all official languages of its members as official languages of 
the union itself. #
In this dissertation I explore the function of positive attitudes and practices of 
multilingualism as a catalyst for European identity, while investigating the components of 
European identity and its relationship with national identity. A mixed methodology of 
questionnaires and interviews is used across three contexts: Romania, Belgium and the 
United Kingdom. Romania joined the EU in 2007; it presents a novel context for 
investigating European identity. Belgium, home of the EU, is one of the oldest members. It 
is symbolically divided by the French-Dutch linguistic border. Finally, the UK – where 
English, a global lingua franca, is an official language – has traditionally had a reserved 
stance towards the EU. These studies show that Europeans perceive their national and 
European identities as compatible, sometimes forming a hybrid identity. I find support for 
the notion that European identity has two components: civic and cultural – and that 
positive attitudes towards multilingualism are intrinsically related to and predict European 
identity. These results vary subtly across contexts and the interviews provide in-depth 
insights into these differences. I conclude by highlighting the role that European 
multilingualism can have in the development of a stronger union. 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1. Introduction 
In October 2012, it was announced that the European Union would be awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize. The Nobel Prize committee said that it was granted “for over six decades [of] 
contribut[ions] to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human 
rights in Europe” (Nobel Prizes and Laureates). The initial goal of the European Union was 
to foster the economic recovery of Europe after decades of war, however, over the years, 
the goals and accomplishments of this unique institution have exceeded even the most 
optimistic expectations. Despite the fact that during the economic crisis that the world is 
faced with today many critics of the EU have argued that it could have done more to 
prevent the crisis or to speed the recovery, it is important to remember that the European 
political leaders have attempted to cooperate and work together to find an economic 
solution. This cooperation at the political and institutional level might have transpired to 
the social level, as well. #
The creation and evolution of the European Union as a unique institution has influenced 
considerably the lives of its 500 million citizens, in most cases improving their quality of 
life and opportunities. Through European programmes such as Erasmus (offering a study 
abroad frame for higher education students), Leonardo (for vocational education and 
training), and many others, students, professionals, or researchers have had the opportunity 
to experience school, work or life in another European country. The open borders between 
the European nations led to an increase in tourism and trade within Europe. These 
examples are countless and it is not in the scope of this paper to list them, but to illustrate 
through them the changes Europe has undergone on a social level together with the 
creation of the European Union. All these changes over the past six decades have 
influenced the European citizens sentiments for each other and towards the EU. #
The European continent is the home of very diverse nations and people, with many 
languages and cultures, with specific traditions and customs, with affinities for other 
groups, as well as antipathies. But as evidenced by the Nobel Peace Prize award, since 
WWII the Europeans have been successful at putting these differences aside and uniting 
under the symbols of the European Union, whether they did it consciously or not. As the 
EU motto proclaims it, we are “united in diversity”. Is it too much to assume that this unity 
extends as far as to form a common European identity? And if this identity exists, how does 
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it relate to the linguistic diversity of Europe? Are multilingual Europeans more prone to 
feeling European?#
The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand how three different groups of 
Europeans understand the concept of European identity and how they see the role of 
multilingualism in the context of European identity using a mixed method approach. I will 
specifically investigate the role of multilingual attitudes and practices in the creation, 
development and/or existence of a European identity. #
1.1. Identity 
The concept of identity has been overwhelmingly present in various sciences for a long 
time. Even in the non-scholarly environment, we all ask ourselves “Who am I?” - it is one of 
the very basic questions of humanity. However, scholars have been struggling to answer this 
particular question for many centuries and even today there is still debate about the exact 
definition of the concept. It is extremely interesting and at the same time frustrating to 
pose this question: we all know who we are, we know which are the traits we have in 
common with our peers and what makes us different from them. On a very basic and 
almost instinctual level, we are all aware of our being and our surroundings; but pinpointing 
a comprehensive and accurate definition of the concept of identity has been a burdening 
task for scholars in many areas of the social sciences. Psychologists, philosophers, 
sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, political scientists and even biologists have tried to 
provide us with the best and most accurate representation of identity. It is worth noting 
here that identity has been used at times interchangeably with concepts such as self, 
identification, persona, individuality, personality and others. #
For the purposes of this project, identity is understood in a more specific way, mainly 
encompassing the concept of social identity, but also drawing from work related to linguistic 
and political identity. The particular social identity studied here is European identity and its 
construction in various contexts. The view adopted is that social identity is a complex 
concept, incorporating a somewhat stable core, as well as changing characteristics. 
Caporaso (2005) suggests that identities provide a sense of stability and continuity, and 
they are the bond between us and the world around us. Risse (2010) argues that 
maintaining there are some stable aspects does not go against the social constructivist 
approach to identity. Rather, he states that “some constructions of European identity have 
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remained remarkably stable over the decades and even precede the European Union” (p. 
21), but this is not to say that European-ness is ascribed to an individual based purely on 
his/her EU citizenship.#
The fluid characteristics will be shown to be affected by various external factors, and at 
times even internal ones. Risse (2010) suggests that the social identities are acquired 
through socialisation within a social group, that is, learning and ascribing to the norms of a 
group. Thus, this study will attempt to show how individuals and groups form a particular 
kind of identity, in this case, the European identity. In very simple terms, the view on 
European identity adopted here is that it is a changing dimension of one’s social identity, it 
could be one of the multiple identities that an individual has, and it can be triggered by the 
context surrounding the individual and group in question. #
Identity researchers provide an operational definition of identity, that they follow 
throughout their research. While some propose a stable, essentialist view, I believe that a 
constructivist approach to identity is better suited for the purposes of this study. Norton 
(1997) for example, defines identity as “how people understand their relationship to the 
world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space, and how people 
understand their possibilities for the future” (p. 410). She thus takes an inclusive 
perspective, indicating the importance of the temporal and spatial dimensions of identity, 
and the negotiation that takes place between the individual and the world he/she lives in. 
This relationship is not a uni-dimensional one, nor is it uni-directional. We will discuss how 
the notion of European identity is very much a temporal and spacial identity.#
One important factor that has been shown to have an impact on aspects of social identity 
is language (Wodak et al., 2008; Norton, 2000; Heller, 1987; Yip, 2005; Block, 2006 and 
others). It is through language that people construct their identity and/or are socialised 
into a particular group. As it is often said, language and the ability to communicate verbally 
is what brings people together in communities. Bilingualism and multilingualism are 
phenomena that are more predominant than one would think, with more than half of the 
world’s population being able to communicate in two or more languages (Grosjean, 2010). 
In the present study I will take a closer look at how various aspects of one’s linguistic 
profile (attitudes to multilingualism, practices of bilingualism and/or multilingualism, self-
assessed proficiency in more languages and frequency of use of these languages) relate to 
and/or influence the development of a sense of European identity. #
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In order to do all this, I will start by discussing recent literature on social identity, 
particularly from the point of view of social psychology and sociolinguistics. I will discuss 
the concepts of individual, collective and multiple identity. As a sub-category of social 
identity, I will explain what is meant by linguistic identity and describe some aspects which 
will be relevant to this study. I will then present the political, national identity and 
European identity, as particular forms of social identity. The last sections of this chapter 
will provide more details about the history of Europe and its relationship with identity.#
1.2. Social identity 
When discussing social identity in the present literature milieu, Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory 
(1974) is the starting point for understanding this concept. Tajfel’s seminal work in Social 
Identity Theory (SIT) marked the foundation of what would become a very influential 
perspective in social sciences. He suggests that social identity is “the individual’s knowledge 
that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value 
significance to him of the group membership” (Tajfel, 1974, p. 31). The sense of affiliation to 
a group emerges as being related to the individual’s self-image in a tridimensional way – 
cognitively (knowledge of the belonging to a group), affectively (the emotional significance 
of this group membership), as well as the evaluative significance of this membership 
(assigning a positive or a negative value to it). This definition however only takes into 
account the individual’s perspective. Kohli (2000) argues that social identity also denotes 
the “interaction processes in which persons identify others and are identified by them, and 
these processes become the basis of self-identification” (p.115). Thus social identity is not 
only a personal act, but it is an identity performed in the interactions with others where 
the individual, as well as the others, acknowledge the belongingness to a particular group. It 
then emerges that the group is a very important piece in the construction of social identity. 
The relation between the individual and the group in light of social identity is discussed 
next.#
1.2.1. Self-categorisation in SIT 
As suggested by the concept of self-categorisation developed in the realms of the SIT, a 
person has an almost instinctive need to categorise the world around. This automatisation 
mechanism allows individuals to draw conclusions regarding a particular object or person 
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by identifying the category it belongs to and thus assigning the characteristics of the group 
to the individual object or person. It is of course a way of simplifying the world, but it can 
have negative consequences (i.e., stereotyping, misjudgement etc.). The development of the 
concept of self-categorisation has also led to the establishment of the ‘in-group’ and ‘out-
group theories’. In the process of self-categorisation, the individual develops the us versus 
them worldview, and thus includes him/herself in a group that in his/her opinion is different 
from another group. In this situation, the individual can accentuate traits the define him/
her as a member (or a non-member) of a group. The minimal group paradigm has beens 
studied extensively in social psychology and showed consistently that just categorising 
people into two categories is sufficient to foster discrimination (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; 
Turner, Sachdev & Hogg, 1983). In the context of ethnic or national identity, this worldview 
is a necessary tool used by politicians and others in power to stir ethnic and national 
identities, passions and conflicts. #
When people self-categorise themselves as Europeans, Risse (2010) argues they could mean 
one of two things: an understanding of themselves as supporters of human rights, 
cosmopolitan, liberal, open-minded inhabitants of the European space, or people who 
identify themselves with the white, traditional, Christian Europe, whom Risse calls 
nationalist Europeans. When, for example, a person self-categorises as European, it is 
unclear which of these two postulations they actually refer to. However, it is not difficult to 
conceive how each understanding of European-ness would construct the ‘other’, or the 
‘out-group’. For the latter, the nationalist Europeans, probably the most threatening 
representation of ‘the other’ would be immigrants from outside the European space; for 
the former, the cosmopolitan Europeans, one potential group to represent ‘the other’ could 
be the nationalist Europeans. Some identities lie dormant for a particular individual and 
come to the forefront of the conscience under certain circumstances. These aspects of 
social identity will be addressed next. #
1.2.2. Salience and centrality of identity 
In a homogenous environment, an identity might not surface until the members of the 
group come face to face with a different group. The idea that identity becomes salient 
when confronted with other groups (or ‘them’ or ‘others’) has been investigated by 
researchers looking at social identity. One does not necessarily think about his/her 
membership in a group until this membership is challenged. In the case of nationalist 
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Europeans discussed earlier, if they are never confronted with immigrants from other 
backgrounds, they might not develop such a strong sense of nationalist European identity. 
Once the immigrants settle in the same geographical space, the nationalist European 
identity can or will become a salient identity of the original inhabitants of that space. As 
Noels and Giles (2009) suggest, “social comparison is influenced by a motivational desire to 
see one’s own group in a positive light, in order to enhance one’s own self-esteem as a 
member of a positively valued group” (p. 651). Thus, people identify as belonging to a group 
for which they have positive attitudes (the in-group) compared to other groups (the out-
groups), and through this mechanism, they increase their own self-esteem. #
The idea of identity salience is also discussed by Yip (2005). She suggests that the salience 
of one’s identity is dependent on the contextual cues. Consequently, a specific identity 
comes to the forefront of people’s identity in certain contexts. For example, the use of a 
language or the presence of members of a particular group can make one’s identity salient. 
Yip discussed her findings in light of bicultural ethnic identity, a particular kind of social 
identity, which describes one’s membership to an ethnic group in relation to the majority 
group. Identity salience suggests that an identity could be primed by certain contextual 
cues. The situations and conditions in which an identity becomes salient indicate yet again 
the interactional nature of social identity or social identities (Kohli, 2000). The affiliation 
to multiple groups leads to the formation of multiple social roles (or identities) which 
emerge in social interactions or are triggered by contextual cues. #
In an earlier study, Yip and her colleagues (2002) pinpointed another aspect of social 
identity, which is the centrality of an identity for a particular individual. They describe the 
concept of centrality as the extent to which some individuals “choose to build their identity 
around race/ethnicity” (Yip et al., 2002, p. 1568). In contrast with the concept of identity 
salience, centrality seems to invoke a sense of agency and voluntariness on the part of the 
individual, he/she chooses the degree to which a particular identity, or membership to a 
group, is central to his/her self-concept. Salience and centrality touch upon the same 
notions, however, salience as described above needs a contextual trigger for a particular 
identity, while centrality is less context-dependent and more stable. #
Cameron (2004) also discussed the centrality of one’s identity as part of a three-
dimensional model of social identity. The dimensions he proposed are cognitive centrality 
(the time spent thinking about the group membership and the subjective importance of the 
group to the self), in-group affect (the nature of the feelings associated with being a 
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member in the group) and in-group ties (the perception of belonging and being similar to 
other members of the group). This model takes Tajfel’s social identity model and develops 
it further by providing more depth to the dimensions, connecting the individual and the 
group through a cognitive and an affective link, but also through the individual’s sense of 
belonging. #
Identity Process Theory (IPT) proposed by Breakwell (2004) suggests among other things 
that a person possesses one sole identity, the distinction between the concepts of personal 
and social identity is forgone, while his/her memberships in different groups are just 
elements of this identity. Breakwell (2004) argues that the content of one’s identity has to 
be characterised on three dimensions: the degree of centrality, the hierarchical 
arrangements of elements and the relative salience of the components of that identity. The 
modification of each one of the elements of the identity determines a change in the whole 
identity, seen from a holistic perspective. Thus in her view, apart from the salience and 
centrality of identity, the hierarchy of elements plays an important role. I also maintain 
that an individual can have multiple identities based on his/her membership in various 
groups, and I will re-claim this categorisation of content of an identity as proposed by 
Breakwell (2004) as follows: identity can be characterised at any point in time by the 
hierarchical organisation of the multiple identities, as well as the centrality of some of 
these identities and their salience, usually determined by a particular context. #
Smith (2010) argued that for different people national identity is more or less central, but 
nonetheless they all understand the meaning of it and that cannot exist without the 
existence of nation. Mirroring this discussion to European identity, it can be assumed that 
since everybody has an understanding of Europe, that translates into an understanding of 
the European identity. The understanding of Europe or the European Union (or whether 
people think of these terms as encompassing the same concept) will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4, the qualitative part of the study. #
In the case of European identity, people who work for the European Union or for 
institutions closely related to the EU might experience a more central role of this identity 
in their life. Furthermore, people who live in cities where the EU is more visible, such as 
Brussels, might experience the increased salience of their European identity. Thus, given 
the right environment, an identity can become salient without necessarily being central; 
but if that identity is a central identity for an individual it is more likely that it will be 
salient even without contextual triggers. It is implied in this discussion that individuals do 
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not hold one single identity, but various, some more central than others, and some that 
become salient under certain circumstances. #
1.2.3. Multiple identities and identity negotiation 
A person can have a multiplicity of identities, which become salient or central at different 
points in time and in different spatial contexts. An individual can never be part of only one 
group, therefore Kohli (2000) argues that we should refer to social identities in the plural 
form, since all individuals are part of multiple groups at the same time. Or to put it in 
Edwards’ (2009) terms: “besides our uniquely personal sense of self, we also have social 
identities based upon the various groups to which we belong” (p.27). This is not to say that 
the individual has no agency in determining his/her identity, but that this individual is in a 
constant negotiation with his/her environment. Multiple identities are a normal feature of 
an individual and under most circumstances, people do no have a problem moving between 
them depending on the context (Ross, 2007; Smith, 1992; Wodak et al. 2008). #
Not only is the transition between these identities fluid and effortless, but at times they 
can lead to hybrid or fused identities (Comănaru & Noels, in preparation; Benet-Martínez, 
2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Smith, 1992; Wodak et al. 2008 and many others). Wodak 
and her colleagues (2008) argued that one way to overcome conflicts and the negative 
aspects of self-categorisation (stereotypes, prejudices, racism, xenophobia - as discussed 
above) is to allow for these hybrid identities to emerge. They discussed the example of 
Switzerland, where about half of the German and half of the French speaking communities 
are Catholic and the other halves are Protestant, thus “linguistic and religious differences in 
Switzerland are reciprocally toned down” (p. 17). Nonetheless, at times these identities can 
become conflictual under particular external or internal factors, and need to be negotiated 
by the individual in his/her context (aspects of the hybrid and conflictual identities will be 
discussed in a later chapter with reference to European identity). The multiplicity of 
identities that one person possesses at all times can be understood through the 
kaleidoscopic self metaphor proposed by Deaux and Perkins (2001).#
Deaux and Perkins (2001) argued that these multiple self-representations of an individual’s 
identity are connected and influence each other in any given situation. In their view, 
depending on the situation, a particular self-representation comes forth, but the other 
aspects of identity are not silenced; on the contrary, even though they are not the main self-
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representation, they are still part of the self and have an impact on the facet that is 
activated in a particular context. Thus, depending on the situation, one might feel one 
identity stronger, but that does not mean the other identities are eradicated. Although one 
identity might not play a significant role in a particular situation, it will always remain a 
part of the self and have an influence in that particular situation. The display of one 
identity and the suppression of the others in a context can be automatic or agential. But 
since identities are quite often influenced by the environment, the individual must 
negotiate them within him/herself and with the context in which the identity is to surface. #
Having multiple identities signifies that at various points in time some of these identities 
need to be revised, thought out and negotiated. Pavlenko and Blackledge (2004) make a 
distinction between the construction and performance of identities, and the negotiation of 
identities. They argue that individuals perform out identities without necessarily being 
aware of it, by behaving in an appropriate manner depending on the contextual cues. But 
the negotiation of identities takes “place only when certain identities are 
contested” (Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004, p. 20) and the individuals have agency in this 
negotiation. The researchers go on to discuss that the negotiation of an identity can take 
place between two parties (i.e., individuals, groups, or groups and individuals), but also 
within the same person. It is thus clear that an individual or a group has a definite sense of 
agency in constructing, negotiating and performing their identity. The European identity 
qualifies as a negotiable identity, as it is not imposed and only in some cases is it assumed.#
It can thus be inferred that people need to manage and negotiate different identities 
frequently. The following section will investigate the various theories regarding the way in 
which multiple identities might interact within one individual. It will also describe in depth 
a particular study looking at bicultural identity and how this concept can be adapted to give 
a better understanding of the relation between national and European identity.#
1.2.4. Models of identity relations 
The Bicultural Identity Orientation Scale (BIOS) was developed in the Canadian context 
with the purpose of better understanding the ways in which bicultural individuals construct 
their identity and how they internalise and manage the two identities (Comănaru & Noels, 
in preparation). In order to better understand this relation, I will briefly present here the 
original study which led to the development of the scale and the concepts behind it. I will 
Introduction  24
then present other models in the literature, which describe the relation between national 
and European identity, using this literature as a rationalisation for adapting the BIOS to 
study the relationship between national and European identity.#
The mobility of individuals provides them with opportunities to negotiate various 
identities often. There are many studies in psychology and sociology that investigated 
different models of acculturation. Notably, Berry’s influential model of acculturation (1980, 
1997) proposes that an acculturating individual will use one of these four strategies: 
assimilation, marginalisation, separation and integration.  The desired outcome from 
Berry’s perspective is integration. The integrated individuals will maintain their own 
identity, but will also interact and adapt to the new cultural environment. Although the 
other three options are not the most advantageous, they could still lead one to become 
bicultural, but to a lesser extent and possibly at a slower pace.#
Another model is presented by LaFromboise and her colleagues (1993) and it postulates 
that the various modes of reconciling two cultures are assimilation, acculturation, 
alternation, multiculturalism and fusion. The fusion model seems to lead to the 
development of a hybrid identity, formed by the blend of the two original identities into a 
third, different one. Hybridity has been mentioned by other researchers as a possible way 
of managing two identities, but it carries different significance depending on the study. For 
example, Dallaire and Denis (2005) suggest a different definition for hybridity, in which the 
individual acquires high competence and strong identification with both cultures. Other 
researchers call it “third place identities” (see Block, 2007, p.21). This notion is different 
from LaFromboise model of fusion, in that the two cultures are not mixed, but the 
individual moves across them at ease, because of his/her competence of the norms of both. #
Other notable studies in the literature on bicultural identity come for Benet-Martínez and 
her colleagues (2002, 2005) and suggest that bicultural identity integration is a two-
dimensional concept, incorporating the perceptions of distance or overlap between the two 
cultures on one dimension, and conflict - harmony on the other. Thus, an individual might 
find that the two cultures are very distant or that they overlap (pointing again to the 
process of fusion, or hybridity) or that they can be in conflict or in harmony. The scale 
developed by Benet-Martínez to test these concepts has been used extensively in the 
context of investigating bicultural identity. These two orthogonal dimensions form the 
basis for the Bicultural Identity Integration concept. This instrument assessed the 
proposed characteristics of bicultural individuals (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005) and 
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the results showed that the distance items were related to the age of the participants, years 
spent in China, Chinese language proficiency, separation, linguistic stress and cultural 
isolation, and negatively related with years spent in the US, US identity, bicultural 
competence and openness. The conflict items positively correlated only with indicators of 
stress and neuroticism. The authors argue that if the bicultural individual does not 
experience situations of conflict between the two identities, their two identities can blend 
into a hybrid identity. #
Santana (2004) investigated the relationship between the BII dimensions and psychological 
well-being (measured by situational coping and state-anxiety) and language use in a sample 
of bilingual Mexican Americans. Her results indicate that greater association with 
American culture, modest allegiance to the Mexican culture, being open to a potential mix 
of traditions and low levels of acculturative stress resulted in higher levels of blended-ness 
between the two cultures. She also found that the use of Spanglish was related to conflict, 
rather then fusion between the two cultures. The author argued that using Spanglish and 
code-switching for the second generation Mexican Americans might be a way of resolving 
conflicts between the two cultures (Santana, 2004). Other studies have investigated the 
notion of conflict between an individual’s two cultures and identities (Ward, 2008; Ward, 
Stuart & Kus, 2011), found support for the existence of this concept and provided 
substance for its understanding.#
A different theory was proposed by Herrmann and Brewer (2004). They argue that there 
are different ways to maintain the equilibrium between the multiple memberships in 
different groups. The three ways in which identities could relate to each other are: nested, 
cross-cutting and separate. The nested identities are conceived as “concentric circles or 
Russian Matruska dolls, one inside the next” (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004) or an onion’s 
layers (Risse, 2010). An example of this type of nested identity would be somebody who 
identifies first with their family, then their neighbourhood, then the city identity and so on. 
Consequently, each small group is part of a larger one and every member of the small group 
identifies with the larger group. Díez-Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) review the literature 
on nested identities and suggest that often they are incompatible; for example a regional 
identity is characterised by parochialism, while national or European identities can be seen 
as cosmopolitan. #
The cross-cutting model of balancing multiple identities suggests that some people from one 
group can be part of a different group, but not all members of the first group are to be 
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found in the second. To illustrate this model, we can think of national identity and religious 
identity, such that some women might be British and Muslim, while other British women 
might be Buddhist, or Christian, or atheists. But there are women who are not British and 
identify with these religious groups, thus religious identity can cross-cut national identity. 
The last model offered by Herrmann and Brewer (2004) argues that the multiple identities 
can also be separate, in the case when one group that a person belongs to has no members 
that are part of another group that s/he is a member of. For example, a person’s 
membership in the work group might not overlap at all with their membership in a leisure 
group, such as a choir. All the models presented here can have implications on the 
psychological well-being of a person. If the memberships in various groups are in conflict, 
they will have a negative impact on the individual’s well-being. However, the multiple 
identities can also be in harmony, if the person does not perceive them as conflictual, and 
thus they will not pose a threat to the individual’s psychological well-being. #
Risse (2010) adds another potential classification, which he considers less hierarchical to 
the one presented by Herrmann and Brewer (2004). It is called blended or the “marble cake” 
model (Risse, 2010, p. 25). This model argues that a local identity and a religious identity 
might be intertwined to such a degree that it would be almost impossible to look at them 
separately, similarly to the notion of hybridity or overlap described by Benet-Martínez 
(2005). Risse (2010) offers the example of a Rhinelander who “is often described as a 
particular type of comparatively tolerant and liberal Catholicism” (p. 25). In this case, the 
local and religious identities are so blended or woven together that they are very difficult to 
separate. Risse (2003) argues that this way of blending identities is relevant when 
considering the national and European identities and the relations that might develop 
between them. He argues that:#
Since EU membership interacts with rather different national 
identity constructions, the overall effect will not be homogenous 
leading to a generalised European identity. Rather, Europe and the 
EU become enmeshed with given national identities leading to 
rather diverging identity outcomes. This concerns, above all, the 
content and substance of what it means to identify with Europe. 
(Risse, 2003, p. 491)#
Grundy and Jamieson (2007) suggest that European identity might represent “a stepping 
stone in progress from divisive nationalism to an inclusive global citizenship” (p.664). They 
warn against oversimplification of the relations between various identities at an individual 
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level, arguing that the model might not be as simple as just nested identities or marble cake 
identities, but it may be a much more complex relation between local, regional, national, 
European and global identities.#
It seems that in the literature on multiple identities and biculturalism, there are some 
features that appear to be relevant to the relation between two groups that an individual is 
part of: one is the idea that the two can blend, fuse, overlap, nest or form a hybrid; while 
the other is that the two might be in conflict and thus have negative implications for the 
well-being of the individual. Benet-Martínez and her colleagues described the concept of 
“cultural frame-switching” (Hong, Chiu, Morris and Benet-Martínez, 2000), which suggests 
that the context is an important factor in the way biculturals respond to the same stimuli. 
They found that when priming participants with cultural icons specific to their two 
cultures, the biculturals will react in accordance to the norms and values of the particular 
culture they were primed with.Thus, another dimension worth exploring is the stability - 
fluidity dimension, which attempts to underline the importance of context for the 
development of the relation between two cultures, as opposed to a more essentialist view, 
which states that people are predetermined to have a certain type of identity, a fixed 
identity, which is not influenced by the environment they live in. #
Based on this literature, focus groups were conducted with first and second generation 
immigrants in Canada. Using these discussions and previous literature as starting points, a 
scale was developed, meant to address the three dimensions discussed above. The scale was 
tested empirically, and the exploratory factor analysis revealed that the most parsimonious 
solution was a five-dimensional model. A closer look at the resulting model suggests that it 
might represent a continuum of bicultural identity, in which individuals can find themselves 
at a point in time, but through which they can move from one dimension to another 
depending on the contextual and personal factors. #
The five factors identified to form the dimensions of the bicultural identity are: conflict (a 
perceived disagreement, incompatibility or even opposition between the two cultures), 
monocultural orientation (the desire to be part of only one of the two cultures), alternation 
(the adjustment of behaviours and attitudes depending on the context), compatibility 
(perceived accord and harmony between the two cultures) and hybridity (the blend of the 
two cultures to create one). These dimensions were inter-correlated, but their correlations 
with various other established scales indicated that the five concepts were separate 
dimensions. #
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The model was then tested using confirmatory factor analysis on two groups of 
participants: first and second generation Canadians. The structural equation models 
suggested that the model was valid and reliable for both groups of participants and that 
these models were equivalent (i.e., there were no structural difference between the two 
groups of participants). Later, some participants were selected from the confirmatory 
analysis stage and invited for interviews. These participants were selected based on their 
scores (either very high or very low) on each one of the five factors. Using this triangulation 
approach to understanding bicultural identity allowed the development and testing an 
instrument for bicultural identity, as well as the understanding of how participants 
perceived it (construct validity) and how well it reflected their sense of bicultural identity.#
Based on the statistical and content analysis, the five dimensions identified were deemed 
valid and relevant to the research on bicultural identity. The comparison of these five 
dimensions with well-being scales indicated that the first three (conflict, monocultural 
orientation and alternation) had a negative influence of the participants’ lives and 
psychological well-being, while the other two (compatibility and hybridity) were closely 
related to higher self-esteem and adjustment. The negative connotation of the alternation 
factor as well as its positive and significant relation to measures of essentialism might 
indicate that participants who identified stronger with the alternation factor kept their two 
identities separate because they believed them to be fixed and should not be altered, thus 
moving between the two cultures almost like flicking a switch. #
The five factors’ relation with linguistic variables was investigated. The results suggested 
that perceived competence in English had a significant negative correlation with both 
conflict and monoculture, and a positive correlation with compatibility and hybridity, 
indicating that the better their perceived English skills, the less conflict the participants 
felt between their two cultures and the less they desired to be part of only one culture. 
Perceived competence in one’s ability to communicate with the majority culture could 
prove beneficial in integrating faster and easier into this group, finding the aspects of the 
two cultures that were compatible and eventually developing a hybrid identity. Competence 
in the language of their other group was only correlated with alternation. This indicated 
that in order to be able to switch between the two cultures, the bicultural individual 
needed to have high perceived competence in their heritage language; speaking the 
language could play an important role in allowing them to be part of that group, when the 
situation required.#
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Figure 1. BIOS: the relations between the five dimensions (Comănaru & Noels, in preparation)#
When asked about their levels of anxiety in using English and their group’s language, 
participants indicated that high anxiety in both languages was strongly related to conflict. 
The ability to communicate has been related to perceived comfort in using the language 
and desire to communicate with members of the group. When the biculturals lacked 
confidence in their skills in their two languages, they also perceived a conflict between the 
two cultures. This could be an indicator that confidence in using both languages allows 
biculturals to negotiate their belongingness in the two groups. The other subscales all 
correlated with anxiety in communicating in English as follows: conflict, monocultural 
orientation and alternation showed a positive correlation, while compatibility and hybridity 
were negatively correlated to anxiety in English.#
For the purposes of the present study, the BIOS instrument was adapted to reflect the 
relation between the national and European identity for each one of the three contexts of 
study. Risse (2003) draws attention that his model of the “marble cake” has not been used 
to test empirically the relationship between the national and European identity and the 
present study aims to address this lack of empirical data. I hypothesise that a stronger 
European identity will be related to perceiving the two identities, national and European, 
as compatible and maybe even forming a hybrid identity or a “marble cake” identity. Risse 
(2010) distinguishes between the inclusive and exclusive nationalists, the first one 
characterising the people that internalise and identify both with their nation and with 
Europe, while the latter points to those who identify only with their national identity. This 
categorisation can be reflected in the BIOS scale: the inclusive nationalists might find their 
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two identities complementary or even forming a hybrid, while the exclusive nationalists 
would fall along the lines of the monocultural orientation dimension. The relations 
observed in the development of the BIOS instrument with the linguistic variables cannot 
be assessed in a similar way in the context of European identity, since there is no official or 
dominant language of Europe. Thus, these relationships will be investigated against 
variables relating to multilingualism, suggesting that the stronger the positive attitudes to 
multilingualism and the weaker the feelings of anxiety in communicating in a foreign 
language will be related to stronger feelings of compatibility between the national and 
European identity. The ways in which national and European identities are related will be 
discussed in a subsequent section (see § 1.4.3.1).#
As stated above, identities can be negotiated within an individual or within a group, thus 
leading to another important aspect of identity - individual and collective identity. The 
following section will review the current literature on these topics.# #
1.2.5. Individual and collective identity 
Mirroring the previous discussion on salience and centrality of an identity,  the distinction 
between the individual and the collective identity (Smith, 1992) is addressed next. An 
individual identity is the understanding that a person has of his or her identity, and it is 
characterised by its situational nature, thus changing depending on the context. For 
example, one can see his or her identity differently depending on whether they are in their 
home country or abroad. Others will potentially identify this individual differently 
depending on the context. An individual can identify and be identified as a Londoner when 
he is at home, but when he travels to Asia, his frame of reference might change to identify 
and/or be identified as an English, British or European person. Accordingly, the individual 
identity is situational and can easily be changed and influenced by the environment. As 
Risse (2010) argues, people are socialised into these identities, but they might or might not 
subscribe to them personally. So although a Londoner in Asia might be identified as 
European, he does not necessarily have to ascribe to this identity. Another possibility is 
that the Londoner might never feel European in his city, but when travelling through Asia, 
the European identity could surface. In this case, the context would influence the salience 
and even the centrality of the European identity. #
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On the other hand, collective identities are seen as more intense, durable, pervasive and 
persistent (Smith, 1992) and are characteristic of identities such as ethnic, gender, social 
class, religious and even national. Social identity theory argues that there is a continuum, 
ranging from inter-person to intergroup, from individual identity to collective identity. 
Thus, if the individual identity is easily malleable and changes depending on the context or 
situation, the collective identity finds itself at the other end of the continuum, denoting 
“those social identities that are based on large and potentially important group differences” 
(Kohli, 2000, p. 117), which are actually the basis for the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ worldview. 
Brewer (2001) also draws attention to the fact that there is a “distinction between social 
identity as identification with a collective and a collective identity as norms, values, and 
ideologies that such identification entails” (Brewer, 2001, p.119), thus establishing the 
connection between the collective and social identity. Edwards (2009) goes on to argue that 
the individual identities are “components and reflections of particular social (and cultural) 
ones” (p.20). This circular relation between the individual and collective identities marks 
their strong connectedness: the social identities are comprised of a multitude of individual 
identities and in turn influence their development and existence. #
Talking about European identity as a collective identity, Eder and Spohn (2005) say that 
“the more a human society is functionally differentiated, the more it needs a collective identity. The less 
it is, the less it needs a collective identity” (p.204 emphasis in the original). Consequently, since 
the European society is so diverse because of the many cultures, nations, languages, 
traditions, customs, histories and so on, it needs a collective identity to bind it together. 
The institutional support provided at the European level can foster the creation of a 
stronger collective European identity (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; Bruter, 2005 and others). 
Breakwell (2004) disagrees with this view and suggests that with the enlargement of the 
European Union, the differences between the groups are so dramatic that it would be 
impossible to create a coherent European identity without reducing it to “something bland 
or even vacuous” or an “unfinished category” (p. 35).#
European identity will be considered to be both an individual identity and a collective 
identity. A person can understand him/herself to be European on a personal level and on a 
collective level, and the two determine each other. In the latter case, both facets of 
collective identity will be part of the study - the identification with Europe and the 
European Union, as well as ascribing to the norms and values of Europe. #
Introduction  32
1.2.6. Social constructivist versus essentialist views on identity 
The perspectives on social identity presented so far suggest that identity is a malleable and 
evolving concept, that one’s identity is not stable throughout his/her life or in various 
contexts, but that it changes and evolves depending on the personal circumstances, as well 
as the context and the environment one finds him/herself in. This perspective is a social 
constructivist view on identity. At the other end of this continuum are the essentialist 
beliefs about identity, which state that identity is largely determined by biological factors 
(such as, race, ethnicity), that it is stable and unalterable, and that boundaries between 
races, ethnicities and even nationalities are inflexible, thus making the move between 
cultures extremely difficult. Although some studies have attempted to test these 
hypotheses (Chao, Chen, Roisman & Hong, 2007; No, Hong, Liao, Lee, Wood & Chao, 
2008), the foundation of the present study and many of the ones that precede it (see Block, 
2007), is that identity is a fluid concept and that people are active agents in the 
construction of their identities, which can also be influenced to a larger or lesser extent by 
the contextual cues. Throughout the lifespan of a person and within a particular group, 
identity is both stable - allowing one to have a sense of continuity in his/her identity - , but 
also changeable - permitting various aspects of identity to surface depending on the context 
and enabling one’s power to alter and mould it. #
This discussion is relevant to the topic of European identity, as it implies that people as 
individuals and as groups can negotiate a sense of Europeanness into their self-concept if 
they feel it is necessary, desirable or appropriate to do so. Of course, the institutions play a 
part in the negotiation, using symbols of the European Union to make the European 
identity salient (see § 1.4.3.6.1); but people are actually the agents who decide whether to 
accept and embrace it or reject it. There are many other factors that come into play in the 
construction of European identity and they will be discussed in the following chapters. 
This section attempted to show that European identity is a particular kind of social 
identity, one which can be voluntarily or involuntarily triggered by contextual factors and 
one that can be negotiated between and within individuals, leading to a more or less central 
role within a person’s self-concept. European identity can be perceived to be an identity at 
an individual level or at a collective one. In order to better understand the notion of 
Europeanness as a collective identity,  I will discuss the concept of ‘imagined 
communities’ (Anderson, 1991, 2006), which will be helpful in understanding the 
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mechanisms through which an individual connects to the group and extends characteristics 
of his/her identity to the group.#
1.2.7. Imagined communities and possible selves 
The idea of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006) is based on the fact that “members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their communion” (p. 6). Anderson 
suggests that this is the key to the formation of the nation-state, declaring that the basis of 
the nation-state concept is rooted in the development of printing technologies and thus 
the institutionalisation of a language over its vernacular variants. Through the 
advancements of the printing technology, one language becomes the language of power in a 
certain context. This development can then be used by the ones in power to create an 
imagined community and instil it in the minds of the others. Language is not only 
important in defining one’s relationship to the immediate group or community, but also in 
establishing an affiliation with a larger community, such as an ethnic group or a nation. The 
power of the printed word is best exemplified by its ability to bring together individual 
identities into a collective identity on a larger scale, where the individuals do not know 
each other personally and cannot establish rapport as such. The printed language though 
has the potential to unite these individuals into an imagined community to which they all 
feel a sense of belongingness and kinship. The standardisation of language through printing 
had significant effects on the communities formed around religion, and some suggest that 
was an important factor in the construction of national identity (Wright, 2o04, argues that 
language aided this development through the dissemination of religious doctrine and the 
standardisation of one variety of the language over the others).#
One could argue here that in the case of European identity the lack of a common language 
could hinder the development of a common identity. Risse (2010) suggests that on the 
contrary, not having a common language leads to the celebration of multilingualism, as 
evidenced by the motto of the European Union - “unity in diversity”. Various countries in 
Europe and in other parts of the world are multilingual, and this feature does not translate 
into a lack of national identity. The European identity, seen through the concepts of 
multiple and collective identity, and imagined community, could thus form around other 
linguistic variables, such as cosmopolitanism or multilingualism. #
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Multilingualism is quite widespread in the EU, with 54% of the EU citizens declaring that 
they can have a conversation in at least one other language than their native one (Special 
Eurobarometer 386, 2012). Another important statistic stipulates that 88% of EU citizens 
consider foreign language competence as being very useful, while an impressive 98% 
“consider mastering other foreign languages as useful for the future of their 
children” (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012, p.7). These statistics indicate that Europeans 
do hold multilingualism in a high regard (the Eurobarometers will be discussed in more 
detail in §1.4.3.2); this study will investigate whether positive attitudes to multilingualism 
foster the development of a stronger European identity.#
Could it be then that in order to promote the common European identity a common 
language is not needed, but rather the necessary condition encompasses positive attitudes 
to multilingualism? Risse’s (2010) notion of the cosmopolitan European identity would 
surely incorporate positive attitudes to multilingualism and to foreign languages in general, 
thus making it a possible precursor of European identity.#
The concept of imagined communities has been transferred into the realm of linguistics by 
Pavlenko and Norton (2007), in their study of the imagined communities of the language 
learners. They set out to discuss how nations influence the imagination of their citizens and 
how their membership in a group, be it an actual membership or a desired one, mediates 
learning English. Apart from Anderson’s concept of imagined communities, they also draw 
on the theory of “possible selves” put forth by Markus and Nurius (1986), which states that 
“possible selves represent individuals' ideas of what they might become, what they would 
like to become, and what they are afraid of becoming” (p. 954). #
Markus and Nurius (1986) describe the possible selves as interconnected to the past and 
present self, and an imaginable future self, carrying them within themselves at all times. 
Dörnyei (2005), following Higgins’ work (1987) incorporates these concepts into the field of 
linguistics in his Second Language Motivational Self System, which is a three-component 
model. The first component of the model is the “ideal L2 self ”, that is, the imagined future 
self who is a second language (L2) speaker; the second component is the “ought-to L2 self ”, 
encompassing the characteristics that one believes one should have in order to “meet 
expectations and avoid possible negative outcomes” (Dörnyei, 2009, p. 29, emphasis in the 
original); the last component is the “L2 learning experience”, which is comprised by the 
motives present in the L2 learning context. The possible selves imagined by the language 
learner can also be tracked by measuring their motivational intensity to study a foreign 
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language (Gardner, 1985) and their intention to continue their pursuit of a foreign language 
(Ryan & Connell, 1987). #
The imagined community proposed by Anderson (2006) has strong ties to the idea of 
possible and ideal selves described by Dörnyei (2009) in his model for foreign language 
learning, the former relating to an imagined collective identity, and the latter to an 
individual identity. Both these notions presuppose a similar way of envisioning one’s 
individual and collective identity, in the present and in the future. The member of a nation 
will bestow traits that s/he considers representative for a group to the entire community, 
although there is no way of knowing whether these characteristics are actually valid or not. 
Similarly, a language learner will construct a future version of him/herself as a potential 
ideal identity to be acquired. Both these concepts require the individual to take a leap of 
faith: in the case of national identity this leap will allow the individual to acquire an ideal 
collective identity, while in the case of the language learner, s/he will envisage an ideal 
future self on an individual level. #
These studies describe the role of the imagined community in constructing identity 
through language, be it the native or a foreign language. They point to the external factors 
and contextual influences that might affect the development of an identity, but also to the 
strength of the internal imagined vision an individual or a group can develop. The cross-
disciplinary expansion of the concept of imagined communities and imagined future selves 
support the validity of the concept. Based on these studies, Europe has the potential of 
becoming, if it has not yet become, an imagined community, on an aggregate level, as well 
as an ideal self, on an individual level. #
1.3. Language identity 
In its simplest form, language identity is the identity determined by the language (or 
languages) one speaks and the two, language and identity, are “ultimately 
inseparable” (Joseph, 2004, p.13). Dörnyei’s (2009) ideal L2 self described above can be 
understood as a future desired linguistic identity. Language can define a group and it can be 
the decisive factor in creating the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy. Linguistic identity can bring 
people together or it can separate them, it can be a catalyst for unity, but also a means of 
exclusion. When talking about a linguistic group, “the symbolism of language provides the 
most central rally-point (...) while permit[ing] a quick enumeration of in-group 
Introduction  36
members” (Edwards, 2009, p.16), thus providing a means of separation between the in-
group (the speakers of that language) and the out-group.#
Many have argued over time that people construct and negotiate their identities through 
language (Block, 2007; Pavlenko & Norton, 2004; Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004; Norton, 
2000; Heller, 1987 and others). This view suggests that language is not a mere “medium of 
communication, but it is understood with reference to its social meaning” (Norton, 2000, 
p. 5). Individual identities are constructed through language, while at the same time 
collective identities and imagined communities are shaped and negotiated using language. 
Language is not a mere vehicle of communicating messages, rather it carries the message 
within itself. The intricate relationship between identity and language suggests that they 
influence each other and evolve together, to a point where they are almost inseparable, 
from a conceptual perspective. Communities shape their language and language shapes a 
community. The case of bilinguals and multilinguals has been discussed quite frequently in 
various fields and the consensus is that a foreign language allows one to gain access to a new 
culture and to a new community (Gardner, 1985; Dewaele, 2008, 2010 and many others). 
Learning a new language can even bring about another identity to the myriad of multiple 
identities an individual possesses. #
Linguistic identity, or as Block (2007) refers to it, language identity, is one of the social 
identities that an individual (or a group) possesses, alongside his/her ethnic, racial, national, 
migrant, gender and social class identity (Block, 2007). This does not mean of course that 
each one of these identities is independent of the others; rather, they are linked and 
connected in overt and covert ways. Since identities are created, appropriated and 
negotiated through language, language identity is probably one of the most influential in 
the development of a person’s sense of selfhood. Block (2007) suggests that “language 
identity may be understood as the assumed and/or attributed relationship between one’s 
sense of self and a means of communication which might be known as a language, a dialect 
or a sociolect” (Block, 2007, p. 40). Citing work done by Rampton and his colleagues 
(1997), Block (2007) suggests that this relationship can take three forms: language expertise 
(or proficiency in that language), language affiliation (the attitudes towards that particular 
language and the emotional connection one feels with it), and language inheritance (being 
born into a particular linguistic community). These three concepts, together with a few 
other linguistic variables described below, will be used in the present study to provide a 
linguistic portrait of the participants. Background information regarding the place of birth 
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and place of residence (for the language inheritance) will be collected, as well as self-perceived 
competence in the participants’ L1 and all other languages (language expertise) and attitudes 
towards multilingualism (for a slightly adapted concept of language affiliation, which will be 
described in the following sections).#
1.3.1. Motivation and language attitudes 
The process of learning a foreign language has received a lot of attention in linguistics and 
psychology. Researchers have struggled to pinpoint the exact factors that lead to the 
successful acquisition of a foreign language. Four decades ago, Gardner and Lambert (1972) 
published an influential book on the attitudes and motivation of L2 learners. They 
identified two types of motivation: the instrumental and the integrative motivation. The 
first type, instrumental motivation, refers to the learner’s desire to acquire an L2 for practical 
reasons, such as a better job, class requirements etc. In this case, the language is perceived 
as an instrument in achieving another goal. The other type of motivation described by 
Gardner and Lambert (1972) is the integrative motivation, which alludes to the fact the a 
learner might want to acquire an L2 in order to be able to gain access to a new community 
and culture. To put this in Block’s (2007) terms, although they do not possess a specific 
language inheritance, the integrative motivation would point towards the desire to gain 
language expertise because of positive affiliation to a specific language. Gardner and 
Lambert (1972) argue, and many later studies confirmed it, that integratively oriented 
learners will have a better chance at acquiring proficiency in an L2 than instrumentally 
oriented learners. #
Another theory of motivation to study an L2 was adapted by Noels, Pelletier, Clément and 
Vallerand (2000; see also Noels, 2001; Comănaru & Noels, 2008) from Deci and Ryan’s 
(1985) Self-Determination Theory (SDT). Within the realms of L2 acquisition, the SDT 
stipulates that the more self-determined orientation one has towards learning an L2, the 
higher the chances of success in this pursuit. SDT suggests that motivation is an affective 
factor that can be found on a continuum of self-determination. This continuum has 
amotivation at one extreme (the total lack of desire to learn an L2); it is followed by external 
regulation (gain rewards, avoid punishments); introjected (alleviate internal pressures and/or 
guilt); identified (personally significant reasons); and integrated regulation (the action is 
consistent with other life goals); intrinsic motivation is at the other end of the continuum 
(for the personal enjoyment of the task). Thus, the motivation can vary depending on 
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external and internal factors, but it has been shown consistently that the learners who find 
themselves closer to the intrinsic side of the continuum of self-determination experience 
more positive outcomes. #
Gardner, Tremblay and Masgoret (1977) found that motivation referred to three underlying 
concepts: attitudes towards the L2, desire and motivational intensity to learn the L2. The 
latter factor has been used by other researchers to test the engagement in the L2 learning 
process (for example, Comănaru & Noels, 2008) and was found to be well predicted by 
more intrinsic and self-determined types of motivation. This concept of motivational 
intensity measures the commitment one has in pursuing another language. Regardless of 
whether their motivation is more instrumental or more integrative in nature, a strong 
motivational intensity can point to the importance L2 has for an individual. The scale and 
concept proposed by Gardner and his colleagues (1977) was adapted and used in this study 
as part of the set of linguistic variables, in order to test its relation to the identity variables. 
However, since our interest is not in a specific foreign language, but rather in foreign 
language learning as a general interest, the original scale was adapted to address this 
conceptualisation. #
Another variable used to predict the learner’s engagement in the process of language 
learning is intention to continue studying that language (Noels, Clément & Pelletier, 1999). As 
its name suggests, this concept measures the learner’s determination to carry on learning 
foreign languages and it is based on Gardner and his colleagues’ (1977) concept - the desire 
to learn a foreign language. This variable has also shown similar patterns of relation to the 
self-determined orientations for L2 learning as motivational intensity: in both cases, the 
more self-determined one’s orientation was, the higher the level of these two variables 
measuring the engagement with the language learning process (Comănaru & Noels, 2008; 
Noels et al., 1999 and others). For the purposes of this study, the original scale was adapted 
to measure the desire (or intention) to continue learning FLs, without pointing to a specific 
one.#
 Apart from motivational intensity and intention to continue studying FLs, another variable 
that can complete the linguistic preference profile of potential language learners is attitudes 
towards that language. Gardner and his colleagues (1977) suggested that these three 
concepts determine the learners’ strength of motivation. Later, Gardner (1985) provided the 
following definition for attitudes: “an evaluative reaction to some referent or attitude 
object, inferred on the basis of the individual beliefs or opinions about the referent” (p.9). 
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Nonetheless, the first studies by Gardner (1985; Gardner et al., 1977) refer to attitudes to a 
specific language, that is, French in the Canadian context. His theory on attitudes and 
motivation has been tested in many other international contexts (see Gardner, 2010 for a 
detailed description of these studies) showing consistently that positive attitudes, 
motivation and lack of anxiety towards the L2 are significantly related to successful 
acquisition of the desired language. The Attitude/Motivation Test Battery (Gardner, 1985) 
uses qualitative methods to tap at these concepts. The scale comprised 19 measures 
(Gardner, 1985b) which can be grouped into four indices: integrativeness, motivation, 
attitudes towards the learning situation and the attitude/motivation index. Although this 
scale has been used extensively and validated in many contexts, it does not address the 
aspect of linguistic attitudes that is of interest to the present study. #
Rather than being concerned with the attitudes learners have towards a specific language, a 
learning situation or a language group, this study aims to investigate attitudes towards 
multilingualism, in general. The language directives given by the European Union do not 
stipulate particular languages to be learned by all the EU citizens, rather they encourage 
multilingualism in more general terms. Carrying on from the discussion regarding 
motivational intensity and intention to continue studying FLs in general, it is more suitable 
to discuss attitudes towards bilingualism (following the view on the concept put forth by 
Baker, 1992) and even multilingualism, rather than Gardner’s concept of attitudes towards a 
specific language.#
Baker (1992) considers “the nature and attributes of attitudes to bilingualism as different 
from attitudes to a language” (p. 76) and argues for the organic nature rather than the 
separated-ness of two languages in the concept of bilingualism. Baker (1992) maintains that 
in the case of attitudes to two separate languages, the scale demands that the participant 
choose one or the other, or since they are presented as being in a balance, it is hard to 
assert positive attitudes to both languages. Continuing the discussions proposed by 
Grosjean (1985, 1989) and Cook (1992), Baker argues that the bilingual should not be viewed 
as two monolinguals in one, but rather that the two languages are in constant interaction, 
might serve different purposes and that quite often it is a case of additive bilingualism and 
biculturalism (Baker, 2011; Lambert, 1974). #
Thus, Baker (1992) developed and tested an instrument reflecting attitudes towards 
bilingualism in the Welsh context. His scale showed good reliability in the Welsh and 
international context, becoming one of the scales of choice when testing attitudes to 
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languages. In this study, multilingualism rather than bilingualism is of more interest. The 
reason for this lies again in the European Commission’s suggestions on foreign language 
learning. Around the same period of time when Baker was developing and testing his scale, 
the European Commission delivered the White Paper on Education and Training (1995), 
which stipulates that each EU citizen should be proficient in three community languages: #
[I]t is becoming necessary for everyone, irrespective of training and 
education routes chosen, to be able to acquire and keep up their 
ability to communicate in at least two Community languages in 
addition to their mother tongue. The Commission regrets the fact 
that the importance of this commitment was reduced, the Member 
States limiting its effect by using the words "if possible". (White 
Paper, 1995, p. 47)#
As indicated above, the European nations are not required in any way to dictate national 
legislation on FL learning, and this directive from the European Commission cannot count 
as anything else but a suggestion. Nonetheless, in some European states multilingualism is 
already entrenched in the national linguistic legislation, having two or even more official 
national or regional languages. The close proximity of various linguistic communities in 
Europe make it an interesting case study. For these reasons, the scale developed by Baker 
(1992) was adapted to reflect the participants’ attitudes to multilingualism, rather than 
bilingualism, defining multilingualism for the purposes of our study as the knowledge (as 
self-reported by the participants) of two or more languages. #
Baker’s scale (1992) has been previously adapted for other contexts. For example, 
Lasagabaster (2005) adapted and used it to test attitudes towards Basque, Spanish and 
English in the Basque context. He states that rather than “questioning the respondents 
about each of their three languages independently, in the traditional fashion, these three 
languages are put forward as a unit” (Lasagabaster, 2005, p. 26). Based on his work, 
Lasagabaster (2005) also advocates for a holistic view of multilingualism as a concept to be 
studied in the field of linguistics, stating that in his study, the different views can be 
separated based on the participants’ L1. When he juxtaposes these results with previous 
ones obtained from traditional attitudes questionnaires (i.e., asking participants about their 
attitudes towards a specific language), the comparison indicates that the concepts are quite 
different. Nonetheless, Lasagabaster (2005) suggests that this does not invalidate the results 
obtained from using a holistic approach to attitudes towards multilingualism, rather, it 
points out to the underlying theoretical difference. Given the three very different contexts 
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in which the present study is carried out (Belgium, Romania and the United Kingdom) and 
the directive of the European Commission which does not place a language above another 
within the European context, an adapted version of the scale developed by Baker (1992) will 
be used, in which the term “bilingualism” will be replaced with “multilingualism”. #
The terms “bilingualism” and “multilingualism” are sometimes used interchangeably in the 
literature, as in the case of them being used as antonyms to “monolingualism”; sometimes 
multilingualism is used to denote the knowledge of more than two languages. It is 
interesting to notice that in two different editions of his book on the “Foundation of 
bilingual education and bilingualism”, Baker revises some discussions on the “advantages of 
trilingualism” (Baker, 2006, p. 108) to the “advantages of multilingualism” (Baker, 2011, p. 
105). This passage follows in both cases an account of the study by Dewaele (2000) in 
which Dewaele describes his daughter's impressive acquisition of three first languages at a 
very young age. The term “attitudes towards multilingualism” will be used to represent the 
participants’ attitudes towards knowing more than one language, irrespective of number. #
Glaser (2005) introduces a new term to denote knowledge of more than one language, and 
that is “plurilingualism”, a term often encountered in official EU documents. She argues 
that plurilingualism helps us deconstruct cultural and linguistic barriers. Drawing from 
social psychology, she argues that different language groups regard each other in the “us” 
versus “them” paradigm. One possibility to move away from a mentality that can create 
conflicts between the linguistic and cultural groups, is to encourage communication 
through the learning and use of more languages. Glaser argues that knowledge of several 
languages will help Europeans see past the differences between them and even forge a 
European identity. #
1.3.2. Second language anxiety 
Foreign language (or second language) anxiety has been identified as playing an important 
role in acquiring competence and using an L2. When individuals use their native language 
and in familiar contexts, they are aware of the norms and expectations of most 
communicative situations they find themselves in and can adjust their identity accordingly. 
However, when they need to interact in an L2, people tend to experience anxiety to various 
degrees. Communicating in a language that is not one’s L1 can pose threats to one’s self-
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esteem. It might also make negotiating social interactions and presenting oneself in a 
positive light more difficult (Horwitz, Horwitz & Cope, 1986).#
MacIntyre and Gardner (1994) define language anxiety as “the feeling of tension and 
apprehension specifically associated with L2 contexts, including speaking, listening, and 
learning” (p.284). Dewaele (2010) points out that since research in the field of L2 anxiety 
started in the 1970s and it has evolved to distinguish between different types of L2 anxiety, 
which are trait, situation-specific or state anxiety (Dewaele, Petrides & Furnham, 2008; 
Dewaele, 2002; MacIntyre, 2007).#
Researchers have found that there are different types of anxiety related to the L2 context 
(for a detailed review, see Dewaele, 2010). Sometimes, people might experience anxiety 
because of the situation or the context in which they find themselves which can potentially 
be unfamiliar (as in the case of using an L2 in an environment where it is the language of 
the community - for example, a British tourist visiting France and attempting to interact 
with the local people in French). A situation-specific type of anxiety that has been studied 
extensively is Foreign Language Classroom Anxiety - in this case, high levels of anxiety have 
been found to be positively related to poor performance (Horwitz et al., 1986). The feelings 
of anxiety one might experience in their L2 can also be influenced by their personality - 
trait anxiety refers to individuals who might feel anxious in various situations and it is a 
characteristic of the individual (Dewaele, 2010). The last type of anxiety is called state 
anxiety and it refers to the fluctuating emotional reaction to a particular situation.#
Although these three types of anxiety are quite different, they can all have a disruptive 
effect on the communicative act. Thus, “second language communication entails risk taking 
and is necessarily problematic” (Horwitz et al., 1986, p. 128), potentially making the 
communicative situation quite unnerving for the L2 learner. In more extreme cases, the 
anxiety that arises in these situations can become an impediment in the further acquisition 
of that language. Many studies have shown that low levels of anxiety in using an L2 is one 
of the most significant predictors of successful L2 learning. #
1.3.3. Proficiency and frequency of use of L2 
Competence in a L2 or FL can be determined in different ways: observing an individual in 
linguistic interactions, obtaining his/her scores on a standardised language test or in a 
language class, or simply asking them to self-report their perceived competence in that 
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particular language. Since the emergence of the concept of competence, it has been studied 
from various angles, looking at linguistics competence (a Chomskyan approach), the 
communicative competence (coming from the field of ethnography and communication), as 
well as pragmatic competence (incorporating not only the grammatical knowledge of the 
language, but also the understanding and correct interpretations of the situational norms). 
Sometimes, language competence and language proficiency are used interchangeably in the 
literature, but as Llurda (2000) points out, they refer to different concepts; he argues that 
competence should be used as to refer to the Chomskyan understanding of the term, while 
language proficiency should refer to an individual’s “capacity to use language” (p.93). He goes 
on to define another term, the communicative proficiency, which Llurda (2000) argues refers 
to “both the knowledge of the world and the strategies necessary to apply language 
proficiency to contextualised situations” (p.93). Given this classification proposed by Llurda 
(2000), language proficiency will be used as the concept of interest in completing the 
linguistic profile of the participants in the study. #
The technique to ask participants to self-report their perceived proficiency in an L2 has 
been used in linguistics studies and it has consistently proven reliable in studies comparing 
self-assessment with language class marks. In order to determine the level of proficiency in 
various FLs, the participants will self-report their perceived skills in reading, writing, 
listening and speaking in the various languages which they master. Being aware of the fact 
that some of these languages might be less used than others and taking into account the 
fact that the frequency of use of a FL has been suggested to have a strong effect on 
proficiency (Dewaele, 2o1o), participants will also address the frequency with which they 
use each of these languages. These measures of proficiency and frequency of use will 
complement the previously described linguistic variables in order to provide a more 
complete linguistic portrait of the participants in the studies.#
Anxiety in using an L2, proficiency in various foreign languages and the frequency with 
which one uses these languages are good indicators of the communicative practices of 
Europeans. Europe provides space and a platform for interaction between the citizens of 
the European Union, but without the tools to engage in this interactions, the practices of 
the Europeans cannot be fully assessed. The concepts described in this section will provide 
a comprehensive picture of the potential and actual use of languages, as well as the 
attitudes towards one of the defining feature of the EU - multilingualism. The following 
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section will address the characteristics of the national and European identity, and will 
discuss the present linguistic milieu in Europe.#
1.4. National and European identity  
This section will present the concepts of national and European identity, as well as the 
relationship between them. I will discuss whether the concept of European identity is 
rooted in the concept of national identity, or whether they are fundamentally different. 
Some have argued that European identity is a form of transnational identity (Hermann, 
Risse & Brewer, 2004) - an identity that is carried across the borders of a nation. Others 
prefer to refer to it as a supranational identity, implying it is different and above the 
national identities, transcending them (Delanty, 2006); or post-national, suggesting that the 
moment European identity becomes reality, we move beyond the limitations of national 
identities (Delanty, 2006). All these terms have been used to describe and understand the 
identity created around the European Union, and the grounds for this will be discussed 
next.#
1.4.1. National identity 
National identity has been researched in different spheres for decades, if not centuries, and 
as our perception of it evolves, so does the concept. On a subjective level, it seems that it is 
rooted in the individual’s understanding of the relation s/he has with the country of origin 
or the country of residence. But research in the field of political science and sociology has 
dealt in depth with the features of national identity and its creation and emergence in the 
modern world. From the point of view of identity, national identity is part of the multiple 
identities which define an individual and with which s/he associates (see § 1.2.3). As Smith 
(1991) suggests, national identity is as concrete as gender, religious, local, regional or ethnic 
identity. #
In his book dedicated entirely to national identity, Smith (1991) argues that depending on 
the geographical location of a nation, there are different types of national identity. As 
Edwards (2009) points out, this is not a novel idea, but has been present in the political 
science literature for decades now. For example, Edwards (2009) discusses Kohn’s 
proposition that nationalism is a dichotomous concept: there is the Western nationalism, 
which is considered to be progressive and cosmopolitan, and there is the Eastern 
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nationalism, described as a type of nationalism that is culturally-based. Smith’s (1991) 
typology goes along the same lines of thought when he argues that in the Western world, 
the national identity that has emerged over time is civic identity. He says:#
Historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality 
of members, and common civic culture and ideology; these are the 
components of the standard, Western model of the nation. (p.11)#
He goes on to argue that the Eastern model of national identity (referring to countries in 
Eastern Europe and Asia) is based loosely on the emphasis on the native community in 
which one is born. In this model called the “ethnic” model of national identity, Smith (1991) 
suggests that the ties between the individuals are usually familial, and thus the members of 
the group share a common vernacular language, culture and mythology, thus making the 
nation primarily a “community of common descent” (p.12), created through the 
promulgation of these common elements. This differentiation between the civic and ethnic 
models of national identity seems to be based in different views on identity, such that the 
civic model appears as the social constructivist version of national identity, while the ethnic 
model takes an essentialist perspective. Smith (1991) goes on to argue that all nationalisms 
contain elements of both these models. Later, this definition was polished and more 
recently, Smith (2010) gives the following definition of national identity:#
The continuous reproduction and reinterpretation by the members 
of a national community of the pattern of symbols, values, myths, 
memories and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of 
nations, and the variable identification of individual members of that 
community with that heritage and its cultural elements (p.20).#
As he emphasises (Smith, 2010, p.20) it is noteworthy to understand this definition as 
working on two levels. The first level is concerned with the individual - collective identity 
dimension, while the second aims at the stability - flexibility of identity dimension. This 
definition also touches on the significance of negotiating an identity. The collective identity 
is constantly interpreted and reinterpreted at an individual level, but this interpretation 
takes place within the boundaries set up by the heritage of one particular nation, and Smith 
considers that they relate to that nation’s set of cultural elements. Edwards (2009) takes 
this idea further and suggests that the boundaries do not need to be physical borders: 
“What is essential for the continuation of a sense of group-ness is a continuation of a sense 
of distinctiveness that allows perceptual boundaries to be maintained” (p. 9, emphasis in 
the original).#
Introduction  46
According to Smith’s (1991) classification, Romania would be governed by an ethnic type of 
national identity, based around folklore, myths and vernaculars, while the United Kingdom 
and Belgium would fall under the civic national identities. Edwards (2009) provides a link 
between the two types of nationalism, saying that nationalism can be “broadly 
understandable as an extension of ethnicity” (p. 163). This understanding of the relation 
between nationalism and ethnicity, and more specifically, civic and ethnic nationalism, 
places them on unequal statuses, marking civic nationalism as the more advanced type, 
potentially having emerged from ethnic nationalism. Edwards (2009) also maintains that 
the concept and reality of nationalism materialised as a product of the French revolution in 
combination with the European romantic period. This suggests that although the ethnic 
nationalism could have been present in the European societies for a long time, the civic 
nationalism is a recent phenomenon and possibly a progressive development of the former. 
Wright (2004) explains how France was a very linguistically diverse territory, but after the 
French revolution “it became a patriotic and revolutionary duty for citizens to learn and 
use French” (p.31). Thus, the French revolution marks the emergence of the relationship 
between nationalism (or patriotism) and language.#
This study is guided by the assumption that although the understanding and attachment to 
national identity might be different in each country, they are not fundamentally different as 
to require various models of investigating the research questions. The distinction between 
the two types of nationalism or national identity can be found in Bruter’s (2005) 
classification of European identity as civic identity and cultural identity (see § 1.4.3.6.1). 
The present discussion on the forms of national identity was indeed essential for a better 
understanding of the European identity, its components and its relation to national 
identity.#
For Smith (1991), language is not a vital element in the formation of national identity. He 
mentions the importance of vernacular languages for the ethnic national identity, but he 
seems to imply that these vernaculars would foster a sense of connectedness to the 
immediate family or group, which in turn would create the basis for the emergence of the 
ethnic national identity. Smith argues that language might play a significant role in societies 
outside of Europe, and that sometimes there are other consequential factors, such as 
religion, which play an important role in the formation of national identity. Another point, 
made by Risse (2010) is that Smith portrays national identity as a stable identity, grounded 
in the historical, mythical and mnemonic ties of the members of the collective group. 
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Although people renegotiate these ties constantly, they are still stable elements which lead 
to a stable, constant type of national identity. #
Other researchers have put forth their vision and understanding of national identity. 
Anderson (1991), for example, described the nation as an “imagined community” (as 
discussed in § 1.2.7). It is in a way a leap of faith, through which one builds a sense of 
belonging to a community. National identity is based on such characteristics. Members of a 
nation tend to perceive it as a cohesive body, and attribute traits to all its members based 
on their mere affiliation with that particular nation. Risse (2010) argues that even in the 
case of an imagined community, the members of that community have to perceive the 
“psychological existence” of it as real, a trait that has been called entitativity in social 
psychology (Campbell, 1958, as cited in Risse, 2010). Caporaso and Kim (2009) define this 
trait as the degree of coherence of the group. Thus, combining these notions put forth by 
Anderson and Risse, the nation and one’s identification with it can be understood as the 
non-fictional, tangible and real feeling of belonging to a community that must be imagined 
because of the impossibility of knowing directly all the members that belong to it. It could 
be argued that accepting this national identity is taking a leap of faith and agreeing to 
identify with a community (and potentially traits of it) that is not entirely known to the 
individual member, but which s/he embraces as his/her own. #
Deviating from Smith’s (1991) understanding on national identity, Block (2007) argues that 
“national identity is not fixed at birth and tied to one’s birthplace; rather, it is an ongoing 
project, recreated daily via actions such as flag waving and the invocation of historical 
events” (p. 32), making it clear that his view on national identity is social constructivist, 
rather than an essentialist one (see § 1.2.6). He also argues that the members of a nation 
show their affiliation to that nation through their discourse, rendering thus their identity as 
subjective and changeable, and tying national identity to language in an indisputable way. 
Wodak and her colleagues (2008) reach a similar conclusion in their study of the 
construction of national identity through discourse in the Austrian context. Interestingly, 
they note that the participants in the study often mentioned language as a differentiating 
factor between immigrant and non-immigrant Austrians, insisting on the specific character 
of Austrian German. The authors propose however, that although on a discursive level, the 
respondents declared language to be “an essential component of Austrianness (...) there was 
hardly any awareness of an independent standard variety of the pluri-national language 
German” (Wodak et al., 2008, p. 193). Thus, although they considered language as essential 
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in the construction of their national identity, the language they used was not necessarily 
specific to their national space. #
Language seems to be an important factor in the construction of national identities, or at 
least it is perceived as being central to defining one’s identity, even in cases when the 
language transcends the national borders. There are also many nations in the world, and 
some European ones as well, that have managed to build a national identity on more than 
one language. Other factors that are significant in the construction of national identity are 
historical or geographical in nature, as well as cultural and sociological - sharing a common 
history, a mythology, customs and traditions, a political system and others, all to various 
degrees, depending on the nation. The next section introduces a new concept - the 
transnational identity. #
1.4.2. Transnational identity 
The concept of transnationalism is attributed to Bourne (1916), who in his essay entitled 
“Trans-national America” argues against the development of America as a melting pot, and 
in favour of the idea of transnationalism. He argues that it is wrong to fight against the 
hyphenates (referring to the new immigrants to America), as this fight might agitate their 
patriotism towards their spiritual country (that is, their country of origin). In the same 
essay, Bourne (1916) describes the advantages of a cosmopolitan nation, and of the 
international national character that America can come to embody. #
Over the last century however, concepts like cosmopolitanism and transnationalism have 
taken many routes, but in the sphere of social sciences they came to be associated more 
with Europe than with America. From a political point of view, any individual who holds 
more than one citizenship, can be seen as a transnational; another example is the 
immigrant (legal or illegal) who moves beyond the borders of his/her country of origin, or 
the child born in a mixed ethnic family. Additionally, as will be discussed in this section, an 
individual can perceive their identity as transnational once s/he does not identify solely 
with one national or regional identity, but his/her identity transcends the geographical state 
borders. #
In the field of social psychology, the notion of transnationalism can be paralleled to 
concepts such as the “universalist self ” (Boski, 2008), “integrated biculturalism” (Roccas & 
Brewer, 2002) or “constructive marginality” (Bennet & Bennett, 2004). Citing Sussman, 
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Roccas and Brewer (2002) argue that integrative biculturalism is “an identity in which the 
individuals define themselves as world citizens” (p.93), distancing themselves from their 
original culture, as well as the host culture. The constructive marginal individuals are said 
to be able to “move easily in and out of cultural contexts” (Bennett & Bennett, 2004, p. 
157). All these concepts have at their core the fact the individuals they represent are not 
bound to one identity, cultural group, or nation, but rather they flow between two or more 
groups, maybe identifying with some elements or maybe just adapting to them to an extend 
that allows them to be functional members of the group(s). Thus, a transnational identity is 
a type of identity that is a step closer to an individual describing his/her identity as a “world 
citizen”, or on a slightly smaller scale, European. #
The European project is unique in its way of trying to bring together countries which vary 
from a political, cultural, historical and economical point of view. In order to develop a 
stronger sense of a transnational identity, the individuals need to be open to the idea of the 
Europeanisation of their nation. Risse and his colleagues (2001) define Europeanisation as 
“the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance” (Risse, Cowles & Caporaso, 2001, p.3) and they argue that this process wears 
away gradually the national sovereignty, but without weakening the state. Thus, the 
Europeanisation of the national identities is based on a steady transformation of the 
understanding of the national identity from a European perspective. Risse and his 
colleagues (2001) suggest that this process takes various forms depending on the 
understanding of nationalism and national identity of each state, making thus the process 
of Europeanisation quite diverse depending on the nation. The transnational identities 
become stronger not by undermining the national identities, but by incorporating the 
Europeanisation elements into them. The motto of the European Union, “unity in 
diversity” seems to fit effortlessly with this understanding of the formation of transnational 
identity through Europeanisation. Without renouncing the national identity, a European 
individual can mould his/her identity to incorporate the European element. This element in 
turn will lead to a Europeanised national identity, that is, a transnational identity, and 
potentially to a European identity. In the next section, the relations between European and 
national identity will be discussed, as well as whether the European identity should be 
viewed as a supranational identity (formed in the basis and principles of national identity) 
or a different type of collective identity altogether. #
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The conceptualisation of transnational identities has also met some criticism in the 
literature. Breakwell (2004) argues that it is almost impossible to develop a sense of 
transnational identity as European identity mainly because of the lack of definition and 
common understanding of identity at the European level. She argues that the various ways 
in which people will internalise this identity reduce its possibility of becoming a common 
identity for the European citizens, even if people will self-categorise as Europeans (p.38). #
As discussed above, Risse and his colleagues (2001) agree that various understandings of 
national identities will lead to different conceptualisations of Europeanisation, but they do 
not consider this diversity of understandings to be a hinderance in the development of 
European identity. They maintain that the pressure to adapt will be greater if the 
understanding of national identity is further from that of European identity. 
Europeanisation, they suggest, was accompanied by a process of domestic change in the 
nuances of each national context (p. 1). Börzel and Risse (2003) suggest that there are 
different routes that a nation can take to overcome the pressure for adaptation and arrive 
at a suitable domestic change at an institutional and state level (p.69). Depending on the 
degree of domestic change required by the Europeanisation process, a nation can go 
through transformation (drastic change), accommodation (modest change) and absorption 
(low change). Thus, Börzel and Risse (2003) propose that depending on the width of the 
differences between the national and European institutions and thus representation at a 
structural level, a nation-state would have to adapt with various intensity to the demands of 
the Europeanisation. #
Consequently, Breakwell’s critique presents a valid point, arguing that it is difficult to form 
a common identity if the members of that particular group have a different understanding 
of what that identity means to them, at an individual and collective level. However, 
accepting this theory can have implications on any collective or group identity. If the 
diverse national identities that Europeans possess lead them to develop a different 
awareness of their European identity, a similar case can be made for any other kind of 
identity, as it is impossible to prove empirically that individuals have the exact 
understanding of their national identity. For each one of them, the national or transnational 
or European identity might have a different meaning based on their experiences and 
personal choices or preferences. Nonetheless, this deterministic stance will not be useful in 
furthering the understanding of national or European identity from an empirical 
perspective. #
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The emergence of Europeanised transnational identities is evident at the level of 
communication in the European public spheres, argues Risse (2010). Rather than 
considering the lack of a common language an impediment, he argues that the public 
spheres have become in recent decades the facilitator of the creation of transnational 
identities and need to be understood from a social constructivist perspective (rather than 
an essentialist one), such that they are not necessarily actual spaces to be used and 
discovered, but they are common themes and issues debated in public, regardless of the 
level (local, regional or national). These transnational public spheres are constantly 
constructed and negotiated by the people involved in the communication process, and 
through this process, the continuous interaction in a transnational space gives form to the 
transnational identities; they, in turn, help to reinforce the transnational public sphere 
(Risse, 2010, p. 126). The characteristics of this European transnational community of 
communication are that: #
(a) European or other national speakers regularly participate in 
cross-border debates, (b) speakers and listeners recognise each other 
as legitimate participants in transnational discourses that (c) frame 
the particular issues as common European problems. (p.126)#
These features presented by Risse (2010) as fundamental for the creation and maintenance 
of transnational public spheres reiterate the intrinsic relation they have with the 
transnational identities. As discussed earlier with regards to identity and language, the two 
are used to reinforce, recreate, construct and negotiate each other. Similarly, transnational 
public spheres and identities are intertwined to the degree that they define and construct 
each other. The social constructivist perspective thus permits an understanding of the 
identity and the public sphere as a reflection of each other. Risse (2010) suggests that based 
on the characteristics named above which shape the transnational public spheres and 
identities, there are different degrees of Europeanisation. Again, this notion resonates with 
the discussion above, suggesting that depending on the understanding of national identity, 
the transnational identities and thus, European identities might take various forms. #
1.4.3. European identity 
In the previous sections, I have touched upon some aspects of European identity. This 
section aims to bring all those discussions together and to elucidate the nuances that the 
concept of European identity will take in the present study. Initially, I will present a brief 
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historical background of the EU and give a short account of the situation today, making use 
of the public opinion surveys, the Eurobarometers; I will discuss the relation between the 
geographical space and the European Union; I will then elaborate on the meanings of 
European identity and the prototypical European. The next subsection will cover the 
relation between European identity and national identity; I will then present the different 
subcategories European identity has been posited to have, with an emphasis on one of the 
very few empirical studies looking at the components of European identity; I will discuss 
the potential new understandings of European identity in the context of the European 
crisis and argue that although there are signs that the European Union and the European 
identity cannot stand up to these challenges, some researchers suggest that a closer union 
and a stronger European identity can potentially assist in overcoming the crisis and 
strengthening the European Union. I will end this section with a brief description of 
previous work done on the relation between multilingualism and European identity.#
1.4.3.1. European Union - historical background and the state of affairs today 
The beginnings of the European Union and of the formation of European identity can be 
traced back to post-World War II Europe. After the devastating effects of the war, the 
leaders of the European countries understood that in order to protect themselves and 
prevent another conflict of such proportions, they needed to cooperate economically and 
politically. The first attempt to bring the European countries together was the creation in 
1949 of the Council of Europe. The Statute of the Council of Europe was signed in the first 
instance by 10 countries, but it now counts 47 member states. Although it shares some 
symbols with the European Union, the Council of Europe is an entirely different 
organisation. In its 1949 statute, the first article reads:#
The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity 
between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising 
the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and 
facilitating their economic and social progress. (Chapter I, Article 
1a, The Statute of the Council of Europe)#
Notably, all the states that join the Council of Europe accept the principles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, the Council, although a separate entity 
from the European Union, works together with it and other European institutions to 
support human rights and prevent conflicts between its member states.#
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Apart from the Council of Europe, after WWII there was a need to ensure that the 
European states can monitor each other and verify that none of them are building 
armaments that could start another armed conflict. In 1950, the French foreign minister 
Robert Schuman proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in order to promote economic development and avoid further conflicts between 
France and Germany, two of the European nations which have traditionally been 
opponents. The Declaration posits that the common economic and material interests will 
lead to the development of stronger ties between France and Germany and any other states 
that might decide to join them. #
The establishment of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take 
part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of 
industrial production on the same terms, would lay a true foundation for their economic 
unification:#
This production will be offered to the world as a whole without 
distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising 
living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements (...) this 
proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation 
of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace. 
(The Schuman Declaration)#
The declaration proposed by France and signed also by West Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg on 9 May 1950 is regarded as the first official 
document of the union of countries that later became the European Union. Although the 
declaration clearly stipulates the fact that it is a union based on economic interests which 
determines its signatories to make every effort to maintain peace, it contains some passages 
that are intriguingly prophetic:#
World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative 
efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it (...) Europe 
will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be 
built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto 
solidarity. (The Schuman Declaration)#
Talking about world peace and the making of Europe reveals the visionary spirit that 
Schuman put into this declaration. The mention of the “de facto solidarity” might be one of 
the earliest indicators of the need for the development of a European identity. This excerpt 
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of the declaration suggests that solidarity between the people of Europe will lead to more 
tangible results, which in turn will “make Europe”. #
Other treaties have taken this vision further and built upon the ECSC precedent. In 1957, 
the signatories of the ECSC, signed another agreement, the Treaty of Rome, also known as 
the “Treaty establishing the European Economic Community”. Through this treaty, the 
original member states agreed to facilitate a common European market, common policies 
regarding agriculture, transport and social issues, as well as to establish the European 
Commission. As Burgess (2002) maintains, the Treaty of Rome “begins not from de facto 
division, but from presumed unity” between the signatory states. Although these countries 
have already had a history of armed conflict at the time of the treaty, its formulation 
maintains the unity, rather than the diversity between the signatory states. Burgess (2002) 
also argues that the language of this treaty suggests a unity of Europe, rather than just the 
six member states that signed the original treaty, while also underlining the European 
solidarity, which he argues is not used in economic sense, but as a “transcendental 
European solidarity that ‘binds’ Europe in the global community” (Burgess, 2002, p. 478, 
quotation marks in the original). Consequently, by this point the signatory states were 
already aware of the importance of solidarity between the member states (and possibly 
other European countries), as well as valued the unity between them without undermining 
the diversity. These initial formulations form the basis of the current understanding of the 
relation between the European states and set the stage for the future treaties that will 
formalise these relations.#
A few decades later, the Treaty of Rome underwent some revisions and in 1993 was put 
forth as the Maastricht Treaty, which marked the creation of the European Union. It also 
established the common currency, the euro, and various elements of political unity, such as 
the European citizenship, as well as European-level guidelines for common foreign and 
internal affairs policies. This treaty is the first one to ensure the cultural sovereignty of all 
of the European Union member states (Wright, 2004, p. 127). Following treaties signed in 
Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon have provided various amendments to the Maastricht Treaty, 
but the birth of the European Union as it is today was decided in Maastricht. By that time, 
the European continent was again in turmoil, with the unification of Germany and the 
emergences from under Communist rule of the Eastern European countries. In 1995 the 
European Union already comprised of 15 member states, and in 2004 another 8 countries 
from the Central and Eastern bloc joined the Union, together with Cyprus and Malta, 
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finally marking the expansion of the EU eastwards. The final waves of expansion came in 
2007, with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, and in 2013 with Croatia joining the EU. #
It is worth nothing here that in 1973, the nine member states of the European Commission 
at that time, have drawn up and signed a Declaration on the European Identity with the 
purpose to “affirm their determination to introduce the concept of European identity into 
their common foreign relations” (Declaration on European Identity). The document posits 
that defining the European identity rests on three main concepts: #
1. The unity of the Nine member countries of the community 
(reviewing here the common heritage, interests and obligations); #
2. The European identity in relation to the world (specifying that the 
unity between the member states is not designed to gain power or go 
against any other country, but rather to provide a balance point in 
international affairs); and #
3. The dynamic nature of the construction of a Unified Europe 
(Declaration on European Identity). #
The concept of a unified Europe seems to be taking shape at this point, and with it, the 
importance of constructing and defining the European identity. Although this declaration 
was only signed by nine countries and did not progress any further than that, the concepts 
of European identity were for the first time made clear and recognised as an important 
factor for the development of the unified Europe. The next treaty to mention European 
identity is the Maastricht Treaty, and as Burgess (2002) points out, this time the concept of 
European identity shows up under the discourse on common security and foreign policy. 
Burgess (2002) seems to decry such brief mention of the European identity:#
Maastricht reduces the concept of identity in the best case to a basis 
for international diplomacy or, in the worst case, to a quasi-
militarised kernel, a celestial fix from which to navigate a defence 
policy in an increasingly complex global battlefield. (p. 479)#
Burgess (2002) argues that the reason we can reflect on and grasp the concept of European 
identity is because Europe and the European Union are not one and the same thing; if they 
were identical, it would be inconceivable to define degrees of European identification or 
formulate the otherness vis-a-vis European-ness. This philosophical argument for the 
existence and justification of the European identity does not rely at all on notions of 
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national identity. Other scholars have attempted to define European identity in relation to 
national identity, as well as other, more tangible European symbols (see § 1.4.3.5).#
Today, the European Union gathers together 28 member states and more than 500 million 
people. The European Union project brought together these European countries in a 
political and economic entity, governed by a number of institutions, which can be grouped 
into executive, legislative and judiciary branches, as well as the financial branch. These 
bodies and institutions are comprised of representatives of the member states, some 
elected, others appointed. The capital of the European Union is in Brussels, where many of 
headquarters of these institutions are located. Depending on various factors, such as the 
economic and political situation, some of the member states of the European Union have 
joined the eurozone, renouncing their currency and adopting the euro. The European 
Union operates as a single market, ensuring the free circulation of goods, capital, services 
and people. The Schengen area is comprised of 22 members states of the European Union 
(and 4 others which are not EU members) and represents the agreement on open borders 
and the abolition of passport controls within its borders. The European Union has its own 
flag, anthem, day and motto. With some restrictions, the citizens of the European Union 
are free to travel, study, work or live anywhere in the European Union. In 2012, the 
European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in the maintenance of peaceful 
relations between the European countries and in the promotion of democracy and human 
rights in Europe. #
It is also important to note here that the European Union recognises as official languages 
all the languages of its member states, bringing the number of EU official languages to 24. 
This means that for the European Union, all languages and their speakers are seen as 
equals. The EU has also made provisions for the protection and maintenance of the 
minority and regional languages. Although the EU cannot impose any regulations at the 
national level, the Commission for Multilingualism supports language learning and 
language diversity in all member states, recommending that all European citizens should be 
able to communicate in their mother tongue and two other European languages. This 
recommendation came in 1995, under the French presidency of the European Union, and 
some have suggested that it was designed in such a way as to promote the learning of other 
former lingue franche of Europe (mainly, French) apart from English (Wright, 2004; 
Mamadouh, 2002). #
Introduction  57
The debate on whether the European Union should adopt a common language has proven 
to be a very complex one, eliciting heated reactions on both sides. Some have argued that 
the European Union should adopt a common language and promote the learning of that 
language as a lingua franca at a European level. Those who have argued against this point 
suggested that such an action would place the native speakers of that language at a clear 
advantage on the European job market, or in any interactions with other Europeans (see 
Van Parijs, 2011). Wright (2004) enumerates some of the advantages that native speakers of 
a lingua franca have: they do not have to struggle to acquire it in order to be able to 
participate in multilingual contexts; “their society is economically advantaged as it has no 
translation, no interpretation, no acquisition costs” (p.127); they also have a political 
advantage as they do not have to deal with any communication barriers; and, ultimately, 
their language gains the prestige, which will lead to the “tacit acceptance of the 
dominance” of the group speaking it as a mother tongue (Wright, 2004, p.127). It is thus 
self-evident that a supranational institution like the European Union could not easily agree 
on a single lingua franca to be used within its institutions and in communications with the 
European citizens, and impose it on them. #
There is a matter that requires clarification at this point: the practices, recommendations 
and policies of the European Union at an institutional level, and the practices that might 
occur in an ordinary interaction between European citizens. In the former case, the EU 
needs to maintain a respectful position towards all European member states and that 
implies holding their languages in the same regard. The latter, the interactions between 
European citizens, whether in an official capacity or just personal contact, will always resort 
to the easiest communicative practice, that is, using a language that is known to both 
interlocutors at least to some extent. #
In order to avoid issues of linguistic injustice, Wright (2004) suggests three solutions: social 
bilingualism (impossible at the European level), artificial languages (Esperanto never 
gathered enough support) and machine translations (an interesting solution, but not yet 
achievable). The three proposed solutions to fight linguistic injustice are discarded one by 
one, and Wright (2004) concludes that the optimal solution would be the adoption of a 
lingua franca. As discussed above, this solution is considered unjust. Therefore, the 
European Union and its institutions have come up with another solution to reduce the cost 
and difficulty of translations: if a document is elaborated in one of the lesser known 
languages of the European Union, it is first translated into the pivotal languages (English, 
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French and German) and these translations are used for translations into all the other 
languages. Thus, the difficulty of finding translators for the less used combinations of 
languages (such as Romanian to Maltese, or Estonian to Bulgarian) is bypassed (Speaking in 
Europe, 2008). #
The critics of this strategy argue that after all, the pivotal languages act like lingue franche 
of the European Union, but others disagree with this assessment, saying that it is just a way 
of easing the work and a cost of the translations. Critics of the 24-official-languages-policy 
of the EU have also argued against the high cost of the translations and interpretations 
required at the European level for the smooth functioning of the various institutions and 
for the translation of all documents elaborated at the EU level in the 24 official languages. 
A document released by the European Union in 2008, ‘Speaking in Europe - Languages in 
the European Union’, calculates that the cost of the yearly translations required at the 
European Union level at 2.20 euros per European citizen per year (Gazzola & Grin, 2012), a 
cost which is considered negligible if it represents the equality of the European languages. #
Many have dealt with the European Union multilingualism issue and tried to find the best 
option for the EU and for its relationship with its citizens (Wright, 2004; Grin, 2008; 
Kraus, 2008). Kraus (2008) suggests that the language issue at the EU level needs to 
address two goals: to develop the communicative basis of the European integration and to 
maintain the language diversity. He proposes various strategies, each with their own 
advantages and disadvantages: the adoption of a marginal European language with few ties 
to other European languages, Latin, an artificial language (possibly Esperanto), Europanto 
(a language created by Diego Marani, a translator for the EU and novelist), and lastly 
English. Kraus (2008) discusses the various issues which the latter option would bring 
about and concludes that a feasible solution is the support for “converging multilingualism 
(...) a model which, in creating shared contexts of communication, attempts to find a 
necessarily precarious balance between pragmatism and respect for diversity” (p. 176). He 
rejects the demonising of English or any other lingua franca, which serve an important 
communicative purpose at the European level (both personal and institutional), but that 
should not preclude us from preserving the linguistic diversity of Europe and supporting 
learning of languages other than English. Kraus (2008) draws attention to the potential 
diglossic situation that might arise from this model, which many times also indicates a 
societal hierarchy and potential schism - English could become the language of the elite, 
education, finances, institutions and so on, while the other European languages would 
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maintain an identity and personal communication function. Nonetheless, converging 
multilingualism can be a viable option against a European diglossic scenario. Kraus (2008) 
suggests that within the European Union, countries could form clusters based on linguistic 
affinities, mutual understanding and passive bilingualism, such that there would be a Latin 
cluster, a Teutonic one, a Scandinavian one and so on. This will encourage communication 
between Europeans. Evidently, learning a language from a different cluster than one’s 
mother tongue would increase the communication potential between the citizens of 
Europe.#
Grin (2008) provides a review of the different policy regimes that can be chosen for the 
official and working languages (OWL) of the European Union. He suggests that each one of 
them has advantages and drawbacks, depending on whether the point of interest is fairness, 
efficiency, speed or accuracy. The regimes he describes are: monarchic (English as OWL); 
synarchic (Esperanto or any other non-European language as OWL); oligarchic (English, 
German and French - OWL); panarchic (all languages are OWLs); hegemonic (all languages 
are official, but English is used as a pivot language); technocratic (all are official languages, 
but Esperanto or another artificial language is used as a pivot language); and lastly, triple 
symmetrical relay (all are official languages, and three are pivotal languages used for 
translation and interpretation) (p. 77-78). Grin (2008) is keen to mention that these are the 
options available on a policy level, and although some might seem more cost effective or 
fair than others, they are laid out as possibilities and not recommendations. #
The relevant argument in choosing one of the options over another needs to take into 
account issues of linguistic justice and fairness, as well as convenience and feasibility. Some 
calculations reveal that the cost of any of the seven regimes does not even come close to 
the heights sometimes described in the media (Grin, 2008). Although officially, the regime 
that is currently embraced by the European Union is the panarchic one, there is evidence 
that in practice, even at the institutional level, the participants in a communication act 
choose various strategies to facilitate dialogue or to make a statement (Wodak, 
Krzyżanowski, Forchtner, 2012). As Wodak and her colleagues argue when discussing the 
linguistic practices of the EU officials (2012), it is not just a matter of multilingual versus 
monolingual practices, but there are a multitude of linguistic practices, depending on the 
topic, context and genre of the exchange. #
At an official policy level, the European Union adopts a policy of fairness and justice 
towards all the official languages of the member states, proving translation and 
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interpretation for all possible combinations. Since in the European Parliament, documents 
need to be translated fast and accurately even in preliminary forms, a system of six pivotal 
languages has been implemented: English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Polish 
(Grindheim & Lohndal, 2008). This system makes the translation process faster and more 
efficient, however, it can be regarded as unjust by the native speakers of the other European 
official languages. For this reason, the final documents are translated and made available to 
the European public in all the 24 languages. There is also evidence that at the 
conversational or debate level, the EU officials use their multilingualism as an asset to 
facilitate easy communication (Wodak et al., 2012). The issues discussed here present the 
official stance of the European Union with regards to multilingualism and language use 
within the European institutions, and the actual practices of the EU officials. The following 
section will present the opinions of the European citizens with regards to languages and 
multilingualism, as revealed by Eurobarometers. #
1.4.3.2. Eurobarometers on languages in Europe 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the European Commission has been ordering at regular 
time intervals public opinion surveys to investigate scientifically the views held by the 
Europeans on certain topics or proposed changes within the Union (Kraus, 2008). In 2012, 
a Special Eurobarometer was commissioned to explore the Europeans’ views on languages. 
The results include for the first time the two new member states, Romania and Bulgaria. 
The report (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012) specifies that the Commission has a 
threefold agenda with regards to multilingualism in Europe: develop and emphasise the role 
of multilingualism in the European economy, motivate Europeans to improve their 
knowledge of languages in order to stimulate communication, and making the necessary 
provisions for all Europeans to be able to access the EU legislation, procedures and 
information in their own language. #
The results of this large scale survey suggests that overall, Europeans have a very positive 
view on multilingualism. An impressive percentage of the respondents (84%) agree that 
everyone should be able to speak an FL, while 72% lend their support to the 
recommendations of the European Union that every European should be able to speak two 
FLs apart from their mother tongue. An interesting result of this Eurobarometer is that 
although 88% agree that all languages should receive equal treatment at the European 
Union level, 53% maintain that the EU institutions should adopt a single language to 
Introduction  61
communicate with its citizens. Other results suggest that the main barriers in learning FLs 
for the participants in the surveys are lack of motivation, time and money, which is also 
related to the fact that a mere 14% were actively learning a language at the time of the 
survey. Nonetheless, the reasons for engaging in learning a FL comprise abroad 
employment (61%), use of that language at work or for business travel (53%), for study 
(46%) and holidays (47%), to be able to understand people from other cultures (38%), to 
meet people from other countries (29%) and to feel more European (10%). The most 
remarkable result though is the fact that almost all respondents (98%) consider it is useful 
for their children to master FLs. These results translate into the fact that almost all 
European citizens taking part in this survey agree that although they personally might not 
have enough time, money or motivation to learn a FL, their children should learn at least 
one FL, since being able to communicate in other languages is beneficial for working 
abroad or in one’s country, travel or study. #
With regards to the daily use of languages, this Eurobarometer found that about 65% use 
their L2 at least occasionally (8% use it daily); similarly, the respondents declared that they 
use their L3 occasionally in proportion of 69%, often 13% and daily 6%. Naturally, a larger 
percentage used their L1 daily (23%), often 23% and occasionally about 50%. With respect 
to the particular languages found to be useful, about 67% consider English to be the most 
useful language, but this percentage increased when the respondents were asked which 
languages would be useful for their children to learn (79% said English, while 20% declared 
French or German, respectively). The high support for English both for themselves and 
their children suggests that within the European context English has the strongest 
ethnolinguistic vitality, followed by French and German. These statistics are also mirrored 
by the languages spoken by the respondents in this survey: 38% revealed that they spoke 
English as an FL, 12% French and 11% German; furthermore, 54% of all respondents 
maintained that they were able to hold a conversation in at least one FL, suggesting they 
were bilingual, 25% trilingual and 10% quadrilingual. #
These results are presented here in order to give a glimpse about the current linguistic 
landscape in Europe and the statistics used by the European institutions responsible for 
matters of language and multilingualism. They suggest that Europeans do place a strong 
value on multilingualism and recognise its advantages for personal and professional 
development. The inferred consequence could be that overall Europeans have positive 
attitudes to FLs and multilingualism, but are somewhat reluctant to engage in language 
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learning actively. One of the questions in this study asked whether the participants would 
learn a FL to feel more European, a question pertinent to the present study. The results 
indicate that only an average of 10% of participants responded positively to this question 
(the Danish respondents scored highest - 18%, while Ireland was 4%; participants 20 years 
old or older - 13%, while below 15 year-olds scored 6%). Albeit a rather low score, this 
particular question relating to the relation between feeling European and speaking more 
FLs or at least having a positive attitude to multilingualism will be investigated in more 
depth in this study. #
Eurobarometers have been used by many researchers looking at Europeans and their 
attitudes to various events in the European Union (Bruter, 2005; Frognier & Duchesne, 
1998; Kohli, 2000; Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Fligstein, Polyakova & Sandholtz, 2012 and 
many others). These large scale surveys offer a snapshot of the European public opinion at 
various points in time and allows for comparisons over time and between countries. The 
data collected becomes available in the public domain and can be used freely in research 
investigations. With regards to Europeans’ identification with their region, nation or 
Europe, some researchers have argued that the way in which the question was formulated 
influenced the respondents (see Kohli, 2000, for a description and critique of the evolution 
of the question regarding national and European identity). Although these changes make it 
difficult to compare the results from various Eurobarometers, they also signify an alignment 
with the rules of questionnaire design, which in time have led to potentially more reliable 
results. #
The Eurobarometers under their various forms (standard, special, flash, qualitative and so 
on) have historically included questions about the feelings of identity. I will briefly present 
now the results from another recent Special Eurobarometer (no. 346, 2011), which looked 
more closely at issues related to identity, both national and European. This survey called 
“The New Europeans” aimed at assessing the feelings of connectedness and identification 
to Europe and the nation. I will discuss in brief the results pertaining to the overall findings 
of this study, looking in more detail at the contexts which are of interest to this study: 
United Kingdom, Belgium, and Romania. #
The results of this Special Eurobarometer (2011) show that across the board, Europeans 
have a very strong connection to their village, town or city, region, and country. The local 
identity reached an impressive 87% for the overall sample of Europeans participating in 
this survey. There was some variation at the national level, with Romania reaching one of 
Introduction  63
the highest percentages (95%), while Belgium recorded one of the steepest declines since 
the previous survey in 2007, currently being at 76%. The identification with the native 
region was also high, averaging 88%, and again Romania scored among the highest, with 
94%. With regards to national identification, the overall European score was 93%, having 
increased 2% since the previous Eurobarometer. The country with the strongest increase 
was the United Kingdom (from 84% in 2007 to 91% in 2011), while Belgium recorded one 
of the lowest scores, 82% (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011). These results indicate the 
strong attachment to local, regional and national identities that most Europeans feel. 
Although these scores are in constant change, sometimes relating to political or social 
events developing at the various levels of governance, the high percentages indicate a very 
strong affiliation with these identities. #
The participants were also asked about their feelings of identification to Europe. The 
results indicated that the European identity was much lower than the local, regional and 
national identities, but pointed to the fact that more than half of the respondents do feel 
European (average score was 53%, increasing 4% since the previous Eurobarometer in 
2007). The break-down of the results indicate that in some instances the feelings of 
European-ness have recorded a decline. Belgium, for example, recorded the steepest 
decline from 65% to 50%, while Romania declined from 56% to 46%. One of the lowest 
percentages was registered in the United Kingdom, 29%. On average, the younger 
participants scored higher than the older ones. Also, the differences between more 
educated and higher social status respondents, and less educated, lower social status was 
approximately 10%. These results are not surprising and they are consistent with previous 
research which points to the fact that the feelings of European identity are more prevalent 
among the so-called elite Europeans (Risse, 2010) or the Eurostars (Favell, 2009) than the 
rest of the European citizens. #
The next section of the report (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011) attempts to pull apart the 
various elements that make up a sense of European identity and to determine what 
percentage of the respondents consider these factors in their personal feelings of European 
identity. The two elements strongest endorsed were the common currency, the euro, and 
the democratic values of the European Union (the latter was endorsed by 32% of the 
respondents as a significant element of European identity). A break-down by country with 
regards to the importance of the euro shows that the country which hosts the capital of 
Europe, Belgium, is a strong supporter of it (55% of the respondents from Belgium 
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considered the euro to be an important element if the European identity). Romania 
recorded a lower score, a bit below the European average (29%), while United Kingdom 
scored a mere 12%. It is important to note here that Romania has not yet moved to the 
common European currency, while the United Kingdom decided not to join the Eurozone 
after the Maastricht Treaty. Other elements that were deemed consequential for the 
European identity were geography (22%), a common culture (22%; the United Kingdom 
endorsed this element the strongest, with a support of 26% of the respondents), common 
history (17%), higher social protection (13%), symbols (11%) and a common religious 
heritage (5%). #
The beginning of the new millennium was marked by one of the most ambitious projects: 
the unification of the European Union under one currency - the euro. In 2002, 12 members 
of the EU gave up their national currency and ascribed to the euro. The bills and coins are 
the same in the whole of Europe, but one face of the coins bears national symbols. 
Nonetheless, any euro coin or bill can be used in the eurozone. Only a year after the 
introduction of the euro, Risse (2003) presents research from Eurobarometers suggesting 
that the common European currency influences the identification of the Europeans with 
the European Union. Risse (2003) argues that “money has always been a symbolic marker in 
nation-building efforts” (p. 487) and even only a year after the creation of the Eurozone, the 
surveys showed that the euro was as important as the freedom of movement and travel, 
both endorsed by about 50% of the people surveyed. The decline in endorsement of the 
euro from 2002 to 2011 can be explained by the fact that in 2002 there were only fifteen 
EU member states, while by 2011 twelve more countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
had joined the EU, and not all of them have joined the Eurozone. Another explanation 
could be the economic crisis that has been affecting Europe for a few years, which might 
have weakened the Europeans’ trust in the common currency. #
The Special Eurobarometer discussed here (no. 346, 2011) also describes the elements that 
Europeans consider important for building strong socio-cultural connections to other 
countries. The factors presented in the survey were subscribed to by the participants as 
follows: more than a third indicated that the food, news, sport and cultural events, and 
knowledge of foreign languages played an important role in developing stronger ties to a 
country, while 20% declared that they feel a connection to a country in which they 
regularly travel on the weekend or for holiday. Thus, becoming better acquainted with a 
country leads to feelings of connectedness to it and an important element is knowledge of 
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foreign languages, presumably the language/s of that particular country. In this regard, the 
authors of the report conclude that “having foreign language skills may be the cause or the 
result of feeling connected to another country” (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011, p. 46). #
The initiative to monitor the perceptions of European and national identity is 
commendable, and over time it will bring about a large body of data which will be available 
to researchers. These Eurobarometers were discussed here in order to provide a 
background against which the present study was conducted. It seems that overall the 
national identity is strongly endorsed in most European countries, although in some cases 
it appears to be diminishing in strength. The feelings of European identity, although 
significantly lower than national identity, have been increasing steadily over time. The 
public opinion surveys suggest that people associate not only the economic aspect of the 
EU with feelings of European identity (i.e., the common currency plays an important part 
in the feelings of identification to Europe), but also the democratic values and human 
rights advocacy. Thus, it seems that the EU has shifted its representation in people’s minds 
from an economic community to a community connected through social and cultural ties. 
The next section will discuss these changes in light of the expansion of the EU.#
1.4.3.3. Europe and the European Union 
In 1957, which is considered the birth year of the European Union (called until the 
Maastricht Treaty, the European Commission), there were six member states. This number 
has increased gradually over the years to reach 28 countries in 2013. Thus, the meaning of 
the term European has shifted in the past six decades, from a more geographical concept to 
one which today includes features connected to the European Union. The geographical 
borders of Europe are considered somewhat arbitrary, since there are European countries 
outside of these borders, such as Cyprus, while others span between two continents, such 
as Russia. Today, more than half of the countries belonging to the continent of Europe are 
also part of the European Union. Guibernau (2011) describes the boundaries of Europe as 
follows:#
Europe is generally understood to include the western portion of the 
Eurasian landmass, together with a number of islands not far from 
the mainland (Iceland, Corsica, Malta, Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, and 
Ireland, as well as Great Britain), however this does not provide a 
clear-cut idea of where Asia stops and Europe begins. (Guibernau, 
2011, p. 32)#
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Guibernau (2011) goes on to argue that the reason why it is so hard to define Europe 
geographically is the fact its borders have been shifting since the ancient times, with 
dramatic changes in the past century. Not only have the countries of Europe changed their 
own borders due to various historical events, but these events have translated to a 
somewhat ambiguous understanding of the boundaries of Europe in general. To give just an 
example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that countries such as Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia are now “in an uncertain relation with regard to 
Europe” (Guibernau, 2011, p. 32). Another country that seems to be outside of the 
geographical borders of Europe, but which has historically been closely associated with 
Europe and which is now in negotiations with the European Union for a potential adhesion 
to the EU is Turkey (much attention has been given in recent years to the feelings of 
European identity in Turkey, but it is not the scope of this project to describe this research 
in detail).#
Guibernau (2011) argues that apart from the unreliability of geographical boundaries in the 
construction of a sense of European identity, the argument which states that the feelings of 
European identity can be rooted in the common European history should also be 
disregarded. She argues that the historical events in Europe have mostly lead to conflicts 
and wars, and thus history cannot be a catalyst for European identity. Elaborating on 
Guibernau’s argument, it is specifically this history of conflict and wars which has 
determined the forward-thinkers after the WWII to establish an entity at a transnational 
level which would ensure that the European countries cannot develop weaponry in secret, 
and thus prevent further armed conflicts. In actuality, the European Union was initially 
created in an attempt to draw to a close long years of war between the European countries. 
Therefore, it may be that European identity is tied to the history of the continent through 
a mediating event, which is the creation of the European Union. #
Culturally, the concept of Europe is also debated. Risse (2010) makes a case for two 
understandings of Europe: a modern, secular, cosmopolitan Europe and a white, Christian 
Europe (Kumar, 2003). Guibernau (2011) also argues against building the foundations of 
European identity in Christendom, maintaining that there have always been religious 
minorities (such as Muslims, Jews or pagans) in Europe. She also points out that the secular 
understanding of Europe was born “in opposition, debate, confrontation, and/or dialogue 
with prevailing religions in different European countries” (Guibernau, 2011, p.34) and only 
came about during the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution periods. And again, 
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because of the discrepancies in the development that took place during these times in 
various countries in Europe, the understandings of Europe in the Europeans’ minds evolved 
differently. A similar point is also supported by Patel (2013) who suggests that the division 
‘us’ and ‘them’ has historically reflected the religious divide in Europe, rather than the racial 
categories.#
Europe then seems to be quite difficult to define accurately from a geographical, historical 
or cultural point of view. However, the European Union today is a much clearer notion, 
pointing to the economical, social and political relations between the various member 
states. In order to be able to understand the meanings attached to European identity, it is 
of utmost importance to understand that Europe is an “evasive, pluralistic and 
vague” (Patel, 2013, p.23) notion, as well as a “large, diverse and complex place” (Caporaso & 
Kim, 2009).The emergence of a European identity coincided with the beginnings of the 
European Union. Kohli (2000) states that European identity should not be seen as a 
prerequisite for the development of a European society, but rather as a consequence of the 
European institutional development. That is not to say that people understand European 
identity as solely related to the EU and its institutions, but rather that the concept of an 
identity characteristic to all Europeans is more likely to have arisen once the political and 
economic institutions aimed at connecting them were in place. It has been proposed that 
the emergent European identity as related to the EU might lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy 
of equating Europe with the European Union, and European-ness with European identity 
(Patel, 2013). Although this discussion should have informed on the differences between 
Europe and the EU, it may be possible that Europeans, under the right circumstances, will 
develop stronger feelings of European identity. The following section will delve more into 
the various meanings attached to European identity.#
1.4.3.4. Definitions of European identity 
In previous sections I have attempted to explain the terms “European” and “identity” as 
individual concepts. To summarise briefly, I have described the relevance of concepts such 
as social and multiple identity, collective and individual identity, as well as how national 
identity is constructed and negotiated, and the role played by language in a discussion 
about identity. Therefore, I understand identity to reflect a dual relationship between the 
individual and the social group, both borrowing and lending traits to each other, in a 
reflective interaction. This negotiation is most often articulated through language, which 
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represents the vessel for the negotiation and a marker for the relation between the 
individual and the group. The term European will be used openly, to allow participants to 
assign the characteristics they consider appropriate to it. This section will give a few 
examples of how European identity and its components has been understood and described 
in previous research, and has no claims to be an exhaustive list of definitions. The terms 
European identity, feelings of belonging to Europe and European-ness are thus considered 
interchangeable and will be used as such, since the present study understands identity to be 
developed and negotiated in a social context, and thus a social construct. #
Other researchers (Duchesne, 2008) suggest that a more appropriate term would be 
European identification. She regards this concept as a process and not an a priori notion, thus 
the preference for the term identification rather than identity. She argues that using the 
concept of European identity implies that the researcher has started off believing that 
there is such an identity, and thus would be prone to the researcher’s bias. Duchesne (2008) 
also suggests that since Europe is a political unit, one’s identification would need be fall 
along the lines of citizenship, and she argues these are currently reserved for national 
citizenship. Nonetheless, the European identity can and most probably does include an 
element of political identity at least for some people, especially since the establishment of 
European citizenship. Although until now the EU has not yet formed cohesive foreign 
policies, the passport of a citizen of a country which is part of the EU does guarantee its 
holder some rights at least within the EU. Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) argue as a 
conclusion to their edited volume on European identity that: #
These identities can be conceived both as social process and 
political project. Understood as process, identities flow through 
multiple networks and create new patterns of identification. Viewed 
as project, the construction of identities is a task of elites and 
entrepreneurs, operations in Brussels or various national settings. (p.
213)#
This conclusion brings together the discussion of whether European identity should be 
regarded as a process, and as such, a work in progress, evolving as a bottom-up identity, or a 
project developed and enforced as a top-down operation from the European elites onto the 
masses. This study is concerned with the European identity as a process and how it is 
understood by people who are not necessarily related in a direct way to the European 
Union institutions. #
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I would also argue that using the term European identity instead of identification is in fact 
correct and appropriate for this study, given the definition provided by Turner (2010): “[t]he 
sum total of social identifications used by a person to define him- or herself will be 
described as his or her social identity” (Turner, 2010, p. 18, emphasis in the original). This 
definition can be transposed to cover the concepts of European identification and identity. 
European identity does actually encompass quite a wide variety of social identifications, as 
will be described below. For example, some argue that the European identity concept is 
formed by three dimensions - a civic, a cultural and a general one (see Bruter 2005, Burgess 
2002, see § 1.4.3.6). These dimensions can be viewed as the identifications Turner was 
referring to in his definition; the various degrees of these dimensions combined form the 
European identity of an individual. These dimensions of European identity are rooted in 
the national identity concepts discussed earlier and their evolution will be discussed here.#
More than two decades ago, Smith (1992) drew parallels between his work on national 
identity and the European identity. He argues that the cultural aspect of European identity 
might not have developed yet a political counterpart, since each European member state 
places its political interests above the European ones. He goes on to list a number of 
characteristics that he attributes to the European cultural identity. The first one would be 
linguistic, as he suggests that most languages in Europe (although not all) are of Indo-
European origins, and that provides ties that are both modern and prehistoric. Another 
characteristic is “cultural geography and territorial symbolism” (Smith, 1992, p. 68) by which 
the author suggests that there are very few geographical obstacles (such as high mountains 
or big rivers); a religious divide, suggesting that Christianity seems to be the European 
religion, although historically some countries have embraced Judaism and Islam (for 
example, Spain); the last characteristic Smith (1992) mentions is a rudimentary sense of the 
other, which he argues could be brought about by immigrants and guest-workers. Díez-
Medrano (2010) develops this position by arguing that for some Europeans, the EU has not 
yet achieved a political reality, and thus they might identify more with the cultural, rather 
than the political or civic aspect of European identity. Nonetheless, there is evidence in the 
Eurobarometers and other research in the realm of European identity that for some the 
political reality of the EU has had a significant influence on their European identity.#
Smith (1992) identifies the issues that each one of these characteristics might bring to the 
development of a European identity at a mass level. Although the elites in urban 
cosmopolitan areas might be better suited to overcome these problems, the working class 
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could become disengaged with the project of building Europe. Education and mass-media 
are means through which the European message can reach the masses, but evidently, they 
are controlled by national interests (Inglehart, 1970; Smith, 1992). Even from a time when 
the European Commission was comprised of just the original six members, research 
conducted through public opinion surveys suggests that these two factors, education and 
mass media, have a strong influence in shaping the Europeans’ attitudes to integration. An 
analysis coordinated by Inglehart in 1970 was among the first studies to spell out the theory 
that through cognitive mobilisation and internalisation of values, the European educated 
group will form an opinion regarding European integration and that opinion will most 
likely be a positive one, because of the positive messages received through the mass-media. 
“Cognitive mobilisation” (p. 47), Inglehart argues, is the process through which “one must 
become aware of it [the European community] before one can develop a sense of 
commitment” (p. 47) and this awareness is much more readily available to the educated 
group.#
Since the days of the study conducted by Inglehart (1970), there have been many efforts to 
establish European institutions and agencies, and although it is a slow process, they do 
seem to aid the development of a European identity (Bruter, 2005). The European Union 
attempts to make information regarding its organisation and functioning available on its 
portal, information available in all official languages of the EU. The technological 
developments make the information and news much more readily available to everybody, 
regardless of whether they are highly educated Europeans or not. Similarly, the positive 
news regarding Europe seems to foster a development of European identity (Bruter, 2005), 
but the channels through which the news is transmitted have widely expanded. #
More recently, Risse (2010) proposed two ways of understanding European identity, which 
have been briefly mentioned above. He maintains that when Europeans describe 
themselves as such, they could mean one of two things. One way of understanding this 
identity incorporates ideas of cosmopolitanism (Schlenker, 2013) and universalism, and it 
“embodies the values of enlightenment, such as human rights, democracy and the market 
economy” (Risse, 2010, p. 245) and Risse names it the modern, liberal European identity; 
this type of European identity is the governing principle of the European project for the 
last five decades. #
The second type is the nationalist European identity, and the people who ascribe to this 
type of identification with Europe believe in an essentialist white Christian Europe to 
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which they oppose the newer waves of immigration from Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 
or adhesion of countries that are not traditionally Christian, such as Turkey, Albania or 
Bosnia. In this latter case, ‘us’ incorporates the white Christian Europeans whose ancestors 
inhabited this space, while ‘they’ are the newer European immigrants with non-Christian 
and/or non-white European background. Depending on the political situation, ‘they’ can 
also mean other members of the European Union, such as citizens from the Eastern 
European countries, which joined the Union in recent years. Schlenker (2013) looked at 
Eurobarometer data and found that when it comes to accepting immigrants, the EU 
immigrants from the Eastern European countries are slightly more easily accepted then 
immigrants from outside of the EU. She also concludes that there are great differences 
between various EU countries and it is thus very difficult to draw conclusions that apply to 
all of them. Rather, she suggests an approach of looking at national particularities. #
The extremes of the notion of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in the case of nationalist Europeans are 
clearly exemplified by the massacre carried out by Anders Behring Breivik in Oslo and 
Utøya against those he believed were the supporters of a multicultural Europe. In July 2011, 
he carried out a bomb and gun attack on government buildings in Oslo and on a youth 
camp of the Norwegian Labour Party in the island of Utøya. Breivik justified his actions in 
a manifesto released before he carried out the attacks, by saying that European values and 
lifestyle were threatened by the non-White non-Christian immigrants and by the 
acceptance of multiculturalism in the European space. Clearly, this is an extreme view of 
national European-ness, but ideas present in his discourse can also be found in the 
platforms of various extreme right-wing nationalistic parties within European countries. As 
Guibernau (2011) warns, the rise of the right-wing discourse within European politics is one 
of the challenges to European identity. Even the moderate advocates of this view, which 
incorporates the belief that the European space should continue to be inhabited only by 
white, Christian, usually Western Europeans, contribute to the opposition ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
which can easily lead to ethnic conflicts and social unrest. #
Following the discussion about the insufficiency of grounding European identity in history, 
geography or cultural traditions, Guibernau (2011) suggests that unlike national identity 
which is a deeply emotional type of identity, European identity is and should be considered 
a non-emotional identity. Smith (1992) goes even further to say that European identity does 
not have a past which can provide the emotional dimension to the concept, and thus also 
lacks “historical depth” (p.62). Nonetheless, Guibernau (2011) argues that European identity 
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is an emergent type of identity, formed around a novel political structure, the European 
Union, and around economic interests that connect the member states of this union, 
something that Duchesne (2008) calls “a work in progress” (p. 402). Thus, Guibernau (2011) 
suggests, European identity is not expected to “arouse feelings comparable to those 
inspired by national identity” (p.41), primarily because the author cannot imagine a cause 
that would unite the Europeans with such an intensity. She argues that the European 
identity can emerge as a rational (that is, non-emotional) identity, based on common 
political, social and economic interests, and that the driving force for the creation of this 
identity would be the economic prosperity brought about by the membership in the 
European Union to each one of the member states. #
Certainly, such a young identity, built on economic interests and without an emotional past 
or history will take some time to become internalised, and thus threats to the economic 
wellbeing of the individual and the group will bring challenges to the newly developed 
identity. Guibernau (2011) presents data from Eurobarometers which seem to indicate that 
the economic crisis that has engulfed Europe in recent years has affected the levels of 
European identity and the connectedness people feel with Europe (more research related 
to the effects of the economic crisis on Europe and European identity will be discussed in § 
1.4.3.7). Other challenges to European identity mentioned are the vast discrepancy between 
the views on European identity between the elites and the masses, the weak political 
determination to work towards the development of the European Union rather than the 
nation, and the rise in recent years of right-wing nationalism (Guibernau, 2011). 
Nonetheless, the European identity as a concept and a feeling is taking shape and 
becoming an integral part of at least some Europeans’ lives. #
A strong sense of ethnic-based national identity translates at a European level into an 
adversity towards non-white, non-Christian and non-European migrants (Fligstein et al., 
2012). Similarly, the civic national identity is related to the cosmopolitan European identity. 
This understanding of national identity will most likely be congruent with aspects of 
European identity. National identities in the European countries have been encouraged and 
nurtured by politicians in these counties for centuries now. It is thus not surprising that 
Europeans feel a strong sense of belongingness towards their nation; but it is important to 
stress that the Eurobarometer reports of the past two decades have shown a somewhat 
stable picture. Except for a few years towards the end of the 1990’s, feelings of 
identification with the nation and Europe have always been higher than just national 
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identification (for a detailed description, see Caporaso & Kim, 2009). If the sum of 
respondents who said they felt both national and European, European and national, and 
only European is considered, the total is always higher than the respondents who feel that 
they are only national. In conclusion, at least to some level more than half of the 
respondents feel that they have a sense of European identity. Fligstein and his colleagues 
(2012) call them “situational Europeans” - people who feel at least in some situations that 
they are European. #
Fligstein and his colleagues (2012) make the argument that if the respondents who declare 
that they do not feel European at all and identify only with their nation are eliminated, the 
other respondents will probably have a sense of cosmopolitan, liberal European identity. 
This can mean that only under circumstances in which the nationalistic Europeans feel that 
they have to identify as Europeans (for example, as opposed to being from another 
continent), would they declare themselves as such. In the Eurobarometers, where they have 
the options: only national, national and European, European and national or only 
European, they would most probably opt for the first category. Schlenker’s (2013) research 
argues that “a majority of Europeans are cosmopolitans, and at first sight no partisans of 
fortress Europe” (p.48), however she calls for more in-depth research to be done in order to 
investigate the identities of Europeans beyond the borders of their nations. That is not to 
say that the nationalistic European-ness is not a category that needs to be addressed, but it 
does not necessarily represent the archetypical European identity. #
The two different types of European identity might have emerged from the two types of 
national identity. Smith (1991) argues that the civic national identity might be more in line 
with Western Europe, and ethnic national identity with Eastern Europe. Similarly, 
cosmopolitan European identity seems to be closer to the Western world, while ethnic 
European identity can be more typical of the Eastern side of Europe. Can we assume then 
that Western Europe is more European than Eastern Europe? Pichler (2008) investigated 
various sociological variables and their relation to European identity by looking at 
Eurobarometer data. He found that there was no difference between Eastern and Western 
European identity. Nonetheless, there is no evidence based on Eurobarometers that the 
respondents from Eastern and Western Europe have a similar understanding of European 
identity, since no questions regarding the civic and /or cultural European identity were 
included.#
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Many researchers have been concerned with the discrepancies between the feelings of 
European identity at an elite level and the masses. Some have noticed that there is a 
correlation between educational level, social class, age, gender and area of residence, and 
degree of European identity (Inglehart, 1970; Fligstein, 2008; Fligstein et al., 2012; Pichler, 
2008; Díez-Medrano, 2010; Duchesne et al., 2010; Favell, 2009 and others). The study 
conducted by Inglehart (1970) suggests that educational level and access to mass media are 
two of the most important factors in the creation of pro-European attitudes. The same 
study also indicates that income is only related to positive attitudes towards 
Europenisation if education is a mediator, and that media has a stronger effect among the 
less educated, in which case it could function as an alternative for cognitive mobilisation 
through education. Inglehart (1970) also found a gender difference with regards to pro-
European attitudes, but he attributes it to a potential lack of awareness rather than a real 
aversion towards European integration. #
Other indicators for a stronger support for Europe are age (younger respondents endorsed 
it more than the older ones) and foreign travel (Inglehart, 1970). Pichler (2008) also found 
that the demographic characteristics of people who have a stronger European identity are: 
“men, people under the age of 60, the better educated, people living in urban areas and 
members of the higher social class” (p. 392). He also draws attention to the fact that more 
research is needed and that it is possible to encounter differences across European nations. #
The European nations are quite distinct when it comes to feelings of European-ness and 
these differences are in part given by the various understandings of the nation-state in 
Europe. This is one of the conclusions of the study conducted by Duchesne and her 
colleagues (2010). It was based on focus groups in France, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom and their report of the results indicates that there is a widespread lack of interest 
among the people interviewed with regards to Europe and European identity. They argue 
that there are differences at the national level, as well as the social class level with regards 
to attitudes towards European integration. Their focus groups were aimed at four different 
social groups: workers and unemployed, employees, managers and party activists. The 
results of the focus groups suggest that the managers and party activists were at both poles 
of the spectrum of attitudes towards European integration, while the other groups, the 
workers and the employees, lacked any interest in the European project. Duchesne and her 
colleagues (2010) maintain that these people should not be considered Euro-sceptics, but 
rather Euro-indifferents. The British sample seems to represent an exception, the 
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respondents being dominated by misconceptions about the European Union, which the 
authors attribute to “an absence of interest” (p. 101), while in the case of the two other 
countries the indifference towards the European Union appears to stem from “an absence 
of salience” (p. 101) and the belief that their opinion cannot influence European politics in 
the slightest. #
Fligstein (2008) coined the term “Euroclash” (p.217) to mark the potential conflict that can 
arise between two groups, which he suggests are delineated by class membership. Based on 
analysis of Eurobarometer data, Fligstein argues that people who are young, educated, with 
higher incomes, “owners, managers, professionals, and other white-collar workers” (p.145), 
men, and with a left-wing political inclination are more likely to have some European 
identity, to consider that the European Union is good for their country and to say that the 
EU has a positive image. These are also the people who have the opportunities and the 
interest to travel, learn and speak a second language for leisure or work, that is, to interact 
with people from other European countries. Fligstein (2008) contrasts this group of people 
with the blue-collar workers, less educated, older Europeans, with a lower income, who are 
not very likely to travel or speak another language. These are the people who most strongly 
identify with their national identity. The clash between these groups might arise because 
the first group has taken advantage of the opportunities that arise from their country’s 
membership in the EU and they will continue to do so, thus continuing to gain economic 
advantages and reinforcing their sense of belongingness to Europe. The latter group on the 
other hand has not benefited economically from the union, but has continued to live very 
locally. The economic disparity between the two groups, warns Fligstein, can easily lead to a 
clash between them, which can be translated at an ideological level into a clash between the 
European and the national identity. #
The positive aspect of Fligstein’s conclusions is that with the passing of time, the shift in 
Europe will be towards feeling more European. As the younger generations today grow up, 
they will continue to seek opportunities to interact with other Europeans, they will also be 
able to communicate with them due to their higher proficiency in foreign languages and 
they will be more eager to benefit from the economic opportunities that the European 
Union can provide. Although currently, the gap between the individuals who identify with 
Europe and those who identify with the nation more can be considered a class difference, 
Fligstein (2008) argues optimistically that in time this gap will diminish. #
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Education appears to be a significant predictor of identifying with Europe, being proficient 
in an L2 and willing to use it in order to communicate with people from other cultures. 
Rather than considering this a hindrance for the development of a wider European identity, 
Fligstein (2008) argues that “the educated elites are at the forefront of European society-
building, because in many ways the European identity project is theirs” (p. 166), and 
consequently they can take a leading role in forming new Europeans. Through educational 
and vocational programmes the European Union is striving to provide people with the 
opportunity to work or study in another European country, thus encouraging personal and 
professional interactions between people from various European backgrounds. This 
interaction can only take place when there is a common language which can be used for 
communicative purposes between Europeans from different backgrounds. Therefore, the 
language policies suggested by the EU which encourage each person to learn two European 
languages apart from their mother tongue are aimed not only at supporting the linguistic 
diversity of Europe, but also at providing people with the necessary tools for engaging in 
interactions at the European level. The European identity project as Fligstein (2008) calls it 
can therefore benefit both from the top-down initiatives rooted in the European Union 
institutions and policies and from the bottom-up ambitions of the young, educated 
Europeans who identify with and benefit from the European project. #
Favell (2009, 2010) researched the group which seems to benefit from the rules and 
regulations of the European Union. He calls them the Eurostars and identifies their main 
characteristic as being free movers in a unique “politically constructed post-national 
space” (Favell, 2009, p. 177), they move abroad to work or study and could potentially lead 
to the creation of a dramatically different European space. They are the educated, skilled 
and professional segment of the European society, which can circulate their skills within 
Europe and potentially help the development of European identity in the process. Both 
Fligstein (2008) and Favell (2009) agree that this group of highly skilled, highly mobile 
people tend to identify less and less with their nation of origin and more with Europe. The 
irony pointed out by Favell (2009) is that although most European citizens are free to move 
to a different country to work or study, the number of people who actually do so is rather 
small. Although the mechanisms for the emergence of a larger segment of the European 
population who could be described as Eurostars is in place, it is not being utilised 
extensively. #
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Following extensive research in various urban environments, Favell (2009) suggests that one 
reason would be that Europeans are deeply rooted in their own culture and language, and 
therefore could potentially find it difficult to accommodate to a new culture and language 
on a permanent basis. Another reason can be the fact that although the European 
regulations regarding the free movement are in place in all the European member states, 
the Eurostars would most probably prefer to move to Eurocities, the urban cosmopolitan 
areas, which are surprisingly similar from a life-style point of view all over Europe. Often 
the Eurocities possess “semi-detached identities from the national societies in which they 
are situated” (Favell, 2009, p. 178) and the examples provided are London and Amsterdam. 
These urban cosmopolitan areas tend to be consistently more similar with each other than 
even with other towns in the same country. Nonetheless, the host culture is not necessarily 
eager to receive new Europeans, not even the Eurostars. Maintaining complicated and 
convoluted bureaucratic systems which require for example almost native fluency in the 
language of the host culture is just one way of ensuring the migration to a particular city is 
directed mostly to the highly skilled Europeans who have the resources and abilities to 
navigate these complicates networks, making it thus “exclusive for the elites” (Favell, 2009, 
p. 181). Thus, as Cerutti (2008) suggests, European identity should be studied by looking at 
“the elites, opinion leaders and bureaucracies as well as at common citizens” (p. 9) in order 
to get a full picture of the views and understandings of European identity. The elites or the 
Eurostars feel a closer connection to the European Union, its institutions, or its ideals, and 
they can be agents in shaping the identity of others who might be apathetic or even 
opposed to the European project.#
It appears that in Europe there are three types of people when it comes to European 
identity: those who declare themselves as only European (which is a very small group, 
consisting most probably of the Eurostars - educated, young, mobile, professional 
individuals, knowing and using foreign languages to communicate with other Europeans, 
and taking full advantage of the provisions put in place by the European Union and the 
opportunities that might arise from them); those who declare themselves as only nationals 
(which is a considerably large group of people who might be older, less educated, not 
interested in travelling abroad for holidays or work, most probably on the right-wing of the 
political spectrum); and those who feel that they are both nationals of their country and 
Europeans (which is also quite a large group, sometimes called the situational Europeans, 
since their identity might change depending on the context; they are also the potential 
hyphenated Europeans, whose identities might be a melange of national or cultural 
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characteristics with European ideals). The three groups are likely to cover very different 
demographic strata of the society, which can eventually lead to a clash between them. 
Based on the research covered above, there are arguments for an optimistic view of the 
present and future situation. The two groups who identify at least occasionally with Europe 
are younger, thus in time they might become the majority. Although some might believe 
that it is not politically correct to argue this, the European and national politics often 
happen at the elite political level. Apart from being in favour or against the EU, or feeling 
European or national, Europeans can also be indifferent, which allows the elite politicians 
to model the European project as they see fit. This apathy can be combated through 
education and with the help of the mass-media, which have been shown to influence the 
levels of European identity. Some efforts have been made at the European level to 
introduce notions of European-ness in the school curricula, to promote multilingualism and 
to encourage exchanges with other educational institutions in Europe. It has also been 
shown that positive media coverage of the European matters is related to stronger support 
for the European project, while the reverse is also true (Bruter, 2005). #
European identity at a group level can be regarded as a changing identity, influenced by 
various societal factors, including the incorporation of new member states into the 
European Union, thus redefining the concept constantly, but also evolving in time, as the 
young Europeans grow older and engage and benefit progressively more from the European 
institutional framework. At an individual level, as a person becomes more educated, skilled, 
travelled, or as they move across the class divisions, they might regard the European Union 
provisions for free movement as useful and beneficial for their personal development. The 
studies presented here reviewed the characteristics of a prototypical European and the 
circumstances which can promote a sense of European identity. All these features provide 
the structure for a better understanding of European identity.!
It is unexpectedly difficult to find exact definitions of European identity in the literature. 
Most research reviewed here presents characteristics of it, elements that it consists of, its 
variability among various population groups, its relation to national identity, but very few 
researchers present an exact definition of it. This is not only because it is such a complex 
term, but also because it brings together two other intricate concepts: identity and 
European. Since the expansion of the EU and its proposed strategy for further 
enlargement, at least from a geographical point of view the term European will soon come 
to bridge Europe and European Union. On all other levels, that is, social, political, 
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economic, cultural and so on, it will probably be a while until the term European will be an 
encompassing term for all-things European. But as some have noted (Patel, 2013; Schlenker, 
2013) it is possible that in time, the difference between the two will diminish and will lead 
to a self-fulfilling prophecy, making thus the term Europeans incorporate all these 
meanings. The view adopted in this study is that European identity is part of the multiple 
social identities that an individual and/or a group have, it is a collective identity, but it can 
have different meanings for different groups of people, mainly differentiated by their 
national identity perception. Unlike others who see it as devoid of meaning or empty 
(Breakwell, 2004; Duchesne et al., 2010), European identity seems to be a complex idea, 
with a myriad of elements connected in intricate ways. It has nonetheless been suggested 
also that, at least at an individual level, it is an unexamined concept (Grundy & Jamieson, 
2007).#
Other researchers have argued against the concept of European identity. Breakwell (2004) 
considers that since the European Union is in constant change and “new member states 
have been allowed to join” (p. 34), which brought along with them their cultural heritage, it 
is impossible to obtain a representation of the EU identity that is not “something bland or 
even vacuous” (p. 35). She also criticises the EU for not attempting to build such an identity 
in a consistent manner by providing the public with the necessary elements for the 
development of an EU identity. These critiques seem to be unfounded since, as will be 
discussed later, the EU has generated a constant stream of elements around which the 
European identity can form, such as the flag, the European day, the European anthem, as 
well as the common currency. As indicated in the public opinion surveys, the emergence of 
these symbols has coincided with increases in the feelings of European identity (see 
Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012 for data on Eurobarometers). The European 
Union purposely does not attempt to replace the national identity or impose a European 
identity, but rather to allow it to develop side by side, or as another layer if identities are to 
be understood as nested (Risse, 2010). Given the high levels of identification with the 
nation at a European level, such attempts would most certainly be received as an 
imposition and rejected quite vehemently. #
Another critique of the European identity comes from Duchesne and her colleagues (2010), 
who proclaim it to be a “pseudo-concept” (p. 101), suggesting that it “limits our 
apprehension of what the phenomena in play must be, notably by lumping them together 
without differentiating between categories of citizens according to the diverse ways they 
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experience and apprehend the processes under way” (p. 101). This argument, apart from 
being circular, presents the research conducted to date in an unfavourable light. As 
discussed above, and I hope I will contribute to this discussion with the present study, 
researchers have looked at European identity from many angles, trying to related their 
findings to demographic information obtained from their respondents, such as profession, 
age, gender, nationality and so on. Some studies have looked at individual nations and 
compared their findings from different contexts. Some other studies have used data from 
the Eurobarometers, other have collected their own interviews, and to a lesser extent, 
questionnaires, while others have investigated the concept of European identity from a 
more theoretical point of view. Taking into consideration all the research conducted to 
date, it would be oxymoronic to proclaim that European identity is a pseudo-concept and it 
would be somewhat offensive towards the many academics and respondents who 
endeavoured to study and provide insight into what can now be called the concept of 
European identity. Admittedly, the term European identity has been used to reflect many 
different theories and ideas, but this is a common occurrence in the case of widely pursued 
topics. #
I will thus use the term European identity to refer to the sum total of identifications that 
reflect the individuals’ adherence to a specific constellation of characteristics and 
associations with Europe and the European Union. Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) 
conclude their volume by saying that the European identities as they exist right now should 
not be constrained by fixed definitions, as they “remain plastic and open to multiple 
interpretations” (p.226). This study will attempt to allow participants to provide their 
understanding of European identity and draw together the common themes that arise from 
this pursuit. #
1.4.3.5. The relation between national and European identity 
European identity is a much more evasive concept than national identity. When it comes to 
national identity, every individual can describe what it is, what it means to them personally, 
and what it represents at a group level. The significances attached to national identity by 
various individuals or groups may vary, but as discussed earlier, relativism should be 
avoided, and the focus should rather be on the commonalities between these different 
significances. Although from a political and sociological point of view, the concept of 
national identity is complex and dynamic, from a non-expert perspective it is an idea that 
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can be easily grasped. Nonetheless, European identity is a more difficult concept. Non-
experts may have an understanding of it at an individual level, but it designates a concept 
still in the process of formation at a group level. One can argue that national identity has 
been around at least since the emergence of nations, although elements of national identity 
have been present long before. Similarly, the emergence of European identity as it is 
understood and promoted today might have its roots many centuries ago, but it has 
become part of the everyday life and discourse of the Europeans only in the past few 
decades. It is a controversial notion, some even suggesting it does not exist yet. This 
section will attempt to explain whether the European identity is a type of identity forming 
on the same patterns as the national identity, or whether it is an entirely different concept 
from a structural point of view and should be studied as such. I will also discuss whether 
the two are hierarchical nested identities, meaning that the European identity encompasses 
the national identity as well as other elements, or their relation is better exemplified by the 
marble cake (Risse, 2010), intertwining elements from one identity into another.#
From a geographical point of view, the national identity of any European country will 
always be circumscribed to the European identity, since any member state is geographically 
located in Europe. It is thus easy to fall into the fallacy of considering the European Union 
as providing an overarching identity, somewhat similar to the relation between national and 
local or regional identities. Of course, geographically, a city or village is located in a region, 
which is located in a country, which is part of Europe. Thus taking these identities at face 
value, a person who identifies with that particular city will also possess the other identities 
to some degree. But this view ignores the emotional connection that people attach to each 
of these identities. Studies show that people living in cosmopolitan urban areas might have 
more in common with others living in the same type of cities in other countries than with 
people from the rural area a few kilometres away (Favell, 2009). #
Considering the relation between European and national identity as nested identities, 
Díez-Medrano (2010) illustrates it by looking at Spain and Great Britain in relation to 
Europe. He argues that in countries like Spain, these identities are nested and are perceived 
as being compatible and they even correlate positively. Conversely, the British consider the 
two identities to be incompatible: if one identifies as European within the British context, 
that person is implying that they do not possess a strong national identity (Díez-Medrano, 
2010). In this case, Europe and the European Union is perceived as threatening to the 
national identity and potentially trying to impose itself over the national sovereignty. 
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Guibernau (2011) suggests that although the European Union is formed by the various 
nation-states members, it is not in the interest of the respective countries to promote the 
EU and foster a sense of European identity, as the EU is quite often used in national 
politics as a political scapegoat or “an excuse of action or inaction within the domestic 
arena” (p. 36). This in turn leads to stronger feelings of nationalism and a distancing from 
the European project. Thus from her perspective it is wrong to suggest that European 
identity is formed on the same patterns as national identity because Europe has a 
completely different character from the nation-state, and the European Union has a 
different agenda in promoting feelings of European identity than the member states have 
to promote national identity. #
National identity is also a territorial identity and some see it is an essentialist concept 
(Kohli, 2000), while the EU with its changing borders is constantly reshaping its map, 
making it difficult for one to identify with it territorially, as discussed earlier. This is also 
the reason Kohli (2000) argues that Europe is held together by a “symbolic temporal 
boundary”, rather than a territorial one, pointing to the positive outcomes it may bring to 
its members, and distancing itself from a conflictual past. He suggests that in the 
construction of European identity, one need not look for ‘the other’ in the construction of 
an identity outside of Europe, but rather the war-ridden past can be the antithetical point 
against which European identity should be built. The European identity in this case can 
consist of elements of national identity or any other territorial identities (regional, local - as 
argued by Díez-Medrano, 2010, or universalist and cosmopolitan, as suggested by 
Schlenker, 2013) and can thus be considered a hybrid identity. As a hybrid identity, it can 
draw elements from other identities which can potentially be conflictual identities. The 
argument presented by Kohli (2000) suggests that the European identity cannot be 
modelled after the national identity primarily because European identity is a much more 
hybrid type of identity, gathering elements from various other sources, and bringing them 
together into a new identity, while national identity is bound to territoriality and language. 
For Kohli (2000), the people that are most likely to develop a sense of European identity 
are the ones “with conflicting and fuzzy territorial attachments” (p. 131) due to living in 
different countries, or at the intersection between two countries (and thus two national 
identities), having multiple citizenships, or living in mixed marriages. Although this group 
of people might have increased in recent years, they are a particular group of Europeans, 
which can only grow at a very limited speed. It would be worrying if these were the only 
people who felt they had a European identity. #
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National identity usually forms around a territory and a language, guided by a top-down 
approach, and leading the members of that group (i.e., nation) to identify with it to such a 
degree that they would be willing even to give their lives to defend it from external threats. 
Citrin and Sides (2004) discuss how even if a nation is multicultural or multiethnic, it still 
has a culture that is dominant (sometimes representing the dominant group, other times 
being a combination of elements from various groups within its territory). Similarly, 
language, ethnicity or religion can aid the construction of a national identity. In the case of 
European identity, all these elements are so diverse that they could not possibly be used as 
the basis for the formation of a common identity (Citrin & Sides, 2004). It follows then 
that the European identity should aim to be built around civic rather than ethnic elements 
at a group level (p. 183), and promote democratic and human rights values at an individual 
level. They also agree that the meaning and construction of European identity will vary 
depending on the recent history and cultural make-up of the European nation, citing 
studies that suggest that the German European identity marks a distancing from their 
historical past, while the French European identity is closely related to the political 
institutions of Europe. #
In a paper which critiques the concept of European identity, Duchesne (2008) suggests that 
much of the literature in this field has been concerned with the relationship between 
national and European identity. She chooses three visions of this relationship, based on 
Anderson’s imagined community, Inglehart’s cognitive mobilisation and Elias’ survival units. 
She argues that if European identity is understood as an “imagined Europe” (p. 405), there 
would be a competition for people’s loyalties between national and European identity and 
thus they will be negatively correlated. On the other hand, if Inglehart was right in 
suggesting that the cognitive mobilisation will give rise to a more educated population in 
Europe, that in turn will lead to stronger feelings of identification with Europe, which will 
be congruent and compatible with national identity. And lastly, Duchesne (2008) describes 
how the survival units postulated by Elias have the potential to evolve from local to 
national and further on to the European level, thus leading to an increased sense of 
cohesion for the Europeans and stronger feelings of European identity, which can co-exist 
alongside national identity. This review of literature presented by Duchesne (2008) points 
to the fact the national and European identity can be compatible, sometimes even form a 
hybrid identity. Although she argues that in the case of “imagined Europe” the European 
identity will correlate negatively with national identity, the argument still holds that the 
two identities can exist simultaneously. Risse (2004, 2010) argues that the relation between 
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the two identities can be represented not only by the nested identities metaphor (or the 
Russian dolls), but also by the marble cake. #
The marble cake disposition of the national and European identity would translate into a 
potential hybrid identity bringing together features of both. This blend can result in a third 
identity altogether, or in a hybrid which maintains elements from both in a more or less 
intact state. Risse (2010) argues that the intertwining of elements from both types of 
identities can make it harder to determine which feature comes from what identity. 
However, there are cases in which it would be an achievable task, such as for example, if 
one would identify as Romanian, eating Romanian food on a regular basis, having contact 
with other Romanians, but also believing in the human rights and European principles of 
law and environmental standards put forth by the European Union. Each of these elements 
can be traced back to its original identity, but the person might perceive them as 
intertwined within his/her self. #
Another idea presented by Risse (2010) is that the development of European identity does 
not necessarily need to be come as a new emergent identity above and beyond national 
identities, but from the Europeanisation of the national identities. The national identities 
characteristic of the Western nations have already come to incorporate many elements of 
European-ness, such as the belief in human rights, equality, the benefits of education, the 
need for active environmental efforts and so on. The unification of Europe brought about 
many benefits for the citizens of Europe, and profiting from these benefits can also be an 
element that links national and European identities. When a European citizen decides to 
go abroad to work, study or just for leisure, that person is exercising their rights as citizens 
of their nation, as well as of the European Union. Even though a sense of European identity 
might not be at the forefront of their consciousness when they pursue these rights, the ease 
of the action is actually ensured by his/her nation’s membership in the EU. #
The European Union does not try to impose a European identity, but it went to great 
lengths to provide elements that would aid its creation and/or development. The EU has a 
flag, an anthem, a day, a motto, a constitution, the euro, a common passport, as well as 
institutions that parallel the national ones. All the symbols that represent the EU have 
been shown to have an impact on feelings of identification with Europe (see Bruter, 2005; 
Risse, 2003) and they are all mimicked after symbols that helped in the creation of national 
identities. The EU prefers not to impose by force any of these elements. The motto of the 
EU, United in diversity, aims to express the EU’s view of the relation it should have with the 
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member states. Quite often, EU officials emphasise the need to support this diversity, be it 
cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious and so on. It is absolutely vital that they do so, such 
that the politicians at the national level, as well as the citizens of each nation do not feel 
that the EU is a threat to their national sovereignty and freedom. Their task is quite 
difficult: to encourage the development of a common identity for all Europeans, without 
threatening the national, regional or local identities. Any potential threat to the national 
identity and sovereignty is likely to have an adverse effect, and thus alienate the very people 
it is trying to unite. Furthermore, the EU requires the national governments and politicians 
to aid in this effort to unite the citizens of Europe under a common European identity, 
which is not always in the best interest of the respective politicians since they might 
perceive it as undermining their power. #
The national identity has another anchor which European identity lacks: quite often, 
although not always, the majority language is used to unite people and promote 
national(istic) feelings. One of the following sections will discuss how the EU’s lack of a 
common language is not necessarily an impediment in the development of a European 
identity, but it can be used as an asset (see § 1.4.3.8). #
The various studies presented here discuss the potential structure of European identity in 
relation to national identity. Some have argued that they can be nested identities, other 
that they might blend and form a hybrid. Some suggest that the European identity is 
modelled after the national identity, and I have presented arguments that at least on a 
symbolic level and following a top-down approach, it does indeed have the elements that 
are historically used to increase levels of national identity. Nonetheless, the bottom-up 
understanding of the development of European identity might present a different 
conceptualisation of this new identity, that is, regardless of the efforts made by the EU 
officials, the European citizens might perceive and define their European identity in other 
terms as well as the ones instilled by the EU. The following section will discuss briefly the 
different subcategories that the European identity has been posited to have.#
1.4.3.6. Components of European identity: civic and cultural 
As discussed earlier, if European identity has been modelled after national identity, there 
should be different types of European identity, or it might be composed of various 
subcategories. Thus, as discussed ethnic European identity follows on the steps of ethnic 
national identity; and civic or cosmopolitan European identity is modelled after civic 
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national identity. These types of European identity have been posited to be related to the 
geographical location of the nations, such that the Western nations would be inclined to be 
more civic, cosmopolitan, while the Eastern countries would adopt a more ethnic European 
identity. As discussed earlier, Pichler (2008) found no support for these claims in his study 
of Eurobarometer data. #
It is possible nonetheless for the European identity of an individual or of a country to 
include elements from both the ethnic and the cosmopolitan European identity. These 
terms have been occasionally used interchangeably with cultural and civic European 
identity, notwithstanding the fact that they might have different nuances. Burgess (2002) 
argues that the EU represents the relationship between the cultural and the civic aspects of 
European identity: the cultural is based on the European heritage, while the civic is 
represented by the institutions of the EU, and these two aspects are in constant 
negotiation: #
The institutional Europe that seeks to legitimate itself through a 
reference network associated with the ‘culture’ of the real Europe is 
in constant negotiation with it. Institution and identity are in 
constant historical reciprocal determination. (p. 480)#
The cultures of Europe are numerous and heterogenous. Although it can be argued that 
some elements transcend borders, one of the most alarming nationalistic discourses is that 
the EU can and will neutralise the diverse cultural elements of Europe and transform the 
continent into a melting pot. Kraus (2008) argues that the project of building an integrated 
European Union was meant to create a cultural European identity without a culturally 
homogenous space, which was the tactic adopted in the creation of the nation-states. The 
cultures and ethnic elements of Europe represent the diversity, while the civic and 
institutional elements are the unity of the European Union (Sassatelli, 2002); diversity has a 
liberal connotation, while unity has essentialist elements (Sassatelli, 2009), just as civic 
national identity is a social constructivist concept in nature, while ethnic national identity 
is essentialist.#
The threat of globalisation or Europeanisation of the cultural elements prompted the EU 
to promote various cultural programmes at the European level, aimed at advancing the 
diversity of specific places of Europe. Sassatelli (2002, 2009) talks about the benefits of the 
three-decade long programme of declaring a European Capital of Culture (or more) every 
year. Her work suggests the importance of building on the existing cultural heritage of 
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Europe and of developing new cultural ties between the EU member states. Although very 
critical of previous work on European identity, both quantitative and qualitative, Sassatelli 
(2009) concludes that “within the current reconceptualisation of identities and cultures, 
Europe’s narrative of unity in diversity is becoming less of a smokescreen and more of an 
asset” (p. 193). The European Capital of Culture is only one of the many initiatives 
promoted by the EU in an effort to encourage cultural cooperation and awareness between 
the European countries. Through these programmes, the EU indicates that it recognises 
the importance of not only an institutional framework which will lend support to 
advancement of a civic European identity, but also the promotion of cultural elements 
(Sassatelli, 2002). Kraus (2008) argues that the development of educational and cultural 
programmes is one of the strategies employed by the European Union in the construction 
of European identity. He suggests that the others are the common EU citizenship and the 
European political symbols (as will be discussed in the next section). #
Kraus (2008) brings together both elements, the cultural and the civic, by supporting the 
idea that cultural identity is “the manifest expression of politically institutionalised cultural 
practices” (p.38). He argues that cultural patterns of identification encompass “collective 
memories, codified everyday knowledge, ethnicity, language and religion” (p.39) and these 
aspects of cultural identity define it by their role in the formation of civic identity, as an 
“institutionally entrenched cognitive and normative template for political 
communication” (p. 40). Kraus also emphasises the importance of the social interaction in 
the emergence of a cultural identity. The relationship between cultural and political (or 
civic) identity proposed by Kraus (2008) suggests that the two aspects of European identity 
are intertwined and emerge together. Nonetheless, as discussed later, these two 
components can be analysed and tested separately, although undoubtedly they form 
together the concept of European identity. #
1.4.3.6.1. Civic, cultural and general European identity - Bruter (2005) 
One of the first and very few empirical studies to look at the components of European 
identity has been designed and conducted by Bruter (2005). He discusses how European 
identity is a bi-dimensional concept, incorporating a civic dimension and a cultural 
dimension. He also briefly discusses the notion of general European identity, which in his 
opinion is a “self-attributed and spontaneous” (p. 20, Bruter, 2005) complement of the 
other two dimensions. #
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In his book, Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass European identity (2005), Bruter 
proposes a theoretical model for the emergence of European identity, both cultural and 
civic. He goes on to test this model empirically, compares the results to data from the 
Eurobarometers collected over three decades and uses focus groups in various European 
contexts to discuss with people the exact meaning and interpretations they associate with 
these concepts. In the following pages, I will present these studies more in depth, because 
the instrument that Bruter created to measure the civic and cultural components of 
European identity was also used in the present study to assess the two dimensions of 
European identity and how they might relate to various measures of linguistic variables, as 
well as with other European identity measurements. Apart from the instruments used in 
the Eurobarometers (which have been consistently criticised by social scientists), there are 
to my knowledge no other scales to assess European identity. #
As a political scientist, Bruter’s proposed model was intended to better understand the 
institutional factors that have an influence on the emergence of a mass European identity 
within the European Union. Figure 2 below represents the model as proposed by Bruter. His 
rationale and findings will be described next, followed by a discussion about the dimensions 
Bruter puts forth as characterising the European identity. #
  #
Figure 2. Bruter’s (2005) proposed model for European integration#
Briefly, the model proposed by Bruter and visually explained by the figure above is 
formulated on two different levels, the individual level and the collective, or “aggregate 
level”, as he names it. Bruter maintains that at the individual level, at a specific point in 
time, one’s European identity is influenced by awareness of news on European integration, 
Institutional inertia
Symbols
News
Unknown factors
European identity
Support for integration
Known effect from European identity model
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regardless of whether they are good or bad news, symbols of integration (the European flag, 
anthem, day etc.), but also their personal experience with Europe, and the importance 
associated with it by the institutions of the State that the individual belongs to. In turn, at 
a group level, Bruter suggests, the European identity emerges and evolves over time. The 
same factors, and possibly others, influence the development of a European identity and 
thus the support for European integration on a mass level. #
Bruter supports the idea that the individual and the general level are intrinsically connected 
and influence each other, and that they are brought together through the methodologies 
that he uses. He starts off by investigating the support for the model at an individual level 
by conducting a survey-based study in three European contexts (the United Kingdom, 
France and the Netherlands). The second phase is investigating the issues at an aggregate 
level by using data from the Eurobarometer surveys over a period of 30 years. Finally, he 
conducts focus groups with participants from the three contexts in order to better grasp 
what people actually mean when they talk about Europe and the European identity. In the 
following paragraphs, I will continue to describe these studies, focusing mainly on the 
survey results, since it is there that Bruter explains and exemplifies the concepts of civic 
and cultural European identity. Also, the present study will follow a similar methodology: 
the first part will investigate the relation between attitudes to multilingualism and other 
linguistic variables and the European identity through surveys conducted in the three 
contexts (Romania, Belgium and the United Kingdom), and then I will discuss the results 
of the surveys in interviews conducted with participants in the three contexts. In Bruter’s 
work, the triangulation of methodologies provided substance, but also nuances to the 
results of the studies; following a similar methodology will give depth to this study.#
The scale developed and tested by Bruter (2005) aimed at assessing participants’ levels of 
European identity on three dimensions: general, civic and cultural. Bruter discusses how 
the previous instruments used to measure European identity, i.e. the Eurobarometers, the 
European Value Study, started off with the presumption that there must be a tension 
between the feelings of identification with one’s nation and the feelings of European 
identification or that they should be hierarchical. He proposes a new instrument which 
addresses the relation between these two levels of political identification (nation and 
Europe), without necessarily asking participants to choose one or the other. Bruter 
proposes that a better way to look at these concepts is to split the European identity into 
its two components: the cultural component, referring mainly to feelings of a common 
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European heritage - a shared culture and values; and the civic component - referring mostly 
to the European Union and its institutions. #
In general and not referring particularly to the European identity context, the cultural 
identity has a social nuance, alluding to “common values, language, religion, ethnicity, 
history, myths etc.” (Bruter, 2005, p. 103), while the civic identity refers to “a set of relevant 
institutional contexts that define the individual’s values and perceptions of freedom, rights 
and obligations as an individual” (Bruter 2005, p. 103). Risse (2010) draws attention to the 
fact that the cultural (or ethnic) European identity has a more negative connotation, 
referring to the traditional European landscape (white, Christian Europeans) and that 
people who endorse this dimension might have a preference for preserving that particular 
status quo of Europe. This type of European identity is emergent from the ethnic national 
identity discussed earlier (Smith, 1991). For Risse (2010), the civic or rather political 
European identity as he prefers to call it relates more to the development of an identity 
which incorporates the national and European dimensions and can be considered a 
successor of the civic national identity (Smith, 1991). Notwithstanding, the nuance that 
Bruter gives these two dimensions does not put one in a more favourable light than the 
other, rather, his intent is to capture the positive aspects of both.#
The general European identity items used by Bruter with his participants aim at asking the 
direct questions of whether or not they feel European, not only to get a sense of how these 
participants relate to the idea of Europe, but also to be able to compare these results to 
other results obtained from previous studies (i.e., Eurobarometer). The relation between 
the cultural and civic components, and the general European identity also allows for an 
interesting discussion, as each combination might be stronger depending on the context. 
For the purposes of the present study, it can be hypothesised that the Belgian context has a 
better understanding and a higher familiarity of the civic identity. It can also be assumed 
that in the Romanian context the participants will identify stronger with cultural identity 
because it is a younger European nation and might be characterised by an ethnic national 
identity,. The ethnic national identity in this case can function as a basis for the cultural 
European identity. As Bruter mentions, the British participants might feel a stronger 
cultural identification with Europe since this nation did not adopt many of the European 
symbols, such as a common currency, or the affiliation to the Schengen zone, which would 
be encompassed in the civic dimension. This British attitude is exemplified in one of the 
public opinion surveys mentioned above (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011), where the 
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British respondents were the strongest endorsers of the common culture as an element of 
European identity, at 26% (the European average being 22%). #
The two questions assessing the general European identity ask participants if they consider 
themselves citizens of Europe and how strongly they identify with Europe. The civic 
identity is assessed through questions referring to various European Union symbols (the 
passport, the flag, the anthem), but also asks participants to choose from a list of five 
options all those which mean something to them: the right to vote for the European 
Parliament, the common institutions, the symbols of the EU, and the right to travel within 
the EU without having to do customs or show a passport. The rest of the questions in 
Bruter’s scale aim at pinning down the concept of cultural European identity. For this 
purpose, he devised a series of questions which should address participants’ feelings of 
closeness to fellow Europeans as opposed to non-Europeans, as well as the belief in a 
common European heritage. One question also asks participants to choose which of the 
answers best represent the feelings of being European and here they can choose all options 
that apply, from the list: a shared heritage, history, ideals, and belonging to the European 
family. #
One question proves to be problematic: Bruter asks participants to choose which of two 
countries they would prefer to win in the Women’s Volley-Ball World Championship and he 
presents four dyads, each with one European and one non-European country. Bruter 
defends his choice by saying that this particular sport does not have a wide following and 
thus the participants would show their cultural European-ness by choosing the European 
country from the dyad. This particular question proved to be problematic in the Romanian 
pilot study (see § 3.1.2) and thus was eliminated from the main study. Also, the content 
validity of this question was assessed in the interviews in Romania. The results showed that 
some people were actually familiar with the sport and chose the team they supported from 
each dyad based on previous knowledge. Even in Bruter’s empirical studies, the sports 
question was problematic, showing significant skewness, and thus being dropped from the 
analysis. #
Bruter (2005) assessed civic, cultural and general European identity using the instrument he 
developed on a sample of N = 212 participants from three distinct European contexts: the 
United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. Bruter reports that the scales showed good 
reliability in all contexts separately and together, with a Cronbach alpha value of 0.60 for 
cultural identity, 0.65 for general identity and 0.81 for civic identity. Although quite low, 
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these levels are considered acceptable for statistical analysis. The factor analysis was 
conducted separately for the civic and cultural identity items and based on the Eigenvalue, 
all items loaded on one factor for each of the respective analysis, although as expected the 
commonalities for the “games” items were very low. #
For the purposes of the statistical analysis, Bruter created 0-1 indices for each variable in 
order to weigh them equally. Although for this particular set of analysis, Bruter’s technique 
was well implemented, slight changes were made for the analysis of the present study 
because of the need to compare the scores obtained from Bruter’s instrument with other 
instruments that measured responses on a 6-point scale (see § 3.1.2). All responses were 
transformed  into 6-point scale responses, weighting them not as 0-1 indices, but as 1-6 
indices. This statistical artefact does not hamper the analysis. On the contrary, it provides 
consistency and thus makes the analysis more reliable.#
Bruter found that all three contexts presented with high levels of identity, both cultural and 
civic, thus skewing the identity variables towards the positive side. An interesting, but 
expected result was that the British sample presented higher levels of cultural identity, 
rather than civic, while in the other two contexts the civic identity was stronger. This is 
consistent with the Eurobarometer findings, that for the British the common European 
culture is a strong element of European identity. It can be explained by the fact that the 
United Kingdom has not adhered to many of the civic symbols of the European Union, 
such as the euro or the Schengen agreement. #
The author draws attention to the fact that the two dimensions, civic and cultural, are 
highly correlated and thus could be evolving together, but insists that they are distinct 
factors. Of course, the sample used in this study was not representative of the entire 
population of the countries they came from and thus the results are not necessarily 
generalisable. However, Bruter (2005) states that it could be inferred that when people are 
primed to think of their European identity, they tend to think more along the lines of their 
civic identity, except in the case of the British participants. Another finding is that being 
able to speak foreign languages and having lived in other European countries are strong 
overall predictors of support for European integration. Knowledge of foreign languages was 
also significant predictor for cultural and civic European identity, while having lived in 
another European country predicted higher levels of civic identity. These results were 
obtained by looking at the three contexts combined, and Bruter does not present the 
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break-down by country. Nonetheless, the results obtained here are consistent with previous 
findings described earlier (Fligsteain, 2008; Favell, 2009 and others).#
Bruter continues his investigation by looking at the influence of good or bad news about 
the European Union and the symbols of the EU on the two forms of European identity. As 
discussed earlier, the media plays a truly important role in a population’s identification with 
Europe (Inglehart, 1970 and others). Bruter’s results indicate that the news, be it good or 
bad, leads to an increase in the feelings of cultural identity, while the increased visibility of 
the European symbols have a positive effect on the civic identity. The analysis of the 
Eurobarometer data from various European contexts over a period of three decades 
suggests, with some exceptions, that there is an overall increase in the levels of European 
identity across Europe, supporting thus the idea of “institutional inertia, which claims that 
increased length of membership automatically reinforces European identity” (Bruter, 2005, 
p. 148). It seems that key moments such as the introduction of various symbols of the 
European Union coincide or are closely followed by an increase of European identity in 
various contexts, consistent with other researchers’ findings (see Risse, 2003; Caporaso & 
Kim, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012 for data on Eurobarometers).#
The last part of the study carried out by Bruter describes multiple focus groups he 
conducted with participants from the three contexts were the data was collected, i.e. 
United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. The reason for conducting these focus 
groups was to better understand how people perceive Europe and the European Union, but 
also how their perception is influenced by news relating to Europe, symbols of the EU and 
the participants’ personal experience with the continent. Interestingly, again at this stage, 
Bruter found support for his theory that the European identity has a cultural and a civic 
component. Many of the participants in the focus group discussions (a majority, as 
described by the author) talked about the ease of travelling in a Europe without borders, 
the free circulation of citizens, European policies and other topics which point to civic 
identity, while others mentioned ideas more in line with a cultural identity, such as peace, 
overcoming historical conflicts and cooperation between Europeans from different 
contexts. It is also worth noting here, that the continental contexts seem to favour the civic 
identity more than the British sample, and Bruter attributes this difference to the reasons 
mentioned earlier (not participating in the Schengen agreement, and not adopting the 
common currency) and to the lack of direct experience of the dissolution of the borders. 
An important point that was addressed multiple times in the focus groups seems to be the 
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experience of Europe, which Bruter says leads over time to the institutional inertia, which 
posits that levels of European identity increase over time even if only for the sole reason of 
belonging to the European Union. Here, the author connects the individual level of his 
model to the mass, or aggregate level, stating that the experience of Europe at the 
individual level is the equivalent of the institutional inertia at the aggregate level, an idea 
supported by the participants in the focus group discussions. #
As part of the European experience, Bruter mentions a point of importance to the present 
study, which is the knowledge of foreign languages and its influence on the participants’ 
feeling of European identity. The author stresses that the sample was split with regards to 
this topic, some emphasising the importance of knowing foreign languages for a better 
experience of Europe, others stating that it has no impact. In broad terms, this study will 
be concerned with explaining if and how proficiency in foreign languages and positive 
attitudes to multilingualism effect the emergence and strength of the feelings of European 
identity, both civic and cultural. #
The studies conducted by Bruter (2005) provide an intriguing perspective on European 
identity - Europeans seem to internalise it in different ways, some showing stronger ties to 
the cultural aspect of the identity, some emphasising the benefits of its civic aspect. These 
studies develop and test an instrument for measuring civic and cultural European identity 
in three contexts. The results are promising, making this instrument a potentially useful 
and valid instrument for studying European identity. #
The present study will further assess the validity of the instrument in three contexts, one 
which was also included in Bruter’s studies - the United Kingdom, and two novel ones - 
Belgium and Romania. Based on his work, it can be hypothesised at this point that the 
United Kingdom will continue to show higher levels of cultural identity than civic identity. 
In the case of Belgium, the levels of civic identity could be either at the same level or 
higher than the cultural identity, since Belgium is the prime receiver of the publicity, the 
news and the symbols of the European Union. It is more complicated to make an assertion 
about the Romanian context: it could be that the younger generation will show higher 
levels of civic identity, since they are the prime beneficiaries from the last wave of 
enlargement of the European Union in 2007 (Ross, 2012), while the older participants 
might show stronger cultural ties to Europe. However, given that Romania is one of the 
newest members of the European Union, the levels of European identity should be lower 
than in the case of the UK or Belgium, given the lesser institutional inertia in this context. 
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Attitudes and practices of multilingualism could show a closer relation to the cultural 
identity (being proficient in more languages can allow for more cultural ties to Europe), or 
to the civic identity (proficiency in more languages can increase the potential for labour 
mobility). These issues will be addressed in this study.#
1.4.3.7. The economic crisis 
Recently, the media has been debating quite avidly the impact that the economic crisis will 
have on the trust in the European institutions and on the citizens’ feelings of belongingness 
to the EU. Sometimes, the media discourse has been fuelled by various rightwing political 
parties and politicians, who use the economic crisis to incite feelings of nationalism and 
distancing from the European Union. As shown in Bruter’s (2005) study and posited by 
others as well (Inglehart, 1970), the amount and type of media coverage that the EU 
receives has a great impact on citizens’ levels of European identity. In a speech given in 
front of the European Commission, President Barroso warned of the dangers of the rise in 
nationalism:#
But European unity cannot be taken for granted. European unity, 
democracy and respect for human dignity have to be fought for 
every day. And today the resurgence of populism, sometimes 
extreme nationalism, threatens to destroy the dream made real. And, 
let us be clear, the indifference of many pro-Europeans is also a risk 
(...) [W]e must put an end to the aberration of dealing with 
European issues at the national level as if they were external or 
foreign policy issues. This is I think enough reason to have the 
temptation to write a new narrative for Europe. (April, 2013)#
Not only does President Barroso warn against the dangers of nationalistic discourses, but 
also against the lack of action and voice of the pro-Europe citizens. The phrase coined by 
Duchesne (2008) springs to mind: Euro-indifference is just as dangerous to the cohesion 
and sustainability of the European project as Euro-scepticism. As Guibernau (2011) argues, 
the European economical prosperity is intrinsically linked to the European identity, and 
thus in moments of economic crisis when the governments impose measures of austerity 
on their citizens, the EU is an easily targetable scapegoat. Bellamy (2013) suggests that the 
crisis showed that “the integration has not produced economic and social convergence 
between states”, and has transformed the relation between the member states from an 
equal position to a power relation, because of the loans and bailouts offered by some 
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countries to others. This shift in the power balance between states might be detrimental to 
the EU, however there are institutional safeguards in place to ensure that the members 
have equal say in a European-wide debate, and as Bellamy (2013) argues, the lasting 
solutions to the crisis will only be the ones that are in line with the democratic and 
“demoicratic” character of the EU.#
Other researchers (Fligstein et al., 2012) think that the crisis provides an opportunity for 
European member states to work together to solve the economic difficulties, which in turn 
should lead to strengthening ties between countries and potentially a stronger European 
identity. It is not yet clear if this is a potential outcome of the European economic crisis or 
whether the crisis came too early, at a point when the European identity had not taken 
strong roots in all of its member countries (Fligstein et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the various 
meetings at the European level showed that the political elite is interested in preserving the 
EU, although at a national level their discourse emphasises the national interests above the 
European ones. #
In a recent Standard Eurobarometer (no. 78, 2012), the impact of the crisis is clearly visible, 
however, the trust of the Europeans in the EU is still higher than their trust in the national 
governments or parliaments (33% versus 28% and 27%, respectively). Also, the Europeans 
participating in this survey indicated that they believed the EU to be more capable to 
tackle the economic crisis than the national governments of their countries. A majority of 
the Europeans have a neutral image of the EU, while the positive image has been 
decreasing steadily (from 48% in 2009 to 30% in autumn 2012). The support for the 
monetary and economic union however has remained quite strong (53%), although the 
authors of the report suggest that there is a wide variation between the member states. 
One of the impressive results is that the Europeans strongly believe that the EU countries 
need to work together and cooperate in order to overcome the crisis (85%). Another 
indication of the trust of the citizens of Europe in the EU in the long run is their belief 
that the EU will come out stronger from the crisis (53%) and that the EU has the tools and 
power to defend the interests of Europe in the global economy (61%). These results suggest 
that although the national(istic) political discourses have tried to promote the EU as a 
destabilising entity for the national economies, the European citizens still trust and hope 
that the EU will play a positive role in the resolutions of the crisis. #
The crisis has taken hold of the global and European economy since 2008 and the EU has 
been monitoring the public’s perceptions through Eurobarometers ever since, there is still 
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little evidence of the effects that it will have on the European identity (Fuchs, 2011, p. 49). 
Although the percentage of people believing that their country’s membership in the EU 
was a good thing has decreased drastically over a very short period of time in some 
countries (for example, in Germany by 10% and in Greece by almost 17% between autumn 
2009 and spring 2010), this only points to the importance of European identity in the 
maintenance of a cohesive and unified European Union (Fuchs, 2011). Thus understanding 
this collective identity of the European citizens, what fosters it and what hinders it is of 
utmost importance for a positive resolution of the economic crisis. #
As Edwards (2009) points out “times of transition, whether welcomed or imposed, are 
always times of renewed self-examination” (p. 16). The European and global economic crisis 
mark an important moment in the history of the European Union and of the European 
identity, and it will, without doubt, have an impact on that identity. Whether the crisis will 
lead to stronger economic, political and social ties between the European countries, or a 
reevaluation of the relationships between the member states and their relationship with 
the European Union, it will most probably change the Europeans’ understanding of their 
identity and how it relates to the national and European levels. The effects of the crisis are 
to some extent coming to light, but they present in a contradictory fashion: Europeans 
trust the EU more than their national governments to solve the crisis, but the enthusiasm 
of their country’s membership in the EU has declined. It is very likely that until the final 
stages of this crisis there will be no definite answer about its effects on European identity; 
it is nonetheless evident, as Fuchs (2011) suggested, that stronger levels of European 
identity can only provide assistance and support to the European project. Fligstein and his 
colleagues (2012) are more optimistic in saying that the current crisis of the European 
Union “will be resolved, as others have been in the past, with a wide, if shallow, sense of 
European identity” (p. 120). The next section will discuss one of the factors that can be 
regarded as controversial in the formation, enhancement and maintenance of European 
identity: language.#
1.4.3.8. European identity and multilingualism 
The motto of the European Union, United in diversity, represents the endeavour pursued by 
the EU to promote cooperation and peace between its member states, while providing a 
propitious environment for the preservation of cultures, traditions and languages. All 
official languages of the EU member states have the status of official languages of the 
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European Union. Simultaneously, the EU is keen on promoting and safeguarding the 
linguistic rights of the EU minority groups. All the official EU documents are translated 
into all the 24 official languages, the European citizens are guaranteed the right to be able 
to use their native language in any communications with the EU, the members of the 
European Parliament have the right to use their own language while giving a speech in the 
European Parliament and there is even a European Commission in charge of matters of 
multilingualism, among other things.#
In 2007, after Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union, the post for 
Commissioner for Multilingualism was created in order manage the language and 
multilingualism matters in Europe. This post was occupied by Leonard Orban, the first and 
only Commissioner for Multilingualism between 2007 and 2010, when the role was 
reassigned to the European Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and 
Youth, fulfilled by Androulla Vassiliou. Some have pronounced this to be a sign that the 
European Union does not view multilingualism as an issue important enough to have its 
own Commissioner, while others suggested that it is merely a way of saving money from 
the European budget, and that the programmes which were designed to support 
multilingualism in Europe will continue to function as before and will benefit from the 
funding allocated to them. #
With regards to the European Parliament, Wodak and her colleagues (2012) found that the 
European officials use various linguistic strategies employing their own multilingual abilities 
to facilitate communication, to emphasise a point, or to provide a transition from the 
previous speaker. Also Grindheim and Lohndal (2008) found that the drafts of the official 
documents are not translated into all languages at once, but rather use a technique of 
employing six pivotal languages. As for the official EU policy for multilingualism, the EU 
recommends that all European citizens should be able to communicate in their mother 
tongue and two other European languages (Wright, 2004; Mamadouh, 2002; Oakes 2002; 
Glaser, 2005). It is generally accepted and expected that English will be one of the 
languages learned (if it is not the mother tongue), and many people who live in multilingual 
or border communities tend to learn the languages of their neighbours (Glaser, 2005; Risse, 
2004, 2010 and others). #
Europeans are probably not the most multilingual people on a global level (Glaser, 2005), 
but quite a large proportion of them are able to communicate at least in one other language 
than their mother tongue (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012). The EU guarantees the right 
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of free movement within the Union, and although only a small proportion of Europeans 
take advantage of these benefits, and they are considered to be the elite, it does appear that 
younger Europeans are more keen on learning languages and on travelling, studying and 
working in the EU. There are thus strong indicators that in time the levels of European 
identity will be influenced by these opportunities. Multilingual abilities have been 
described as having a commodifiable value (Glaser, 2005; Heller, 2010), by increasing the 
chances of employment and financial gain in any part of the world, and within the 
European Union, specifically. #
Critiques of the concept of European identity have argued that this identity will have 
difficulties in becoming a strong and widespread identity for European citizens, because 
there are no fixed geographical borders and no one common language, as it is usually the 
case for the formation of national identities. Others, like Grindheim and Lohndal (2008) 
argue that the EU is something new, completely different from the nation-state, and thus 
the rules of the formation of national identity do not apply to the development of the 
European identity. They argue that at least at the institutional EU level, this issue is solved 
by the complex and intricate mechanism of translation, which handles this task efficiently. 
As Kraus (2008) suggests, even if the Europeans communicate among themselves in one 
language, that should be done in such a way as to preserve the linguistic diversity of 
Europe. He argues for a “politics of language that substantially enhances our understanding 
of the language of diversity” (p. 198). Language, being part of each European’s identity, has 
the potential to become not just a means of communication with other speakers of that 
language or just a marker of identity, but also a sign of respect for the linguistic, cultural 
and political diversity of Europe. On a personal and social level, positive attitudes to 
multilingualism and multilingual practices could be the catalyst in the development of 
feelings of European identity.#
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2. Rationale for this study 
The three contexts in which I chose to investigate the relationship between European 
identity and multilingualism are Romania, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The 
interdisciplinary and complex nature of the literature on European identity requires as a 
first step of the study an in-depth exploration of the components of European identity and 
the relation between this identity and the national one. The next step is the assessment of 
the relationship between European identity and multilingualism, and the enquiry into 
whether multilingualism has the power to predict European identity. #
The contexts chosen provide the opportunity to look at one of the new member states 
(Romania), one of the founding members of the European Union (Belgium) and one 
member of the EU that has not joined the eurozone and where the discourse against the 
EU has intensified in recent years (the United Kingdom). Linguistically speaking, 
Romanian is a language spoken only within the borders of Romania; Belgium presents an 
interesting linguistic landscape, possessing a linguistic border between Dutch and French; 
and the UK’s official language is English, one of today’s lingue franche of Europe and the 
entire world. As Kohli (2000) states, “the most acute test for European mass identification 
is faced by those countries that will decide whether to join the EU, but also by those that 
may possibly face the decision to leave it again (such as the UK)” (p.126). #
The previous studies which looked at European identity have consistently used a 
qualitative approach, with the exception of the Eurobarometers and Bruter’s (2005) study 
discussed above. I believe that in order to better understand a complex concept such as 
European identity and its intricate relationship to multilingualism the best methodological 
approach is the use of triangulation (Dewaele, 2009; Duff, 2006; Saville-Troike, 2003), using 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. Thus, the first stage of the research was 
comprised of collecting online surveys, and the statistical results were complemented by 
interviews conducted in all contexts. As Duff (2006) argues, triangulation is not just 
employing quantitative and qualitative methods to study a particular topic, but also 
combining research and theory perspectives. This mixed-methodological approach 
combined the rigour of statistical analysis with the subtleties of data given by interview 
data.#
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The present study coincides with the evolution of the economic crisis in Europe. Such 
strained times will have an impact of the feelings of European identity, and it is possible 
that these changes will be most evident in countries such as Romania, which joined the EU 
recently, the UK, which has always been a somewhat reluctant member, but maybe even in 
Belgium, which is considered to be at the heart of Europe. I will briefly discuss each of 
these contexts from a linguistic point of view, as well as their relation and role within the 
EU.#
2.1. Contexts 
2.1.1. Romania 
According to the press release from the Romanian National Statistics Institute, Romania 
has a bit over 19 million inhabitants, of which 90.6% speak Romanian as a mother tongue. 
Hungarian is the second largest mother tongue, with 6.7% of the citizens of Romania 
declaring it as first language (Institutul National de Statistica, 2012). Other ethnicities and 
languages of Romania are: Romani, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Russian, German, Turkish and a 
few other languages spoken by small communities. The Romanian Constitution guarantees 
the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious right of all national minorities (Article 6, 
Constituția României, 2003), as well as support for the principle of equality among all 
Romanian citizens. It is also estimated that between 4 and 12 million Romanians live 
abroad, some having left as refugees or asylum seekers during the Communist regime, 
others left after the fall of Communism in 1989, while another wave of migrants left 
Romania after 2007, when the country joined the European Union. #
Romania is the seventh largest European country, having the same borders since 1947 Peace 
Treaty signed in Paris. The Romanian language belongs to the family of Romance 
languages, and according to Article 13 in the Romanian Constitution, it is the official 
language of Romania (Constitutia Romaniei, 2003). Certainly, with Romania’s accession to 
the EU, Romanian became one of the EU’s official languages. Romania joined the European 
Union only in 2007, thus being one of the youngest members of the EU. It has not yet 
joined the Eurozone or the Schengen area, but it has taken steps in these directions, 
expecting to join the Eurozone in 2015. #
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With regards to national and European identity, as discussed above, Romania is part of the 
Eastern European countries, and thus might adhere to a stronger ethnic national identity. 
Pichler (2008) maintains that there are no clear-cut differences between the Western and 
Eastern part of Europe with regards to their patterns of identification with Europe. Case 
(2009) suggests that it is wrong to consider the Eastern and Western Europeans as different 
and points to clear examples of how historical events in the Eastern part of Europe have 
impacted the history of Western Europe. This is not to say necessarily the concept of 
European identity has exactly the same meaning and connotations on both sides of the 
European continent. Clearly, the historical events that have dominated the European 
landscape in the 20th century must have left their mark on Europeans’ understanding of 
their identity, be it national or European. However, as Case (2009) argues, the Eastern 
European viewpoint should not be underestimated in this debate. She states: #
Overlooking or belittling the East-Central European perspective on 
what it means to be European is thus not an error of snobbery alone, 
it is a form of denial about the links between cause and effect and, as 
such, a political move. (p. 115)#
Favell (2009) talks about the Eastern migration to the West and suggests that most of these 
migrants are well-educated, middle-class individuals, looking for a lower-level better-paid 
job. Although according to the European Union, these migrants should be considered “free 
movers” and should be encouraged to travel, study and work abroad, the reality is that they 
are more often than not considered immigrants. Some member states of the EU have put 
restrictions for the Romanians and Bulgarians in 2007, and presumably only in 2014 these 
restrictions should be lifted. There are however many right-wing political parties in the 
Western states who argue against the restrictions being lifted of fear of mass migration. In 
their nationalistic political discourse, the Western states attempt to portray the Eastern 
migrants as people coming to take advantage of the social systems of the host countries. 
Nonetheless, Favell (2009) argues that the Eastern European migrants are the European 
citizens who most take advantage of the European regulations with regards to freedom of 
movement and work, exercising their rights as citizens of the European Union.#
Some recent studies have focused on the concept of Romanian national identity (Brubaker, 
Feischmid, Fox & Grancea, 2006; White, 1999; Flora, Szilagyi & Roudometof, 2005 and 
others), quite often emphasising aspects of the relationship between the Hungarians and 
Romanians in the region of Transylvania. Others have incorporated data from Romania 
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from Eurobarometers (Tatar, 2010 and others). A study conducted by Dragoman (2008) 
looked at the feelings of national identity and Europeanisation in the context of Sibiu 
becoming a European Capital of Culture in 2007, simultaneously with Romania’s accession 
to the EU. In his study, he found that there is a tension between the feelings of Romanian 
identity and European integration which he attributes to the different demands imposed 
on an individual by these two concepts. Nonetheless, the study does not seem to have a 
sound methodological basis, having arrived to these conclusions based on data from the 
World Values Study, but without actually detailing the analysis. Dragoman (2008) also 
suggests that more studies should investigate the Europeanisation of Romanians and their 
identity after joining the EU.#
To my knowledge, there is no study that investigated in depth the feelings of European 
identity within the Romanian space post 2007. The present study aims to address this issue, 
by collecting survey data as well as interviews. Due to convenience, most of the sampling 
will be done in Cluj-Napoca, one of the largest cities in Transylvania. However, since the 
surveys are online, they will not be restricted to a geographical area. The study also aims to 
investigate the differences, if any, between Romanians who were under 35 years old at the 
time of data collection, and those who were over 35. There is evidence to suggest that age is 
an important factor that influences European identity, and that younger participants feel 
more European than the older ones (Ross, 2012; Pichler, 2008; Inglehart, 1970 and others). 
The reason 35 was chosen as the cut-off age for the separation of the two groups is that 
people who were 35 at the time of the study would have been around 13 years old in 1989, at 
the time of the Revolution in 1989. This means that they would have lived their adult life in 
a democratic regime, unlike the other participants who would have been old enough to 
understand and experience Communism in Romania before 1989. The same cut-off age was 
used for the other contexts, for reasons of consistency. #
2.1.2. Belgium 
Belgium has about 11 million citizens (Eurostat, 2010) and it is located geographically and 
metaphorically at the heart of Europe. Belgium, specifically the capital Brussels, is the host 
of many European and global organisations, including the headquarters of the European 
Union. Belgium is a federal parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy (The 
World Factbook - Belgium, 2013). Although, for many, Belgium is a symbol for the unity of 
Europe, there have been tensions between the Dutch-speaking Flemish people (living 
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mostly in Flanders, the Northern part of the country) and the French-speaking Walloons 
(residing in Wallonia, the Southern part of Belgium). These two languages, Dutch and 
French, have the status of official languages of the country, together with German, which is 
spoken by a smaller minority in the Eastern part of Wallonia. Dutch is spoken as a first 
language by approximately 6 million Belgians (about 58%), French by about 4 million, and 
German by 75.000 people (De Caluwe, 2012). Brussels is officially a bilingual city, having 
both French and Dutch as official languages. Although it is situated in Flanders, a bit over 
half the population of the capital has French as a mother tongue, about 5-7% speak Dutch 
as an L1 (De Caluwe, 2012), and almost 10% are bilingual (De Schutter, 2011). There is a 
growing number of people who have an immigrant language such as Arabic or Turkish as 
their L1 in Brussels (Ceuleers, 2008).#
The geographical location of Belgium has influenced its linguistic landscape, being at the 
confluence of Romance and Germanic Europe. The economic situation of the two regions 
has shifted over the years, and together with other factors it has led to various political 
conflicts between the two regions, Flanders and Wallonia (De Caluwe, 2012). The most 
recent one was in 2007, when it took more than a year for the political parties to reach an 
agreement to form a government. During that time, there were rumours in the local and 
international media about whether the two regions would separate into two different 
countries. These political conflicts are not always reflected in the attitudes of the Belgians. 
For example, in 2008 the National Frite Day was organised for the first time, the organisers 
arguing that the words for mayonnaise and frites were the same in both French and Dutch, 
and that should be enough to unify Belgium. The motto of the day was “Everyone speaks 
Frites!” (Carling, 2008). Although on a comical tone, this might convey attitudes prevalent 
among Belgians with regards to their country and its internal linguistic borders. #
The linguistic border of Belgium has been a source of tension to such degree that some 
have argued that they have developed their own forms of national identity (Keating, 2001, 
p.vii). Although this tension might stem from the economic differences between the more 
prosperous Flanders and the more penurious Wallonia, the “economic divide is construed 
along linguistic lines” (Vogl & Hüning, 2010, p. 228). There are nonetheless Belgians who 
believe that a resolution to the political and economic impasse in their country is 
bilingualism and multilingualism, which would allow people to work in any area of Belgium. 
Linguistic and political culture cannot be detached, and furthermore “linguistic culture is 
political culture” (Kraus, 2008, p. 83, emphasis in the original). In the case of Belgium, this 
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assumption has been part of the political life and has become entrenched in the political 
and linguistic discourse.#
De Caluwe (2012) maintains that there is still a small number of Flemings, a few thousands, 
who insist on their children being bilingual French-Dutch, although in the educational 
system in Flanders French is taught as a second language, on the same level as English. 
Quite often, the author suggests, the young Flemings choose English over French as the 
language to become their L2. But those who believe in bilingualism distance themselves 
“from the prevailing ideology, which often equated the struggle on behalf of Dutch as a 
struggle against French” (De Caluwe, 2012, p. 270). Vogl and Hüning (2010) argue that the 
situation in Wallonia is different, as a recent change in policy is encouraging the teaching of 
Dutch in schools and is pushing for bilingualism. Nonetheless, they put forward the claim 
that the sum total of the language policies in both regions of Belgium “still add up to a lack 
of proficiency in the language of the respective other language community. This fosters the 
division of Belgium” (p. 244). #
Belgium is officially a multilingual country, but in practice it is actually formed by two 
predominantly monolingual regions and the bilingual capital, Brussels. Geographically, 
Brussels is located in Flanders, but it is officially a bilingual region. Ceuleers (2008) argues 
that bilingualism is increasingly becoming a pre-requisite for a successful career in the 
capital. This is a new development, as traditionally individual bilingualism is not regarded 
as desirable (for a historical account, see Vogl & Hüning, 2010). Brussels has always been 
considered to be at the heart of Europe, but public discourse in Belgium often attempts to 
emphasise both the linguistic and identity differences between Brussels and the "Rest-of-
Belgium” or RoB (de Schutter, 2011). De Schutter argues for what he calls “the Brussels 
model”, mirroring van Parijs’ Belgian linguistic justice model (2001). Van Parijs suggests that 
in order to maintain a just linguistic society, the language dominant in a territory should 
become the official language of the people living in that territory, much like it is in Belgium, 
with Flanders having Dutch as an official language, French in Wallonia, and German being 
the official language in the German Community. Brussels on the other hand is officially 
bilingual, providing services and administration in both French and Dutch. De Schutter 
(2011) suggests that in order for linguistic justice to be fully attained in a territory where 
there are more languages present, all these languages should become official, much like they 
are in Brussels. The latter would be a model for linguistic pluralism, while the former is a 
proponent of the linguistic territoriality principle. De Schutter (2011) argues in favour of 
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the Brussels model suggesting that this is the only model that can truly be considered 
linguistically just, while the RoB model allows for linguistic minorities to be driven away 
from a territory by means of linguistic territoriality. Although this is a philosophical 
argument closely related to issues of linguistic justice, the two linguistic landscapes 
currently present in Belgium (the bilingual capital and the monolingual regions of Flanders 
and Wallonia) are an interesting case study for the purposes of the present study, therefore 
one of the research questions has been included in order to test the differences between 
Brussels and RoB.#
Belgium is a founding member of the European Union, being one of the original six 
countries which formed an economic alliance in 1950, as was discussed previously. The 
Eurobarometer surveys discussed earlier indicate that although there has been a decrease in 
the feelings of identification to Europe in recent years, Belgium is still one of the highest 
supporters of the EU and the eurozone. Therborn (2008) nonchalantly states that due to 
the political, economic, social and linguistic struggles within the Belgian borders, the 
country might have split long ago were it not for Brussels being the capital of the EU (idea 
also presented by Licata, 2000), and that it is “the capital of a failed nation-
state” (Therborn, 2008, p.73), although it functions as the capital of the EU. Brussels is a 
model of cosmopolitan linguistically and ethnically diverse European city, which is not only 
the functioning capital of one of the leader European states, but also of the EU. It has 
become the home of many European and international institutions, which brought along 
with them more diversity by hiring people from all over the world. Brussels and Belgium 
have faced the many challenges of being at the heart of Europe, both practically and 
metaphorically, and have been successful at accommodating the needs of Belgians and 
Europeans alike. Thus, saying that it is “the capital of a failed nation-state” is a futile 
overstatement that does not characterise the state of affairs in Brussels and Belgium today.#
The idea that Brussels has become a “den of techno-bureaucrats” (Cerutti, 2008) is in stark 
contradiction with it being the home of Europe. Being at the heart of Europe and seat of 
the European Union (for a historical perspective on how Brussels became the capital of 
Europe, see Therborn, 2008), the question of how European the Belgians feel has been 
addressed quite often, usually in comparative studies of various European nations and 
contexts (Bruter, 2009; Duchesne et al., 2010; Díez-Medrano, 2008; Licata, 2000, and 
many others). As discussed earlier, the Eurobarometers indicate that the levels of European 
identity in Belgium are moderate to high compared to the rest of Europe. Also, it seems 
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that a strong national Belgian identity is compatible with feelings of European identity. To 
my knowledge, there are no studies looking at the feelings of identification with Europe 
comparing Wallonia and Flanders, or Brussels and the two regions (the ROB). Through the 
surveys and the interviews conducted in Belgium, this study addresses issues related to 
these questions. The participants have the option of filling out the French or the Dutch 
version of the survey. As with the other contexts, the generational change will be 
investigated, by comparing the under 35 years old participants with the ones over 35. The 
survey data was collected online, while the interviews were conducted in Brussels. #
2.1.3. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the official name of the UK, 
has a little over 63 million people, making it one of the largest countries in Europe by 
population. Great Britain includes England, Scotland and Wales (The World Factbook - 
United Kingdom, 2013), and the majority of the population is concentrated in England 
(over 53 million, UK Census, 2011). The largest city in the UK is its capital, London, with a 
population of about 8 million. London is a cosmopolitan city, attracting people from all 
over the world to work in various fields, including banking, services and education. With 
regards to the form of government, the UK is a constitutional monarchy with a 
parliamentary system. #
The 2011 census data shows that in England and Wales more than 90% of the population 
has English as a main language, while in London the percentage is 78 (Nomis, 2011). These 
percentages indicate that London is home to a diverse population, but that overall in the 
UK the majority of people have English as a first language. English is the official language 
in the UK, while Scots, Scottish Gaelic, Welsh, Cornish and Irish are recognised as regional 
languages and some of them have official status in parts of the UK (The World Factbook - 
United Kingdom, 2013). As discussed previously, the Eurobarometers indicate that 61% of 
the participants from the UK are unlikely to speak a foreign language (Special 
Eurobarometer 386, 2012) and this might be due to the fact that English is becoming more 
and more a de facto lingua franca in the world, with 38% of Europeans speaking it as a 
foreign language (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012). The United Kingdom joined the EU in 
1973, which marked the beginning of the perceived threat to French as a foreign language 
within the EU. Many have argued (Oakes, 2002 and others) that the implementation of the 
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“mother tongue + 2” at the European multilingualism policy level was due to the perceived 
threat that English posed to French within the European Union. #
The Eurobarometer opinion polls show that in the UK, attachment to the EU is one of the 
lowest in the Union - 29% (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011). However, when broken down 
into civic and cultural components, the cultural European identity is found to be 
significantly higher than the civic identity (Bruter, 2005). This result is also corroborated by 
Eurobarometer studies, which show that for the UK sample a common European culture is 
one of the most important aspects of European identity, being endorsed by 26% of the 
sample - the highest level among the European countries (Special Eurobarometer 346, 
2011). This finding could be due to the fact that the UK did not adhere to many of the civic 
elements of European integration, such as the Euro, or the Schengen zone. #
Bruter (2005) discusses the evolution of the national identity in the UK and points out to 
the differences between feeling English and British. It appears that the term (and the 
symbols associated with it) British has been used interchangeably with English in England, 
but the Scottish, Welsh and Irish consider them to be entirely distinctive attachments. For 
example, in the 2011 Census, 57.7% described their identity as English only (data for 
England and Wales, Nomis, 2011), 8.7% called themselves “English and British”, and 19.1% 
identified as British only. In the same census, about 33% said they do not feel English at all, 
and 71% that they do not feel British. Bruter (2005) argues that because of the perceived 
threat of European integration, the British symbols (driving on the left side of the road, the 
non-metric system, the Pound Sterling) have gained substantial support. But the author 
describes the paradox of these symbols - the Pound Sterling is used by England and 
Scotland, but it has different physical characteristics, while the non-metric system was only 
adopted in the UK in the 19th century, and it was regarded as a thread to British-ness, 
while the metric system was regarded as a symbol of British identity (Bruter, 2005, p. 
44-45).#
Other studies have looked at European identity within the UK context. Some, such as 
Duchesne and her colleagues (2010) found evidence for a lack of interest on the part of the 
participants towards Europe and European identity. As discussed earlier, Grudy and 
Jamieson (2007) found that for their Scottish sample, the European identity concept is an 
unexamined concept and that they identified a lot stronger with the Scottish identity than 
the British one. The respondents in this study also expressed their view that being Scottish, 
rather than English, is more closely linked to being European, however the levels of 
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identification with Europe were not very high. The participants in this study were divided 
in two groups, one representative sample, and one target sample (which included 
participants who were enrolled in European language classes or other Europe-related 
fields). The results clearly indicate that the target group felt significantly closer to Europe 
than the representative sample, indicating that exposure to European topics is positively 
related to European identity.#
An interesting finding was presented by Cinnirella and Hamilton (2007) who looked at 
European, British and ethnic identities and the relationship between them for a group of 
white British participants and a group of South Asian British participants. The results 
indicate that for the white British group high level of European identity correlated 
negatively with national identity, while for the other group this correlation was positive. 
The South Asian group also displayed higher levels of British, European and ethnic identity 
when compared to the white British group. The authors argue that this difference in the 
perceived relation between national and European identities between the two groups might 
be due to the fact that the white Britons tend to be past-oriented, still holding on to old 
stereotypes regarding the continental Europeans and strong positive attitudes towards the 
British Empire, while British minority members might be more future-oriented, attempting 
to distance themselves from the British imperialistic past. #
Similar results were reported by Díez-Medrano (2003) in his study looking at the different 
ways people interpret European integration in Germany, Great Britain and Spain. He also 
found split opinions in the UK regarding the European Union and European integration, 
correlating with the participants’ view of the British past and the British empire. Those 
who considered it to be a “glorious history” (Díez-Medrano, 2003, p. 182) tended to express 
more nationalistic views, while those who distanced themselves from the imperialistic past, 
although not expressing too much enthusiasm, did not display strong doubts about it 
either. Many of his British respondents reported a fear that the European integration was 
damaging to the UK and that it came to the detriment of British culture. Also, it seems 
that the British participants in his study reported perceived differences between the British 
and the European cultures. Nonetheless, there was a high frequency of respondents who 
referred critically to the “British nationalism and xenophobia” with regards to Britons who 
expressed a strong national identity. This is not to say that British nationalism is 
predominantly xenophobic, rather that it includes elements of multiculturalism (Risse, 
2010) on a local level, and apart from ideas of European integration. #
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The previous studies regarding the views on European identity within the UK context 
suggest that although present, the European identity takes a potentially different form here 
than in the rest of Europe. Risse (2010) proclaims that in the eyes of the UK, Europe will 
always be regarded as the Other and that so far “the United Kingdom has embraced a 
‘Europe a la carte’” (p.83, quotations in original). Even the political discourse advocating for 
the European Union and European integration is more often than not centred around 
economic interest, and not identity. The UK maintains its insular status with regards to 
Europe, preferring a more distant attitude to European integration on various levels 
proposed by European politicians. In spite of that, Favell (2008, 2009) argues that London 
is one of the Eurocities, where the EU citizenship is part of everyday life, engaging in 
behaviours facilitated by the membership in the EU, such as voting in local and European 
election or relocating within the EU, even though the participants in his studies did not 
display covert positive attitudes towards the process of European integration. The present 
study originated in London, but due to the fact that data for the survey were obtained via 
the internet, participants from other UK regions were included in the sample. The 
qualitative interviews were all conducted in London, with London residents. Once the data 
were collected, analysis was done to compare the Over-35 with the Under-35 years old 
group, in order to see if there were differences between the two. #
2.1.4. Conclusion 
The intricate relation between identity and language is well-known and well-researched. 
National identity, as a form of social identity, has also been shown to be linked to language 
and geographical borders (Ross, 2012). There are however some exceptions, as for example, 
the multilingual countries. European identity is not an entirely new concept, but it is a 
concept that is in constant change, depending on various political, economical and social 
factors. From an institutional perspective, the way linguistic diversity is currently addressed 
at the European level is to provide equal rights to all national languages, promote individual 
multilingualism and protect regional and minority languages (Vogl, 2012), as well as 
providing translation and interpreting services at the EU institutional level. However, the 
present study aims to investigate if favourable attitudes multilingualism and practices of 
multilingualism can boost the levels of European identity on a social and even individual 
level. #
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As described earlier, the Eurobarometers provide some data on the Europeans’ views on 
multilingualism and identity, however the surveys have little data on attitudes towards 
these concepts (Favell, 2009). The present study aims to fill this gap, by conducting both 
surveys and interviews with Europeans from the three contexts mentioned above. The 
three contexts will provide three different angles to study European identity. Belgium is one 
of the founding members of the EU, the UK has long been seen as a reluctant member, 
while Romania is one of the newest EU members. From a linguistic point of view, Belgium 
is a multilingual country, at least from a territorial point of view, with Brussels being not 
only officially bilingual, but also at the “heart of the European Union” and a very 
cosmopolitan city. The United Kingdom is the country whose official language is one of the 
most prominent lingue franche of today, it is an insular country, separated geographically 
from Europe. Its capital, London, is a vibrant cosmopolitan and diverse city. Romania had 
been under communism for over forty years, until 1989. Since then, the country has made 
significant progress to become a democracy, progress that has been acknowledged by the 
international community together with Romania’s accession to the European Union. By 
investigating these three contexts, using surveys and interviews I strive to provide a more 
nuanced view on the relationship between European identity and multilingualism.#
2.2. Research questions 
The research study was carried out in multiple stages. Quantitative data was initially 
collected in each context, followed by interviews in each of the three contexts. The 
research questions reflect the width of this study:#
2.2.1. Quantitative studies 
Using the data collected via the online questionnaires, the following research questions 
were investigated:#
Each context:#
RQ 1: What is the relation between the national-European BIOS variables and attitudes to 
multilingualism, educational level, language proficiency, Bruter’s (2005) European 
identities and other identities present in the study? #
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RQ 2 : What is the relation between the linguistic variables and the various European 
identity variables?#
RQ 3 : Can positive attitudes to multilingualism and higher interest in learning languages 
predict a stronger sense of European identity (self-assessed, and also as understood 
by Bruter, 2005, - civic, cultural and general European identity) ?#
RQ 4: Is there a difference between the younger participants (under 35) and the older 
participants in their identification with Europe and the European Union?# #
Belgium: # #
RQ 5: Is there a difference between the levels of European identity between the inhabitants 
of Brussels and the rest of Belgium (RoB), regardless of their linguistic background? 
Is there a difference between the linguistic variables between these two groups? #
All contexts:# #
RQ 6: Is one context “more European” than the other contexts? Do they differ on the 
linguistic variables?#
2.2.2. Qualitative studies 
The interviews followed a semi-structured framework. The purpose was to give more 
nuance to the statistical analysis using the voices of the participants in the interviews. The 
following research questions were used as guidelines in the interviews, but the participants 
were free to mould the discussion as they saw fit. One of the main purposes of the 
interviews was to assess the content validity in each context for the scale proposed by 
Bruter (2005) to test various aspects of European identity. The rest of the questions 
covered topics from the Quantitative studies section, as follows:#
All contexts:#
RQ 7: Discuss with the interviewees their understanding of the European identity scale in 
order to assess its content validity.#
RQ 8: Discuss the interviewees’ attitudes to multilingualism in light of their context and 
individual linguistic portrait.#
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RQ 9: Discuss the interviewees’ understanding of feeling European and European identity, 
including topics such as advantages and disadvantages, what factors benefit or hinder 
the development of identification with Europe, the relationship they perceive 
between national and European identity, and their particular identity portrait.#
RQ 10: Discuss the interviewees’ opinions regrading the relationship between 
multilingualism and European identity - how are they related, is one a predictor of 
the other, or are they concepts independent of each other?#
!
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3. Quantitative studies 
3.1. Methodology 
3.1.1. Romanian pilot study 
The questionnaire was tested for reliability and validity using a Pilot Study in spring 2010. 
Data was collected only in Romania and it included the majority of the instruments present 
in the online cross-national surveys. Most of the instruments had already been used in 
other contexts, but not in Romania. The total number of participants amounted to N = 153. 
The results of the pilot study indicated that the questions were relevant to the topic and 
context of study. #
The data was collected through the snowballing technique, the questionnaires being 
distributed in Cluj-Napoca. The mean age of the respondents was M = 27.4 with a standard 
deviation of SD = 13.4. About 20% of the total sample of participants were over 35. The 
majority of the participants were female (N = 119), and most of them were still students at 
the time the data was collected (N = 110). With regards to educational level, 64% had 
finished high-school, 24% had a university degree and 12% had already received a Master or 
PhD. The high number of high-school graduates should be seen in light of the fact that a 
clear majority of the participants in the pilot study were still enrolled in university, but had 
not yet completed their studies in order to receive a Bachelor. #
With regards to the background of the participants, 91% were Romanian, 6% declared they 
were Hungarian, and 3% German. The ethnic distribution of the sample was also reflected 
in the L1: Romanian - 93.5% and Hungarian - 6.5%. The most spoken L2 was English (61%), 
followed by French (18%), then German (8%); for L3, the most common language was again 
English (31%), then French (31%) and German (9%); the most spoken L4 was Spanish 
(24%), followed by French (13%), then Italian (7%) and so on. A very high number of 
participants reported they spoke an L2 (98.7%), an L3 (88.5%), and even an L4 (60.4%) 
suggesting that the sample was truly multilingual. #
Some items on the scales needed to be reversed prior to the analysis. The mean scores for 
the scales were calculated. With regards to Bruter’s (2005) European identity scale, a 
decision was made to recalculate all means for the cultural, civic and European identity 
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items by weighting them on a 6 point scale (rather than calculate 0-1 scores as he used the 
scale, Bruter, 2005) in order for these items to be comparable with other 6-point Likert 
scales included in the questionnaire. #
The validity and reliability of the scales used were tested. The convergent validity (the 
degree to which the European identity scale developed by Bruter, 2005, was related to 
other European identity variables in the survey) needed to be assessed since this scale had 
not been previously used in the Romanian context. The results of the correlational analysis 
between the items of European identity on Bruter’s (2005) scale and other variables of 
European identity showed that the scale had good convergent validity in this context. #
The reliability analysis also indicated that all scales were reliable, with one exception. The 
cultural European identity scale proved unreliable when the sports question was included. 
When this item was removed, the reliability of that scale increased to acceptable levels 
(although the value remained one of the lowest among the instruments used). A decision 
was made at this point not to include the sports question in the cross-national study, but 
rather to discuss it with the participants in the Qualitative section of the study in order to 
test its content validity (See Appendix F for Cronbach  values).#
The participants were also asked to describe their identity in a few words. The responses 
indicate that although in some cases identity was an unexamined concept, most 
participants understood the question and responded accordingly. #
Based on the results of this pilot study, it was concluded that the instrument was fit for the 
purposes of the study. The final version of the questionnaire is described below. #
3.1.2. Cross-national study 
3.1.2.1. Instruments 
The instruments used for these surveys have been compiled in order to assess the research 
questions posed earlier. The majority of the instruments are established scales, adapted to 
the particular contexts studied here. All questions of the surveys were translated by native 
speakers into the language/s of the contexts to be investigated, i.e. Romanian in Romania, 
French and Dutch in Belgium and English in the United Kingdom. The final versions of the 
questionnaires were uploaded to Survey Monkey, an online system for collecting 
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questionnaire responses. The study has been approved by the Ethics board at Birkbeck 
College, University of London.#
The first page of the online questionnaire was the Informed Consent: participants were told 
about the nature of the study and the anonymity, voluntariness and confidentiality of their 
responses. Informed Consent was implied by filling out the questionnaire.#
The first part of the questionnaire comprised questions regarding the Background 
Information of the participants, including age, gender, educational level, place of birth and 
place of residence, and self- described ethnic background. This section also included 
questions regarding the participants’ linguistic background: languages known (regardless of 
the level); self-assessment of their proficiency in each language using a scale from 1 to 6, 1 
being “Not at all” and 6 being “Native-like” (I read / write / speak / understand my L1, L2, 
L3, L4); frequency of use of each language using a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being “Less than once 
a month” and 6 being “Daily”. Participants were also asked to describe their parents’ 
linguistic background. Other questions included in this section asked participants about 
their interest in learning another language and how they would proceed to learn it, their 
use of various languages when they used social media and about their opinion regarding the 
importance of knowing foreign languages (see Appendix D for the English version of the 
questionnaire, including the  Background Information). #
The following section of the questionnaire included established scales and some questions 
aimed at understanding the participants’ linguistic attitudes and practices, and their self-
assessed levels of European identity (see Appendix A-D for the questionnaires in all four 
languages).#
Anxiety and Confidence in Using L2 (adapted from Clément, Gardner & Smythe, 1977) : 
Anxiety was assessed using 5 items on a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being “Strongly disagree” 
and 6 being “Strongly agree” (e.g., “I feel uncomfortable every time I have to use my 
second language”). Confidence was assessed using 9 items also on a scale from 1 to 6 
(e.g., “I feel confident and relaxed when I have to use my second language to ask for 
directions”).#
Attitudes to Multilingualism (adapted from Baker, 1992): The scale was developed by Baker 
(1992) to evaluate people’s attitudes to bilingualism. Each item was modified to ask 
about “more” or “various” foreign languages, rather than an L2 (as it was used by 
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Baker). The instrument included 24 items, assessed on a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being 
“Strongly disagree” and 6 being “Strongly agree”. Some items were reversed and 
adapted for each context (e.g., “It is enough to speak Romanian”).#
Motivational Intensity (adapted from Gardner, Tremblay & Masgoret, 1997; Gardner, 1985): 
this index assessed on a 6 point Likert scale the effort and engagement in learning 
foreign languages (e.g., “I make a point of trying to understand all of the L2 I see and 
hear”).#
Intention to Continue Studying Languages (adapted from Noels, Clément & Pelletier, 1999; 
Ryan & Connell, 1989): this instrument assessed participants’ intention to continue 
learning languages in the future, also on a 6 point Likert scale (e.g., “I intend to study 
foreign languages again in the future”).#
Bicultural Identity Orientation Scale (adapted from Comănaru & Noels, in preparation): this 
instrument was adapted to include measures relating to the participants’ 
understanding of the relation between their regional and national identity, and their 
European identity. It included 20 items divided into 5 subscales: conflict, 
monoculture, alternation, compatibility and hybridity, to be rated on a 6 point Likert 
scale.#
Circle Diagrams (adapted from Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992): the initial purpose of this 
instrument as developed by Aron et al. (1992) was to test the inclusion of the other in 
the self using a pictorial measure. Based on their diagrams, two pictorial measures 
were developed to assess the degree of distance and overlap, as well as the nested-
ness of identities, between the national and European identity; another version of 
this diagram was created to investigate the relation between regional, national and 
European identity (see Appendix A-D for the diagrams).#
European Identity (Bruter, 2005): the instrument developed by Bruter evaluated people’s 
perceptions of their European identity by dividing it in general, civic and cultural 
European identity (see Appendix D for the English questionnaire).#
Various Other Questions: Participants were asked to describe in their own words their cultural 
and ethnic identity, and to rate on a 6 point Likert scale how much they identified 
with terms like: European, member of the European Union, world citizen, country 
citizen, the region they live in etc. #
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3.1.2.2. Procedure 
The final version of the questionnaire was uploaded via Survey Monkey, an online survey 
software and questionnaire tool. Four different versions of the survey were uploaded: 
Romanian, English, French and Dutch (see Appendix A-D), and opened them up for data 
collection. Using our contacts both within and outside of the academic world, the survey 
was disseminated until at least 100 questionnaires were collected in each language group to 
allow for statistical analysis. The links to the web surveys have also been made available via 
various social networks, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Google Buzz. Potential participants 
were asked to send the link to others who might be willing to participate in this study. 
Once the target sample was reached, the questionnaires were taken offline and the 
collection of the quantitative data was considered completed. Participants had the 
opportunity to leave comments after the completion of the survey. #
3.1.2.3. Participants 
3.1.2.3.1. Romania 
A total of 312 Romanian participants completed the survey. Twelve participants were 
removed from the final sample because they had had only filled out the very first questions 
of the survey, leaving a final sample of participants of N = 300. The snowballing technique 
was used to recruit participants, sending the questionnaire to professors at the Babes-
Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, and asking them to distribute it to students 
who might be interested in filling it out; the questionnaire was also circulated via social 
networks.#
All of the participants indicated Romania, as their place of birth, with the majority being 
from the province of Cluj (35.4%). The second largest area represented was the capital, 
Bucharest (5.1%), while the rest of the participants indicated as a place of birth a wide 
distribution of towns and cities in Romania. As a place of residence, again most of the 
participants lived in Cluj and Bucharest, but some (approximately 20%) lived abroad.#
With regards to the gender distribution of the sample, 27.5% participants were male (13 
participants did not indicate their gender). About 37% had a university degree, almost 25% 
indicated that they had or were in the process of receiving either a Master’s degree or a 
PhD, with the rest of them (35.5%) saying that they had a high-school diploma (1 
participant did not answer this question). #
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The age of the participants in the Romanian sample varied from 18 to 75, with a mean of 
M = 29.9 and a standard deviation of SD = 12.1, suggesting a wide distribution of age, but 
with approximately 80% younger than 35 years of age. One question asked participants to 
identify their ethnicity. Again the results are unsurprising and in line with the ethnic 
demographic of the country: 90.5 % declared themselves Romanian and 7.4 % Hungarian. 
The other ethnic groups represented in a very small proportion - 4 participants - were 
Moldavian (from the Republic of Moldova), and one German. Only one participant 
identified as having a double ethnicity: Romanian and Canadian. #
The distribution of the first language among this sample is consistent with the ethnic 
distribution: 90.4 % declared Romanian as their L1, 7.7 % Hungarian, and two participants 
were bilingual: Romanian and Hungarian, and German and Hungarian. Almost all 
participants declared they spoke an L2 (see Table 1 for number of participants who spoke 
L2, L3, L4, L5 and L6). The predominant L2 was English (68.4%), followed by French 
(12.4%), and Romanian (7.1%). Other L2’s included German (6.7%), Italian (3.4%), Russian 
(1.4%), Hungarian (0.3%) and Spanish (0.3%). The most widely learned language as an L3 
was French (38.7%), followed by English (28.4%), German (13.5%), Italian (9.1%) and 
Spanish (5.2%). Three participants spoke Russian as their L3 and 2 Hungarian. The other 
languages spoken by just one participant each were: Greek, Dutch, Portuguese and 
Romanian. #
With regards to L4, 25.4% declared Spanish to be their L4, 22.3 % - French, 18.1% Italian 
and 16.1 % German. The other languages present were English (5.2%), Russian (2.6%), 
Norwegian (2.1%), Hungarian (2.1%), Portuguese (1.5%), Japanese (1%), and Catalan, 
Chinese, Hebrew, Latin and Yugoslavian, each spoken by one participant (0.5 %). As an L5, 
25.6 % of the participants who answered this question knew Spanish, followed by French 
and German with 17.1 % each, Italian (12.2%) and Hungarian (8.8%). The other languages 
were Latin, Polish, Portuguese and Swedish with 2.4% each, and Finnish, Greek, 
Norwegian, Dutch, Russian and Serbian - 1.2%. #
Table 1. Number of Romanian participants who declared speaking foreign languages (L1 N=300)
L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
Number Ps 294 274 192 81 26
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Apart from asking the participants what languages they knew, they were also asked to self-
assess their linguistic proficiency in the first four languages (speaking, understanding, 
reading and writing) and to rate with what frequency they used each language. The results 
are displayed in Table 2.#
3.1.2.3.2. Belgium - Francophones 
One hundred and seventeen people filled out the French version of the questionnaire. The 
requirement for this questionnaire was that the participants be Francophone or bilingual 
French-Dutch and Belgian nationals. All participants were sent the two versions of the 
Belgian questionnaire, one in French and one in Dutch and were asked to fill out the 
appropriate one. After the data collection stage had been completed, four participants were 
removed from the final sample before the analysis for the following reasons: one 
participants was Flemish and lived in the UK; apart from moderate proficiency in French 
this participant could not be considered Francophone Belgian. Two other participants born 
in Flanders, one living there still and one living in Brussels were also removed from the 
sample before the analysis for the same reasons. Another participant born and residing in 
Guinea was not included in the final sample because she did not match the criteria. Six 
participants were excluded for failing to answer more than the demographic questions. 
Thus the final sample was composed of 107 participants.#
A large majority of the participants indicated Belgium as a place of birth (96.3%). Two 
participants were born in Germany, one in Romania and another one in Congo, but they 
remained in the sample either because they have been living most of their lives in Belgium 
or because they were born to Belgian nationals abroad and then returned to live in Belgium. 
From the participants born in Belgium, 57% were born in the Walloon Region, 32.7% in 
Brussels, while 1.9% did not indicate their native town, writing down only Belgium. A small 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of language proficiency and frequency of use of L1-L4 for the 
L1 L2 L3 L4
M sd M sd M sd M sd
Proficiency 5.92 0.3 5.18 0.93 4.29 1.07 3.81 1.07
Frequency 5.98 0.11 4.51 1.66 2.78 1.8 1.77 1.31
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number of participants (4.7%) indicated that their place of birth was Flanders in Belgium, 
but further investigations showed they were Francophone. #
All but one participants indicated that they resided in Belgium; this participant, although 
of Francophone Belgian origin lived in Denmark. The majority of the other participants 
resided in the Walloon Region (63.6%), 21.5% lived in Brussels and 12.1% lived in Flanders. #
The participants were asked about their gender and 72.4% were female (2 individuals did 
not answer this question). With regards to their age, the sample of Francophone 
participants had a wide distribution, with the youngest participant being 18 and the oldest 
91 (M = 29.37, SD = 15.78), with approximately 75% younger than 35. The educational level 
was consistent with the age distribution of the participants: 32.7% were high-school 
graduates, 39.1% had a university diploma, and 26.2% had either a Master or a PhD. #
When asked about their ethnicity, the largest number of participants indicated they were 
just Belgian (37.4%). Other answers ranged widely, from bilingual, European, Caucasian, 
multicultural, to answers such as “nous ne faisons pas partie d'ethnies en Belgique, ce n'est pas le 
Rwanda ici !” (translation: we do not belong to ethnic groups in Belgium, this is not 
Rwanda!)#
The distribution of the first language within this group of participants showed that the vast 
majority (97.2%) had French as an L1, 2 participants spoke Dutch and one spoke German as 
a first language (these last 3 participants indicated that they were bilingual, and their other 
L1 was French). As for L2, the most represented language was Dutch (49.5%), followed by 
English (34.6%), then Spanish (7.5%). Italian (3.8%), French (2.8% - the bilingual 
participants), and Moroccan and Romanian with 0.9%. Interestingly, all participants 
indicated they spoke a second language (see Table 3 for the number of participants who 
spoke foreign languages). #
As for the L3, the most spoken language was English (55.1%), followed by Dutch (28%), 
Spanish (6.5%) and German (4.7%). Italian was spoken as an L3 by 1.9% and Arabic and 
Table 3. Number of Belgian Francophone participants who declared speaking foreign languages (L1 
N=107)
L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
Number Ps 107 105 90 60 13
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Danish by 0.9%. The most popular L4 was Spanish, spoken by 24.3% of the participants in 
this sample, followed by German (19.6%), Dutch (14%), Italian (10.3%), English (9.3%) and 
Walloon (dialect) - 1.9%. The following languages were spoken as an L4 by one participant 
each:: Arabic, Berber, Japanese, Latin and Portuguese. With regards to the participants L5, 
the most well-known language was German (9.3%), followed by Italian (8.4.%), Spanish 
(5.6%) and Dutch (3.7%). Arabic, Latin and Portuguese were each known by 1.9% as their 
L5, and Catalan, Danish, Irish, Walloon and Yiddish were known by just one participant 
each. Some participants in this sample indicated they even spoke an L6 and these people 
spoke: Spanish (4.7%), German (1.9%), and Chinese, Danish, Irish and Latin (0.9%).#
Apart from asking the participants what languages they knew, they were also asked to self-
assess their linguistic proficiency in the first four languages known (speaking, 
understanding, reading and writing) and to rate with what frequency they used each 
language. The results are presented below in Table 4.#
3.1.2.3.3. Belgium - Dutch speakers 
The total number of Dutch-speaking participants in the study was 254. The requirement 
for inclusion in this group was that the participants be speakers of Dutch or Dutch-French 
bilinguals, and Belgian nationals. A closer examination of the sample indicated that some of 
the participants did not fulfil these requirements and, as a result, eight of them were 
removed from the sample before the analysis for the following reasons: one was born in the 
United States and lived in the United Kingdom. Three were born in the Dominican 
Republic, Hungary, and Romania, respectively, and although they spoke Dutch, it was their 
L3 and they did not identify as either Flemish or Belgian. Another participant was born and 
lived in Belgium, but his parents were German, and Dutch was also his/her L3. Several 
participants were born in the Netherlands and lived in Belgium. Only three of them were 
Table 4. Means and standard deviations of language proficiency and frequency of use of L1-L4 for 
the Belgian Francophone group
L1 L2 L3 L4
M sd M sd M sd M sd
Proficiency 5.92 0.24 4.51 1.09 4.01 1.09 2.68 1.3
Frequency 5.8 0.91 4.51 1.73 3.84 1.81 2.59 1.82
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removed from the sample, because they identified themselves as Netherlanders, rather than 
Flemish or Belgian.Sixteen participants were removed from the analysis because they had 
only completed the background information section of the questionnaire and none of the 
other questions. The final sample used for the analysis was comprised of N = 230 
participants. The participants were recruited through personal contacts at various 
academic institutions in Belgium and also through social networks.#
The vast majority of the participants were born in Belgium (94.7 %), while the rest came 
from the following countries: 3% were born in the Netherlands, one participant was born 
in Congo, one in Germany, one in Luxembourg and one in South Korean. Further 
investigations revealed that although these participants were not born in Belgium, they 
either had Belgian parents or they had lived long enough in Belgium as to identify as 
Belgians. With regards to the region of origin in Belgium, the majority (72.5 % of the ones 
born in Belgium) came from Flanders, 25.7% were from Brussels, and only two (less than 
1%) were born in Wallonia. #
With regards to residence, most of the participants lived in Belgium (94.3%), almost 4% 
lived in the UK, 1% in the United States, one participant in the Netherlands and one in 
Australia. From the ones residing in Belgium, 73.3% lived in the Flanders, 24% lived in 
Brussels, and less than 1% in the Walloon region.#
Consistent with the previous samples, the Dutch-speaking participants were divided on 
gender such that almost 61% were female and 29.1% male, with 10% of the participants 
refusing to answer the question. The age range varied from 17 to 68 years old, with a mean 
M = 26 and a standard deviation SD = 10.72% (23 participants refused to answer this 
question). The age distribution was skewed towards the younger generation, with 86% of 
the sample being under 35. Somewhat consistent with the age distribution was the 
educational level of the participants: most of them, 45.2%, had a high-school diploma, 
17.4% had a university degree, 30% held a Masters or a PhD, while 6.5% had finished a 
technical school. One participant indicated they had a candidate diploma, a pre-Bachelor’s 
degree.#
The participants were asked to identify their ethnic background, and the majority (almost 
50%) responded Belgian, or some variation of it (white Belgian, catholic Belgian etc.); 
approximately 10% indicated they felt Flemish, 8% answered white and about 7% answered 
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European. Others identified themselves with various other ethnic groups and combinations 
of characteristics. #
The predominant L1 in this sample was Dutch (96.1%), followed by French (1.3%), Spanish 
(0.9%), and German, Italian and a Flemish dialect, each with 0.4%. The participants who 
declared not to have Dutch as an L1, were closely investigated to ensure they should still 
remain in the sample, and due to their identification as either Belgian or Flemish, it was 
decided that they fulfilled the requirements. One participant declared him/herself bilingual 
- Dutch and French. All participants in this study indicated an L2 and an L3, almost 90% 
knew an L4, about 50% an L5 and 18% and L6 (see Table 5).#
English and French were the most spoken second languages, with 49.1%, and 42.6% 
respectively. The other languages present as an L2 in the sample were: Dutch (2.6%), 
German (2.2%), Spanish and Italian (1.3% each) and Finnish and the Limburgish dialect 
(0.4% each). As mentioned earlier, all participants in the sample declared they had an L3 
and the distribution of it was as follows: French (44.8%), English (41.3%), German (6.1%), 
Spanish (4.8%), Italian (2.2%) and Swedish (0.4%). Almost 88% of the sample revealed they 
knew a fourth language. The most predominant L4 was German (45.2% of the entire 
sample), followed by Spanish (14.3%), French (9.6%), English (7.4%), Italian (6.5%). Latin, 
Portuguese and Russian were also among the L4s, each known by 0.9%, while the Brussels 
dialect, Norwegian, Polish, Romanian and Tagalog were each spoken by one participant 
(0.4%) as an L4. #
The diversity of L5s known by the participants in the Dutch speakers sample increased, 
such that a little over 21% had German as an L5, Spanish (10.9%), Italian (7%), Latin (2.2%), 
English (1.3%), Arabic, Catalan, French, Japanese, Russian and Swedish (each with 0.9%), 
and Esperanto, Greek, Hungarian, Korean, Croatian, Norwegian and Polish (each with 
0.4%). About 18% of the entire sample declared they knew a sixth language: 4.3% knew 
German, 3% Spanish, 2.6% Latin, 1.7% Italian. Catalan and Russian were known by 0.9%, 
Table 5. Number of Belgian Dutch-speaking participants who declared speaking foreign languages 
(L1 N=230)
L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
Number Ps 230 230 202 117 41
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while Afrikaans, Arabic, Danish, Greek, Hungarian, Classical Greek, Norwegian, 
Portuguese and Punjabi by 0.4%. #
The questionnaire also asked the Dutch-speaking participants to rate on a Likert scale 
their self-assessed proficiency (which was calculated again by taking the average of their 
reading, writing, listening and understanding skills) in the first four languages. Another 
question referred to the frequency with which these languages were used by the 
participants and this question was again assessed on the Likert scale. The results are 
presented below, in Table 6.#
3.1.2.3.4. United Kingdom 
A total of 125 people participated in the English version of the questionnaire. Six 
participants were removed from the sample before the analysis for the following reasons: 4 
participants only answered the Background Information section, one participant was born 
in Germany and lived in Kenya, and another one was born in Romania and lived in 
Belgium; these last two participants had no direct ties with the United Kingdom, reason 
for which they were not included in the final sample. Thus, the analysis was carried on 
using a total of N = 119 participants. The participants were recruited using personal and 
academic contacts. The survey was sent to students and staff at Birkbeck, University of 
London, and was also distributed via social networks. #
Almost 70% of the participants indicated they were born in England (N = 83). One 
participants was born in Scotland, one in Ireland and one in Wales, amounting thus to 
72.9% of the entire sample being born in the UK. The rest of the participants were born in 
various European countries (Italy - 5 participants, Spain - 4, Poland - 3, Belarus, Cyprus, 
France, Germany - 2 participants each), but also Argentina, Australia, Hong Kong and 
United States (1 participants each). With regards to the place of residence, all but one 
Table 6. Means and standard deviations of language proficiency and frequency of use of L1-L4 for 
the Belgian Dutch-speaking group
L1 L2 L3 L4
M sd M sd M sd M sd
Proficiency 5.94 0.18 5.2 0.77 4.63 0.96 3.42 1.23
Frequency 5.95 0.31 5.08 1.35 4.34 1.61 2.45 1.65
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participant (who declared their residence in Finland) indicated they lived in the UK. More 
than 90% of them resided in England, 7.6% in Scotland and 0.8% in Wales. #
The gender distribution of the participants in the English sample was 29.8% male and 
70.2% female (15 participants did not answer this question). A little over 30% of the 
participants had a university degree, 37.8% had a master degree and 26.1% were PhD 
students or had already received their degree. Only 3.4% in this sample had just a high-
school diploma, indicating thus a highly educated sample. #
The age of the participants in this sample varied between 20 and 70 years old, with a mean 
M = 34.9 and a standard deviation SD = 11.9. Approximately 50% of the sample was younger 
than 35. The distribution of the mother tongue in this sample was the following: 
Approximately 73.1% of the participants indicated that their L1 was English. The second 
largest group spoke Spanish as an L1 (5%), followed by French and Italian (each spoken by 
3.4% of the total number of participants) and Greek (2.5%). Other L1’s included: Finnish, 
Polish and Russian (1.7% each), Chinese, German, Portuguese, Ligurian, Swiss German, 
Slovak (0.8% each). Three of the participants indicated that they have grown up in a 
bilingual home, one speaking English and German, another one Chinese and English, and 
the last one Dutch and Limburgish. #
A very large proportion of the participants indicated that they spoke a second language (see 
Table 7 for the number of participants who spoke foreign languages). The most common L2 
was French (39.5%), followed by English (17.6%), and German and Spanish, each spoken as 
an L2 by 11.8% of participants who answered this question. Other L2’s were Italian and 
Swedish (each by 2.5%), Greek, Nepali and Russian (each by 1.7%) and Breton, British Sign 
Language, Mandarin, Dutch, Ga, Japanese, Polish and Twi (one participant each). As for L3, 
the most learned language in this sample was again French (26.9%), followed by German 
(18.5%), Spanish (16%), and Italian (5.9%). The other L3’s were: English (5%), Mandarin 
(2.5%), Dutch, Japanese, Portuguese and Swedish (each 1.7%), and Belarusian, Catalan, 
Czech, Greek, Ha, Latin and Russian ( 0.8%).#
Table 7. Number of British participants who declared speaking foreign languages (L1 N=119)
L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
Number Ps 116 105 74 43 19
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A little over 60% of the sample of participants indicated that they knew an L4. The 
distribution of these languages was as follows: Spanish (11.8%), French and German (9.2%), 
Italian (6.7%), Arabic, Dutch, Greek, Japanese and Swedish (1.7%), and Akrikaans, Bangla, 
Czech, Danish, English, Finnish, Guernesiais, Hausa, Hebrew, Hindi, Hungarian, Icelandic, 
Jamaican Patois, Mandarin, Polish, Punjabi, Sichuan, Thai, Turkish, Welsh (0.8%). 
Approximately 36% of participants indicated they knew an L5. The languages spoken as an 
L5 were: Spanish (5.9%), Italian (5%), German (4.2%), Latin (3.4%), French and Portuguese 
(2.5%), Hebrew and Russian (1.7%), and Danish, Faroese, Greek, Irish, Japanese, Mandarin, 
Newar, Polish, Romanian, Swedish, Turkish (0.8%). The last question regarding language 
knowledge asked participants whether they had an L6 and 16% of the participants 
responded that they did know an L6. Out of the whole sample, 3.4% knew Italian as an L6 
and another 3.4 knew Spanish. Icelandic was spoken by 1.7% as an L6. The other languages 
mentioned were: Akan, Arabic, Finnish, German, Greek, Hungarian, Polish, Portuguese 
and Turkish (0.8%).#
The participants self-assessed their proficiency in their L1, L2, L3 and L4, by rating their 
speaking, understanding, reading and writing skills in each one of these languages. They 
were also asked to rate the frequency with which they use these languages. The results are 
displayed below in Table 8. #
Table 8. Means and standard deviations of language proficiency and frequency of use of L1-L4 for 
the British groups
L1 L2 L3 L4
M sd M sd M sd M sd
Proficiency 5.92 0.3 4.41 1.35 3.67 1.41 3.05 1.3
Frequency 5.81 0.68 3.37 2.09 2.24 1.79 1.91 1.49
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3.2. Results 
The research questions proposed for the quantitative part of this study are:#
RQ 1: What is the relation between the national-European BIOS variables and attitudes to 
multilingualism, educational level, language proficiency, Bruter’s European identities 
and other identity variables present in the study?#
RQ 2: What is the relation between the linguistic variables and the various measures of 
European identity present in this study?#
RQ 3: Can positive attitudes to multilingualism and higher interest in learning languages 
predict a stronger sense of European identity ?#
RQ 4: Is there a difference between the younger participants and the older participants in 
their identification with Europe and the European Union?#
RQ 5: In the case of Belgium, is there a difference between the levels of European identity 
between the participants from Brussels and the ones from the rest of Belgium, 
regardless of their linguistic background? How about on the linguistic variables? #
RQ 6: Is one context “more European” than the other contexts? Do they differ on the 
linguistic variables?#
Before proceeding to investigate each of the research questions, the scales used were tested 
for reliability, assessed through the Cronbach alpha coefficient (see Appendix F for  
values). Another analysis was also performed to look at the convergent validity of the 
European identity scale developed by Bruter (2005), by conducting correlational analysis 
with other scales included in the questionnaire which tapped at the concept of European 
identity. #
The analyses performed for the RQ 1 were correlations between the 5 BIOS variables and 
various measures of identity, educational level and proficiency in foreign languages. The 
validity of the BIOS scale was also explored here. In order to investigate RQ 2 correlational 
analysis were conducted between the linguistic variables and the measures of European 
identity. For the analysis required by RQ 3, regression analysis was used to identify the best 
predictors of European identity. T-tests were used to investigate the differences between 
the younger and older participants with regards to their feelings of European identity (RQ 
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4). For RQ 5, the Belgian Francophone and Dutch speakers data sets were merged and the 
analysis was conducted on the whole sample together. Using t-tests, the differences and 
relations between the participants from Brussels and those from the rest of Belgium were 
assessed. A similar procedure was followed for RQ 6, combining all sets of data and using 
analyses of variance to determine the differences between the groups. #
3.2.1. Romania 
3.2.1.1. Reliability 
Reliability analysis was conducted on all scales to be used in the statistical analysis. The 
values of the Cronbach α were all acceptable for analysis, varying between .58 and .89. 
Cronbach alpha values indicate the internal consistency of a scale and vary between 0 and 1. 
It is considered that a .6 value is questionable, but useable. The higher the value, the better 
the internal consistency of the scale (George & Mallery, 2003, p.231)#
3.2.1.2. Validity 
To check whether the scales used tapped at the same concepts, correlational analysis was 
used for the various measures of identity. The results indicated that most of them were 
highly and positively correlated. The relation between different self-assessed identities was 
investigated here, as well: the general European identity correlated strongly and positively 
with the civic and cultural European identity, with feeling European, Eastern European and 
a citizen of the world, as well as with the two diagrams (European - national and European - 
national - regional). This variable did not show any relation to the measures for Romanian, 
regional and city identity (for a breakdown of all correlations, see Table 9). #
3.2.1.3. RQ 1 - BIOS and European identity & language 
In order to assess the validity of the BIOS scale, its scores were assessed in relation to the 
two diagrams (adapted from Aron et al., 1992), the first one representing the possible 
overlapping between the national and European identity, and the second one between 
regional, national and European identity. The results obtained indicated that conflict and 
monocultural orientation were negatively and significantly correlated with the two 
diagrams. Alternation showed no relation, while compatibility and hybridity were both 
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positively and significantly correlated with the scores obtained from the graphical 
representation. This pattern of correlation was observed throughout the analysis. #
The results obtained by performing correlational analyses indicated overall, that the 
stronger the feelings of European identity (general, cultural or civic), the more people 
perceive the national and European identity to be compatible and even to form a new 
identity, a hybrid between the two, and the less they felt a conflict between the two or 
displayed an inclination for monoculture. This pattern was also obtained when correlating 
the BIOS variables with educational level, and the trend was present in the correlation with 
attitudes to multilingualism (see Figure 3 for graph of the r scores). The variable that was 
most strongly related to the BIOS scale was general European identity, showing strong 
negative correlations with conflict and monoculture, no correlation with alternation, and 
strong positive with compatibility and hybridity #
The same pattern of correlations was obtained between the BIOS variables other identity 
variables, such as feeling Romanian, European, and member of the EU. No relation was 
observed between the five dimensions and proficiency and confidence in foreign languages, 
or intention to continue studying languages. Motivational intensity showed some relations, 
enough to suggest a trend, consistent with the pattern described above.#
Figure 3. Graphical representation of the r scores between BIOS and European identity variables, 
educational level and attitudes to multilingualism for the Romanian group#
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3.2.1.4. RQ 2 - Language and European identity 
The correlational analysis between the linguistic variables and the measures for European 
identity was conducted by correlating Bruter’s European identity instrument (general, civic 
and cultural) and linguistic measures. These measures included self-perceived proficiency in 
L1, L2, L3 and L4; frequency of use of L1, L2, L3 and L4; and the scales which assessed the 
participants’ attitudes to multilingualism, their confidence and anxiety in using foreign 
languages, motivational intensity to study foreign languages and intention to continue 
studying them. The results of these analyses suggested that frequency of use and self-
perceived proficiency in a foreign language are arbitrarily related to the measure of 
European identity mentioned above: the civic European identity correlated negatively with 
frequency of use of L2 (r = -.14, p < .o5) and the cultural European identity correlated with 
frequency of use of L4 and proficiency in L1 (r = .19, p < .05; respectively, r = .14, p < .05). #
The variable that correlated strongly and positively with all three types of European 
identity was attitudes to multilingualism, suggesting thus that the higher the support for 
multilingualism, the stronger the sense of European identity. The general European identity 
also correlated with motivational intensity and intension to continue studying foreign 
languages, and negatively with feelings of anxiety when using a foreign language (see Table 
10 for the r values). The civic European identity was also correlated positively with 
motivational intensity. #
Attitudes to multilingualism also correlated positively with the variables that asked 
participants whether they identified with being a member of the European Union (r = .16,  
Table 10. Pearson r values for European identity and linguistic variables for the Romanian group
Eur gen Eur civ Eur cult
Attitudes .20** .14* .14*
Anxiety -.20** 0.02 0.03
Confidence 0.06 -0.06 -0.09
Motivation intensity .21** .14* 0.06
Intention to 
continue
.13* 0.06 0.02
** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.
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p = .01) and a world citizen (r = .19, 0 = .003). These two variables showed significant 
negative correlations with anxiety when using a foreign language, suggesting that the more 
anxious people are when using a foreign language, the less they feel as a member of the EU 
and as a world citizen. Interestingly, the identification with being a world citizen correlated 
positively with proficiency in all foreign languages: L2 - r = .16, p = .01; L3 - r = .20, p = .004; 
L4 - r = .18, p = .03, as well as with interest in learning another foreign language (r = .20,       
p = .002) and motivational intensity and intention to continue studying languages (r = .18,   
p = .004; respectively, r = .21, p = .001). #
Other correlational analyses were performed in order to assess the relation between the 
identification with Romania and the linguistic variables mentioned earlier. The results seem 
to suggest that the stronger the feelings of nationalism, the lower the confidence, 
proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, the correlations being negative. 
Feeling Romanian correlated with the confidence in using foreign languages at r = -.19,        
p = .003, the frequency of use of L2 at r = -.16, p = .01, L3 at r = -.12, p = .08 (not significant, 
but a possible trend, given the other correlational results), and L4 at r = -.20, p = .01. The 
self-perceived proficiency in the foreign languages showed the following correlations with 
the identification with the term Romanian: L2: r = .21, p = .002, L3: r = -.18, p = .01, and L4:  
r = -.05, p = .54 (not significant). #
3.2.1.5. RQ 3 - Linguistic predictors of European identity 
Regression analyses were performed in order to find the best predictors for the general, 
civic and cultural European identity. The starting point for this analysis were the results of 
the correlational analyses described above. As such, the variables entered as independent 
were attitudes to multilingualism, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying 
foreign languages, and anxiety, all entered at the same time. The dependent variables used 
were in turn general, civic and cultural European identity.#
In the first instance, the linguistic variables were entered as predictors for the three types 
of European identity (Bruter, 2005). At the bivariate level all the linguistic variables 
correlated with this variable, however at the multivariate level, only the variables attitudes 
to multilingualism and anxiety in using a foreign language were predictors of the general 
European identity, with anxiety predicting a low level of general European identity. 
Although the variable attitudes to multilingualism was correlated significantly and 
positively with the two other types of European identity at the bivariate level, the 
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regression analyses showed that this variable was a predictor only for cultural European 
identity. None of the other linguistic variables proved significant in the regression analyses 
(see Table 11 for values).#
The same analyses was performed for the other variables that aimed at the feelings of 
European identity, namely, feeling like a member of the European Union and feeling 
European. An inspection of the results indicates that anxiety was a predictor of lower levels 
for both dependent variables. An unanticipated result showed that intention to continue 
studying foreign languages was also a predictor of lower levels of European-ness (see Table 
12 for values). #
Table 11. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables (IV) and the 
Equation Coefficients
IV R F Beta t r pr sr
Eur gen 0.08 5.19*
Attitudes 0.24 2.02* 0.21 0.13 0.13
Motivational Intensity 0.11 1.38 0.21 0.09 0.09
Intention to Continue 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.01
Anxiety -0.15 -2.23* -0.2 -0.14 -0.14
Eur civ 0.03 1.73
Attitudes 0.1 1.37 0.13 0.09 0.09
Motivational Intensity 0.12 1.56 0.14 0.1 0.1
Intention to Continue -0.03 -0.35 0.07 -0.02 -0.02
Anxiety 0.06 0.9 0.01 0.06 0.06
Eur cult 0.03 1.54
Attitudes 0.16 2.22* 0.15 0.15 0.15
Motivational Intensity 0.03 0.4 0.06 0.03 0.03
Intention to Continue -0.04 -0.56 0.02 -0.04 -0.04
Anxiety 0.05 0.72 0.02 0.05 0.05
* Significant at .05 level.
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A decision was made to investigate the predictiveness of just two of the independent 
variables, that is, attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety to communicate in a foreign 
language (see Table 13).#
Table 12. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables (IV) and the 
European-ness and member of the EU (DV) for the Romanian group
Equation Coefficients
IV R F Beta t r pr sr
Eur 0.08 4.85*
Attitudes 0.1 1.38 0.11 0.09 0.09
Motivational Intensity 0.08 1 0.09 0.06 0.06
Intention to Continue -0.17 -2.20* -0.07 -0.14 -0.14
Anxiety -0.21 -3.20* -0.23 -0.2 -0.2
EU member 0.06 3.75*
Attitudes 0.12 1.73 0.15 0.11 0.11
Motivational Intensity 0.08 0.95 0.12 0.06 0.06
Intention to Continue -0.09 -1.2 0.01 -0.08 -0.07
Anxiety -0.17 -2.55 -0.2 -0.16 -0.16
* Significant at .05 level.# # # # # # # #
Table 13. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables attitudes to 
multilingualism and anxiety (IV) and Bruter’s European identity measurements (DV) for the 
Romanian group
Equation Coefficients
IV R F Beta t r pr sr
Eur gen 0.06 8.87*
Attitudes 0.18 2.80* 0.2 0.18 0.17
Anxiety -0.17 -2.66* -0.2 -0.17 -0.16
Eur civ 0.02 2.61
Attitudes 0.15 2.26* 0.14 0.15 0.15
Anxiety 0.05 0.74 0.02 0.05 0.05
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These variables were chosen based on theoretical grounds, but also because they seemed to 
be the best predictors of European identity is the analyses presented above. The results of 
this second regression analysis indicate that attitudes to multilingualism is a suitable 
predictor of all types of European identity (although, just the t score was significant, the F 
score was not), while anxiety only predicted the general European identity.#
3.2.1.6. RQ 4 - Generational differences 
In order to investigate whether there was a difference between the younger and the older 
generations of Romanians who participated in this study, the sample was split into two 
groups, the ones younger than 35 and the ones older than 35 years of age. As discussed 
earlier, the reason for choosing this age is that the people who are now 35 would have been 
in beginning of their teens when the 1989 revolution against the Communist regime took 
place, therefore, it is safe to say that they grew up in a democratic environment, opened to 
Europe and the world. #
A series of independent t-tests were performed in order to identify the differences between 
the two groups on various identity measures. The results suggested that there were 
significant differences on most of the variables investigated.#
The initial analysis looked at Bruter’s instruments for European identity. The comparison 
between the Under-35 group and the Over-35 group showed significant differences between 
the groups on all three variables of European identity, with the Over-35 group scoring 
higher in all cases (General European identity: t (235) = -2.52, p = .01; Civic European 
identity: t (220) = -3.62, p <.001; Cultural European identity: t (223) = -3.11, p = .002). The 
results obtained by looking at these groups on the first diagram (European and national 
identity) are consistent with the findings for European identity from Bruter’s instrument ( t 
(236) = -3.36, p = .001). #
Eur cult 0.02 2.6
Attitudes 0.15 2.21* 0.14 0.14 0.14
Anxiety 0.06 0.92 0.04 0.06 0.06
Significant at .05 level.
Equation Coefficients
R F Beta t r pr srIV
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The two groups were compared on their identification with being a world citizen, 
European, Eastern European, member of EU, Romanian, member of the region and the city 
they were from. The significant results were European ( t (234) = -2.20, p = .03) with the 
Over-35 group feeling again more European. Interestingly, the results for world citizen and 
regional identity followed a different pattern: they showed significant differences between 
the groups, with the Under-35 group scoring higher on both variables ( t (232) = 3.14, p= .002, 
respectively t( 228) = 2.83, p = .005). These differences in means are represented in Figure 4.#
Figure 4. Means of the identity variables in the two age groups for the Romanian group#
3.2.2. Belgium - Francophones 
3.2.2.1. Reliability 
Reliability analyses were conducted on all scales to be used in the statistical analysis of the 
data collected from the Francophone Belgian participants. All scales except one proved to 
be reliable, with the Cronbach alpha value ranging between .93 and .63. The exception was 
recorded for cultural European identity as described by Bruter (2005). This variable was not 
included in the analysis of the Francophone data. #
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3.2.2.2. Validity 
In order to assess the validity of the identity scales, correlational analyses were conducted 
with these scales. The results indicate that Bruter’s general European identity variable 
correlated strongly and positively with other variables tapping at the European identity, 
such as European-ness, member of the EU, the two-layer diagram and others. These results 
are presented in Table 14 below. Interestingly, some of the European-ness measurements 
also correlated strongly and positively with measures of national and regional identity, but 
not with the variables tapping at the participants’ identity with their city. #
3.2.2.3. RQ 1 - BIOS and European identity & language 
The five variables of the BIOS were again correlated with the two diagrams. Not all the 
correlations were significant, but the pattern of correlations was again consistent, with the 
conflict and monocultural orientation variables correlating negatively with the diagrams, 
alternation showing no relation and compatibility and hybridity correlating positively (see 
Table 14). The trends of this correlational pattern being present, it can be presumed that 
with a larger sample of participants the correlations could have reached significance levels. 
The fact that the pattern was somewhat consistent with the Romanian sample, allowed us 
to continue to investigate the relations. Due to the fact the cultural European identity did 
not have a high reliability index, it was not included in the analysis. However, the general 
European identities correlated in a pattern consistent with the diagrams, but stronger and 
more significant correlations were recorded between the compatibility and hybridity 
variables and both civic and general European identity. #
With regards to educational level and attitudes to multilingualism, no relation was recorded 
with the five variables. Alternation though showed strong positive correlations with some 
linguistic variables, such as confidence in using a foreign language, L2, L3 and L4 
proficiency. The foreign language proficiency also correlated positively and significantly 
with hybridity. The motivational intensity correlations showed a trend consistent with the 
pattern observed earlier, but none of them were significant; intention to continue studying 
languages showed no relation to the five variables.#
!
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Figure 5. Graphical representation of the r scores between BIOS and European identity variables, 
educational level and attitudes to multilingualism for the Belgian Francophones#
3.2.2.4. RQ 2 - Language and European identity 
In order to assess the second research question for the Francophone Belgian sample, 
correlational analyses were conducted, looking at the relation between Bruter’s general and 
civic European identity measurements and the linguistic variable present in the study. The 
linguistics self-assessed proficiency did not correlate with the European identity variables, 
except for one: the correlation between the civic European identity and proficiency in L1 
was positive and significant ( r = .25, p = .03). In the case of the frequency of use of various 
languages and their relation with the European identity scales, again only one relation was 
significant, between frequency of use of L3 and the general European identity, but this 
relation was negative: r = -.25, p = .03. Consistent with our expectations and with the 
previous results, the variables related to attitudes to multilingualism and confidence in 
using a foreign language (respectively, anxiety in using a foreign language) also showed 
significant correlations with the civic European identity; these variables did not prove to be 
significantly related to the general European identity scale. Interestingly though, the other 
linguistic variables, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying foreign 
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languages, did not show significant correlations with either of the two European identity 
variables. The results are presented in Table 15.#
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The correlations between the linguistic variables and the other measurements of identity 
were then tested. Some of the proficiency variables showed relations with the identity 
variables such that proficiency in L2 was significantly correlated to the Brussels identity (r = 
.32, p = .005), while proficiency in L4 was related to a feeling of being Western European (r 
= . 25, p < .05), with the Brussels identity (r = . 34, p = .006), with regional identity (r = .28, p 
= .014) and the city identity (r = .31, p = .013). The feeling of European-ness only correlated 
with attitudes to multilingualism (r = .25, p = .023). Identification as a member of the EU 
and a world citizen also correlated positively with attitudes to multilingualism (r = .28, p = 
0.11, respectively, r = .25, p = .023). Interestingly, a feeling of belonging to the capital city of 
Belgium was negatively related to both motivational intensity to learn a foreign language (r 
= -.23, p = . 039) and intention to continue studying languages (r = -.40, p < .000). A strong 
identification with being Walloon was only significantly related to intention to continue 
studying a foreign language (r = .27, p = .016).#
3.2.2.5. RQ 3 - Linguistic predictors of European identity 
In order evaluate the third research question for the Francophone Belgian sample, 
regression analyses were carried out. The purpose of these analyses was to identify the best 
predictor, if any, of the European identity measurements. Initially, the predictability of 
Bruter’s general and civic European identity by the attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety 
in communicating in a foreign language was assessed. Motivational intensity and intention 
to continue studying languages were not included in this analysis because of the low or 
inexistent correlations they showed with the identity variables in the analysis conducted for 
RQ 2. The results indicate that for the Francophone Belgian sample the best predictor for 
Table 15. Correlational r values for European identity and linguistic variables for the Belgian 
Francophones
Eur gen Eur civ
Attitudes .28* .30**
Anxiety -0.12 -.23*
Confidence 0.2 .31**
Motivation intensity -0.02 0.18
Intention to continue -0.04 0.03
** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.
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both general and civic European identity was again attitudes to multilingualism, but in this 
case the anxiety variable did not show any power of predictability (see Table 16 for values).#
Regressional analyses was continued by keeping the same independent variables - attitudes 
to multilingualism and anxiety in using a foreign language - and changing the dependent 
variables to European and member of the EU. The results showed a similar pattern to the 
results obtained for general and civic European identity, i.e. the only predictor for these IVs 
was attitudes to multilingualism in both cases. Similar to the previous analysis for this 
sample, the R square and F values were quite low, and not significant in the case of 
European ( F (2,80) = 2.66, p = .076). #
3.2.2.6. RQ 4 - Generational differences 
In order to answer the fourth research question, the sample of Francophone Belgian 
participants was split based on age. This split yielded a sample of N = 26 Over-35 and N = 78 
Under-35. Although the split yielded groups of very different sizes, independent t-test were 
still used to assess the difference between them, keeping in mind the fact that the results 
might prove to be just tentative.#
The only two results that showed a significant difference between the two groups were the 
investigating people’s identity as Walloons (with the Under-35 groups feeling significantly 
Table 16. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables 
attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety (IV) and Bruter’s general and civic European 
identity measurements (DV) for the Belgian Francophones
Equation Coefficients
DV IV R F Beta t r pr sr
Eur gen 0.08 3.49*
Attitudes 0.27 2.41* 0.28 0.26 0.26
Anxiety -0.05 -0.44 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05
Eur civ 0.12 5.12*
Attitudes 0.26 2.30* 0.3 0.26 0.25
Anxiety -0.17 -1.53 -0.24 -0.17 -0.17
* Significant at .05 level
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more Walloon than the Over-35 group) and inhabitants of Brussels (the Under-35 group felt 
significantly less Brusseler than the Over-35 group). The graph below shows the two groups 
and their scores on each one of the identity variables analysed. #
Figure 6. Means of the identity variables in the two age groups for the Belgian Francophones#
3.2.3. Belgium - Dutch speakers 
3.2.3.1. Reliability 
The Cronbach alpha index for reliability was calculated for all variables in order to decide 
whether all scales could be used for the analysis of the data. The alpha value ranged 
between .93 and .66 for all variables, except the cultural European identity. As in the case of 
the Belgian Francophone sample, the Cronbach alpha value for cultural European identity 
was not suitable, therefore the variable was excluded from further analysis.#
3.2.3.2. Validity 
In order to assess the validity of the European identity scale, correlational analysis with the 
other European identity variables were conducted. The relation between these variables 
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and other identity variables present in the questionnaire was also assessed. The results 
indicated that general and civic European identities correlated strongly and positively with 
other variables aimed at tapping at the European identity concept. The Flemish identity 
correlated negatively with the general European identity and showed no relation to other 
variables of interest. The Belgian identity variable was positively correlated to most of the 
measure of European-ness, i.e., civic European identity, EU membership and feeling 
European (see Table 17 for r values).#
3.2.3.3. RQ 1 - BIOS and European identity & language 
In the case of the Dutch-speaking Belgian sample the cultural European identity was not a 
reliable scale, thus this variable was not used in the analysis. To test the validity of BIOS 
scale, correlations were conducted between the five variables of BIOS and the two 
diagrams -  the diagrams were the graphical representation of the relation between the 
participants’ national and European identity; and regional, national and European identity 
(see Table 17).  The results indicated that in the case of the Dutch-speaking sample, similarly 
with the previous samples analysed, the pattern of correlations was maintained; the conflict 
and monoculture variables correlated negatively with the two European identity scales, 
while compatibility and hybridity correlated positively and significantly with them. 
Alternation showed a correlation with civic European identity, but not with general 
European identity. This pattern was also observed when the five variables were compared to 
the variable attitudes to multilingualism, confidence in using a foreign language, 
motivational intensity and intention to continue studying foreign languages; in some these 
cases, the correlations were not significant, but the pattern was present. #
With regards to proficiency in other languages and their relation to the five BIOS variables, 
it is worth noting that hybridity correlated positively with proficiency in all languages, 
including L1, while compatibility showed the same relation to proficiency in L1, L2 and L3. 
Alternation again showed zero correlations to these variables, but monocultural orientation 
and conflict correlated negatively (although not always with significant correlations) with 
the linguistic proficiency variables. Educational level showed a negative relation to conflict 
and a positive one with compatibility and hybridity (see Figure 7 for graphical 
representation of the r scores).#
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Figure 7. Graphical representation of the r scores between BIOS and European identity variables, 
educational level and attitudes to multilingualism for the Dutch-speaking Belgians#
3.2.3.4. RQ 2 - Language and European identity 
The second research question was aimed at understanding the relation between the 
European identity variables and the linguistic variables. For this purpose, correlational 
analyses were conducted between the general and civic European identity variables and the 
linguistic self-assessed proficiency and frequency of use, as well as anxiety and confidence 
in using a foreign language, attitudes to multilingualism and the motivational intensity and 
intention to continue studying languages. The results showed positive and significant 
correlations between the general European identity and proficiency in L2, L3 and L4 (r= .26, 
r = .24, r = .28, respectively, with p < .001). The frequency of use variables showed no 
relation with the two European identity measurements, however, attitudes to 
multilingualism correlated strongly and positively with both of them: for general European 
identity, r = .28, p< .001, and for civic European identity, r = .21, p = .003. The general 
European identity variable also showed significant relations with motivational intensity      
(r = .20, p = .006), confidence (r = .30, p < .001) and anxiety (r = -.20, p = .005). Civic 
European identity was also shown to be related, although weaker, to motivational intensity 
(r = .18, p= .02) and intention to continue studying a foreign language (r = .15, p = .04). #
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The investigation went on, by assessing the relation between the other identity variables 
and the linguistic variables. Some results indicate a strong and negative correlation between 
feeling Flemish and L3 proficiency (r = -.22, p = .002), frequency of use of L2 (r = -.23,           
p = .002) and L3 (r = -.30, p <.001), as well as attitudes to multilingualism (r = -.24, p =.001). 
The only other relations between feeling Flemish and a linguistic variable were observed 
with the anxiety of speaking a foreign language variable (r = -.20, p = .007) and confidence 
variable (r = .30, p <.001). A somewhat similar pattern of correlations was observed with the 
identity variable tapping at the Belgian identity; one of the differences remarked though 
was that attitudes to multilingualism correlated positively with this identity variable, 
although it was a somewhat weak correlation (r = .14, p = .05). Feeling Brusseler showed a 
positive and significant relation with the frequency of use of L2 and L3 (r = . 17, p = .02;        
r = .23, p = .002) and attitudes to multilingualism (r = .27, p <.001). #
3.2.3.5. RQ 3 - Linguistic predictors of European identity 
The analysis of the Dutch-speaking Belgian sample of participants continued by 
investigating the best predictors of the general and civic European identity. In the first 
instance, all the linguistic variables were included in the analysis, but motivational intensity 
and intention to continue studying the language showed no power of prediction for these 
two European identity variables. The analysis was run again, this time introducing as 
possible predictors only the variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety. The results 
indicated that in the case of general European identity, both independent variables showed 
significant results, while in the case of civic European identity, only the variable attitudes to 
multilingualism variable was significant (the results are displayed in Table 18).#
Table 18. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables attitudes to 
multilingualism and anxiety (IV) and Bruter’s general and civic European identity measurements 
(DV) for the Dutch-speaking Belgians
Equation Coefficients
DV IV R F Beta t r pr sr
Eur gen 0.1 10.50*
Attitudes 0.25 3.54* 0.28 0.25 0.25
Anxiety -0.16 -.2.20* -0.2 -0.16 -0.15
Eur civ 0.05 4.54*
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As in the previous analysis, the predictability of other measures of European identity by 
these linguistic variables was investigated. Yet again, motivational intensity and intention to 
continue studying a foreign language were not included because at the bivariate level they 
showed no relation to the European identity variables. The regressional analysis showed 
that attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety in speaking a foreign language were not 
predictors of the identity as a member of the EU; as for the European variable, again, only 
attitudes to multilingualism proved to be a somewhat strong predictor (F (2,189) = 3.70, p = .
027).#
3.2.3.6. RQ 4 - Generational differences 
The Dutch-speaking Belgian sample was also assessed with regards to the fourth research 
question which investigated the differences in various identity measures between the 
Under-35 and the Over-35 participants. It is worth keeping in mind that the two groups are 
quite different in size. T-tests were performed in order to investigate the possible 
differences between them and the results showed very little variation in the scores obtained 
by the Under-35 groups and the Over-35 one. The only significant t-test was on the variable 
EU member identity, t(172) = -2.53, p = 0.12, with the Over-35 scoring higher (see Figure 8 for 
comparison of scores between the two groups).#
Attitudes 0.22 3.01* 0.21 0.22 0.22
Anxiety 0.04 0.5 -0.01 0.04 0.03
* Significant at .05 level.
Equation Coefficients
R F Beta t r pr srDV IV
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Figure 8. Means of the identity variables in the two age groups for the Dutch-speaking Belgians#
3.2.4. United Kingdom 
3.2.4.1. Reliability 
Reliability analyses were conducted on all scales to be included in the analysis. All scales 
indicated an appropriate Cronbach alpha value (ranging between .63 and .97), which 
allowed us to proceed to the statistical analysis.#
3.2.4.2. Validity 
For the English sample, correlations between the identity measures were run in order to 
check whether the measures were consistent and valid for this context. The results indicate 
that most measures correlate strongly and positively with each other. Correlations between 
the self-assessed measurements of identity were also conducted in order to better 
understand the relation between them. Unsurprisingly, the measures of European-ness 
correlated significantly and negatively with the measures of British and English identity 
(trend, not significant). The pattern of correlations is consistent with the correlation 
recorded for the Romanian sample (for a breakdown of all correlations, see Table 19).#
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3.2.4.3. RQ 1 - BIOS and European identity & language 
For the UK sample, the validity of the five BIOS variables was initially checked, by 
correlating them with the two graphical representations of the possible relation between 
the national and European identity; and the regional, national and European identity (see 
Table 19). The correlations observed were consistent with the pattern previously observed 
and were surprisingly strong: negative significant correlations were observed with the 
conflict and monocultural orientation variables, no correlations with alternation, and 
positive and significant correlations with compatibility and hybridity. #
Bruter’s European identity variables displayed similar correlations as in the previous 
analysis; conflict correlated significantly and negatively only with civic European identity, 
but indicated trends for the other two as well; monocultural orientation was also negatively 
correlated with general and civic European identities, while alternation correlated strongly 
and positively with general European identity. Compatibility and hybridity showed positive 
and strong relations to all European variables.#
With regards to language proficiency, the only variable that showed strong correlations 
with the BIOS variables was proficiency in L2, such that it correlated positively and 
significantly with alternation, compatibility and hybridity, but showed no relation to the 
conflict and monoculture variables. This particular pattern of correlations was also 
observed for confidence and intention to continue studying languages, while motivational 
intensity only correlated with compatibility and hybridity. #
Educational level also showed slight variations from the pattern of correlations observed 
for the other sample, such that it correlated negatively and significantly with conflict and 
monocultural orientation, positively with compatibility, but showed no relation to 
alternation or hybridity. #
!
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Figure 9. Graphical representation of the r scores between BIOS and European identity variables, 
educational level and attitudes to multilingualism for the British group#
3.2.4.4. RQ 2 - Language and European identity 
Correlational analyses were performed to investigate the relation between the European 
identity scales developed by Bruter (2005) and the linguistic variables pertaining to 
language proficiency and frequency of use, confidence and anxiety in using a foreign 
language, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying a foreign language, and 
attitudes towards multilingualism. #
The results obtained in the case of the UK sample indicate a relationship between the 
proficiency one has in a foreign language and general European identity; Proficiency in L2 
showed a correlation of r = .47, p = .000 with general European identity, while L3 
proficiency correlated at r = .32, p = .003 and L4 proficiency correlated at r = .27, p < .05. 
The only other correlation between the linguistic proficiency variables and Bruter’s 
European identity scales was recorded between L2 proficiency and civic European identity 
(r = .36, p = .000). With regards to the frequency of use of the languages known and their 
relation to the European identity scales, a pattern can be distinguish, although it is not 
always significant. The frequency of using L1 was correlated negatively with all measures of 
Bruter’s European identity, but significantly only with the civic identity (r = -.22, p <.05). 
However, the results indicate that there is a significant positive relation between the 
frequency of use of L2 and L3 and the general and civic European identity (L2 frequency of 
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use and general European identity: r = .44, p = .000; L3 frequency of use and general 
European identity: r = .36, p = .000; L2 frequency of use and civic European identity: r = .42, 
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p = .000; L3 frequency of use and civic European identity: r = .39, p = .000). The other 
linguistic variables mentioned above all correlated significantly with the measures of 
European identity, anxiety having a negative relation to them (see Table 20 for r values).#
The relation between the linguistic variables and the various identity measures was assessed 
by conducting correlations between the same linguistic variables and European, Western-
European, British, English regional and city identity. Western European identity, region and 
city identity did not prove to be related to any of the linguistic variables. But the other 
variables followed a pattern consistent with the previous results, such that European-ness 
correlated with L2 proficiency (r = .40, p=.000) and with L3 proficiency (r = .33, p = .002), as 
well as with the frequency of use of these languages (r = .28, p = .007; r = .26, p = .02). It also 
correlated positively with attitudes to multilingualism (r = .22, p = .03), motivational 
intensity (r = .38, p = .000), intention to continue studying a foreign language (r = .33, p = .
001), and confidence when using a foreign language (r = .34, p = .001). European-ness 
correlated significantly and negatively with anxiety in using a foreign language (r = -.30, p = .
003). The variables tapping at the British and English identity showed an exact opposite 
pattern to the European identity variable, correlating negatively with L2 proficiency and 
frequency of use, as well as attitudes to multilingualism, intention to continue studying 
another language and confidence. The only significant and positive correlation was 
recorded between strong feelings of being British and English and anxiety to communicate 
in a foreign language. #
Table 20. Correlational r values for European identity and linguistic variables for the British group
Eur gen Eur civ Eur cult
Attitudes .30** .38** .27**
Anxiety -.46** -.28** -0.14
Confidence .46** .33** .24*
Motivation intensity .42** .34** .28**
Intention to continue .42** .43** .25*
** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.
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3.2.4.5. RQ 3 - Linguistic predictors of European identity 
Regression analyses were used in order to find the best predictors for general, civic and 
cultural European identity. Based on the theoretical assumptions and the previous 
correlational analyses reported here, the independent variables chosen were attitudes to 
multilingualism, anxiety to communicate in a foreign language, motivational intensity and 
intention to continue studying foreign languages. These variables were entered at once, 
since there was no presumption that one would take precedence over the other. The 
variable confidence in communicating in a foreign language was again dropped due to the 
high correlation it showed to have with anxiety (r = -.73, p = .000). The other linguistic 
variables also showed strong correlations, but not as strong as the correlations between 
anxiety and confidence. Andy Field (2009) suggests that variables can be entered as 
predictors even if they are correlated, unless the correlations are above .80, on the 
condition that the collinearity statistics are closely examined. The dependent variables 
considered were general, civic and cultural European identity, in the first place. Regression 
analyses were also conducted looking at the variables European and member of the EU. All 
the results are presented in Table 21 and Table 22. #
The collinearity statistics tolerance and VIF were inspected for any abnormal values, which 
would indicate the relation between the predictors is too strong to allow for a valid 
regression analysis, but in all cases these statistics were within the normal values. Thus, the 
next step was the regression analyses; in the first instance, the predictors for general, civic 
and cultural European identity variables were investigated.#
!
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Although at the bivariate level there were strong positive correlations between the identity 
and the linguistic variables, at the multivariate level, these predictors barely had any effect 
on the dependent variables. The same results were obtained for the European and member 
of the EU variables. All the F values for the regression analyses were significant; however, a 
close inspection of the t values and their significance levels points to the fact that the only 
predictor for general European identity was anxiety, suggesting that higher levels of anxiety 
might predict lower levels of general European identity.#
Table 21. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables (IV) and the 
European identity variables (DV) for the British group
Equation Coefficients
DV IV R F Beta t r pr sr
Eur gen 0.3 9.53*
Attitudes 0.03 0.26 0.3 0.03 0.02
Anxiety -0.31 -3.13* -0.46 -0.32 -0.28
Motivational Intensity 0.16 1.4 0.42 0.15 0.12
Intention to Continue 0.2 1.57 0.42 0.16 0.14
Eur civ 0.23 6.50*
Attitudes 0.16 1.37 0.38 0.14 0.13
Anxiety -0.12 -1.14 -0.28 -0.12 -0.11
Motivational Intensity 0.08 0.67 0.34 0.07 0.06
Intention to Continue 0.24 1.85 0.43 0.19 0.17
Eur cult 0.11 2.61*
Attitudes 0.15 1.2 0.27 0.13 0.12
Anxiety -0.001 -0.01 -0.14 -0.001 -0.001
Motivational Intensity 0.19 1.44 0.28 0.15 0.15
Intention to Continue 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.04 0.03
* Significant at .05 level.
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In regression analysis, when too many variables are entered at once, there is a possibility 
that they will mask (Lawrance, 1995) the truly significant ones and yield a significant F 
value, but no significant t-values. Thus, the same analysis was carried out again, but only 
with the variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety as predictors for the various 
measures of European identity. These predictors were chosen due to their theoretical 
relevance and their distinctive nature. The results showed a dramatic change, indicating in 
almost all cases these two independent variables were strong predictors of all types of 
European identity (the only exception was anxiety as predictor of cultural European 
identity showed no significance). The results in Table 23 show the strength of these 
predictors.#
Table 22. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables (IV) and the 
European-ness and member of the EU (DV) for the British group
Equation Coefficients
DV IV R F Beta t r pr sr
Eur 0.18 4.95*
Attitudes -0.02 -0.13 0.22 -0.01 -0.01
Anxiety -0.15 -1.39 -0.3 -0.15 -0.13
Motivational Intensity 0.24 1.91 0.38 0.2 0.18
Intention to Continue 0.16 1.16 0.33 0.12 0.11
EU member 0.2 5.56*
Attitudes 0.13 1.05 0.33 0.11 0.1
Anxiety -0.1 -0.93 -0.27 -0.1 -0.09
Motivational Intensity 0.2 1.62 0.38 0.17 0.15
Intention to Continue 0.15 1.12 0.37 0.12 0.11
* Significant at .05 level.
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3.2.4.6. RQ 4 - Generational differences 
The differences between people under 35 and people over 35 with regards to their 
identification to various groups were investigated by conducting independent sample t-
tests. The sample was split in two groups: Under-35 (N = 45) and Over-35 (N=38). The results 
of the t-test analysis investigating the various measures of identity. indicated that these two 
groups were different on some of these variables. #
Bruter’s European identity variables were first assessed, and the results showed that the 
two groups were different with regards to their general and civic European identify, but not 
their cultural identity (General European identity: t (81) = 2.66, p = .009; Civic European 
identity: t (81) = 3.63, p =.001). The Under-35 group scored thus significantly higher on 
measures of general and civic European identity. The other significant differences were 
recorded in the case of Diagram 3, which showed various possible representations between 
the regional, national and European identities (t (81) = 2.05, p <.05); in this case as well, the 
Under-35 group scored higher than the Over-35 group, indicating a stronger relation 
between the 3 identities (for the graphic representation of Diagram 3, see Appendix A-D). 
Table 23. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables attitudes to 
multilingualism and anxiety (IV) and Bruter’s European identity measurements (DV) for the British 
group
Equation Coefficients
DV IV R F Beta t r pr sr
Eur gen 0.25 14.89*
Attitudes 0.2 2.09* 0.3 0.21 0.19
Anxiety -0.41 -4.36* -0.46 -0.42 -0.4
Eur civ 0.19 9.94*
Attitudes 0.33 3.33* 0.38 0.33 0.32
Anxiety -0.2 -2.04* -0.28 -0.21 -0.19
Eur cult 0.08 3.75*
Attitudes 0.25 2.38* 0.27 0.24 0.24
Anxiety -0.08 -0.72 -0.14 -0.08 -0.07
* Significant at .05 level.
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With regards to their identification as members of the European Union, the Under-35 
group scored significantly higher as evidenced by the t-tests (t (81) = 2.26, p <.05). These 
results indicate that the younger generation of people in the UK tend to identify more with 
Europe and, mostly, the European Union. #
Figure 10. Means of the identity variables in the two age groups for the British group#
3.2.5. Belgium - Brussels and the rest of Belgium 
3.2.5.1. RQ 5 - Brussels versus RoB - linguistic and European identity  
For the purposes of investigating the European identity of the people from Brussels 
compared to the rest of the Belgian sample, the analysis was conducted by splitting the 
sample based on whether they were born or resided in Brussels. This division yielded two 
groups of participants: the ones who were born or lived in Brussels (N=132) and those who 
were neither born in Brussels, nor lived there (N=205). Descriptive analyses of the 
background information of the two groups indicated that the first one consisted of 31.1 % 
male participants (7 did not indicate their gender), while the second had 26.8% male 
participants (18 participants in this group did not indicate their gender). With regards to 
age, the Brussels Group had a mean of M = 27.6 (SD = 11.0) and for the Rest-of-Belgium 
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Group the mean was M = 26.8 (SD = 13.8). The educational level distribution was also 
similar between the two groups, same as the distribution of the L1 (around 65% in both 
groups had Dutch as a L1, and around 30% had French in both groups). #
In order to investigate the differences between these two groups a series of t-tests were 
conducted to determine whether there were significant differences between the Brussels 
Group and the Rest-of-Belgium Group on these following variables: proficiency and 
frequency of use of a foreign language, the linguistic variables, the European identity and 
other identity variables and the BIOS variables. The results are presented below.#
3.2.5.1.1. Proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages 
The two groups were compared on their self-assessed proficiency and frequency of use of 
various languages. The results of the t-test indicate that the groups are significantly 
different with regards to proficiency in L2, L3 and L4, and also frequency of use of L2, L3 
and L4, with the Brussels Group scoring significantly higher on all of these variables. The 
results are presented in the Table 24:#
3.2.5.1.2. Linguistic variables 
The same analyses were conducted to investigate the differences between the two groups 
on the following linguistic variables: confidence and anxiety in communicating in a foreign 
language, attitudes to multilingualism, motivational intensity and intention to continue 
Table 24. Language proficiency and frequency of use means for the Brussels Group and RoB Group
Group
Brussels RoB t df
L2 Proficiency 5.23 (0.78) 4.85 (0.99) 3.68* 325
L3 Proficiency 4.69 (1.02) 4.29 (1.03) 3.40* 324
L4 Proficiency 3.54 (1.28) 2.99 (1.26) 3.54* 279
L2 Frequency 5.20 (1.32) 4.71 (1.57) 2.87* 317
L3 Frequency 4.56 (1.60) 3.96 (1.70) 3.14* 317
L4 Frequency 2.78 (1.79) 2.31 (1.62) 2.19* 267
Note: * = p<.05. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to the means. 
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studying another language. The results of the t-tests indicated that the two groups were 
only different in their levels of anxiety (t (324) = 3.18, p < 0.05) and confidence (t (324) = 2.95, 
p <0.05) in using a foreign language. #
3.2.5.1.3. European identity variables 
With regards to the differences between the two groups on the European identity variables, 
the results of the t-test analyses indicated that the two groups were not significantly 
different on any of these variables. #
3.2.5.1.4. Other identity variables 
The two groups were also compared on other identity variables, such as their identification 
with their city, region or country, with being a member of the European Union, a Western 
European and a world citizen. The t-test analyses yielded no significant results between the 
Brussels Group and the Rest-of-Belgium Group, thus suggesting that from an identity 
point of view the two groups were equivalent.#
3.2.5.1.5. BIOS variables 
The two groups were compared on their scores on the BIOS instrument, which intended to 
assess the way people manage their regional, national and European identities, whether 
they see these identities as forming a hybrid, being complementary, requiring them to be 
flexible and alternate between them depending on the context, preferring a monocultural 
identity or being conflictive. The results of the t-tests suggested that the two groups were 
only significantly different on their levels of alternation (t (273) = 2.04, p < 0.05), with the 
Brussels Group showing a higher degree of alternation between their regional, national and 
European identities.#
3.2.5.1.6. Conclusion 
The results obtained by comparing the Brussels Group with the Rest-of-Belgium Group 
indicate that they are not significantly different on any of the identity variables, except that 
the Brussels Group alternated more between their national and European identity than the 
Rest-of-Belgium Group. Due to the cosmopolitan nature of Brussels, people might 
encounter more opportunities in which they need to alternate between their regional, 
national and European identities. The main differences however, were recorded on the 
linguistic variables with the Brussels Groups feeling less anxious when using a foreign 
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language, and declaring more proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages than 
the other group. One explanation for this result is that there may be increased 
opportunities to use a foreign language in Brussels. It seems then that the Brussels model 
fosters the development and use of foreign languages, but it does not influence the levels of 
identity between the participants in the two groups. Nonetheless, when interpreting these 
results it is important to keep in mind that the participants were all highly educated, young 
and multilingual. It is however reassuring to observe that the national, regional and 
European identity are at similar levels throughout the whole of Belgium, including Brussels. 
The results obtained here are also a good validator for the previous decision to compare the 
Belgian Francophone and Dutch-speaking groups. #
3.2.6. All contexts - Romanian, English, French and Dutch 
3.2.6.1. RQ 6 - Comparison of contexts 
The four data sets were merged in order to be able to assess the level of impact of context 
on the European identity and linguistic variables. The analysis was performed by forming 
the four groups based on the context and comparing their results. The resulting groups 
were: English (N=119), Belgian Dutch speakers (N=230), Belgian Francophone (N=107) and 
Romanian (N=300). The analyses investigating how the groups differed on the European 
identity and linguistic variables were performed using one-way ANOVAs and the 
significant results were further assessed using Tukey post-hoc tests. The variables 
investigated were: proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, the linguistic 
variables, the European identity and other identity variables and the BIOS variables. The 
results are presented below. #
3.2.6.1.1. Proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to see whether the context affected the levels of self-
assessed proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages. Statistical significant 
differences were observed for all variables, except proficiency in L1. The Tukey post-hoc 
tests indicated which groups were significantly different from each other and these results 
are presented in Figure 11.#
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Figure 11. Means of proficiency and competence in L1, L2, L3 and L4 for the four groups#
The graph above presents the significant results of the analysis of variance between these 
four groups. The post-hoc Tukey tests indicated which of the groups showed significant 
difference. With regards to proficiency in L2, there was a significant difference between the 
four groups: F (3, 722) = 27.93, p < 0.001. The mean scores indicated that the English and the 
Belgian Francophone group scored significantly lower than the Romanian and the Dutch-
speaking group, but the English and the Belgian Francophone groups did not differ 
significantly; same was true for the Dutch speakers and Romanian groups. The ANOVA for 
proficiency in L3 showed significant differences between the groups as well: F (3, 686) = 
20.40, p < 0.001. In this case, the Dutch-speaking group scored significantly higher than all 
other groups, while the Romanian groups was significantly higher than the English group. 
The results of the One-way ANOVA for proficiency in L4 were also significant: F (3, 533) = 
19.00, p < 0.001, and the post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that the Romanian groups scored 
significantly higher than all other groups, and that the Dutch-speaking group was 
significantly more proficient in L4 than the Belgian Francophone group. #
The frequency of use variables for L1, L2, L3 and L4 all showed significant differences 
between the groups, although in some cases the F values were quite low. For example, with 
regards to frequency of use of L1, F (3, 701) = 6.44, p < 0.001. As indicated by the graph, the 
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Romanian group was significantly different from the Belgian Francophone and the English 
group, and the Dutch-speaking group was significantly different from the Belgian 
Francophone. Although these results are statistically significant, the graphical 
representation and the F value, clearly indicate that the differences are not so high. But 
these differences increased in the case of the frequency of use of the L2 between the four 
groups: F (3, 712) = 26.15, p <0.001. In this case, the Dutch-speaking group was significantly 
different from all other groups, and the Belgian Francophone and Romanian group were 
also significantly different from the English group. The differences in the frequency of use 
of the L3 between the four groups were even stronger, with F (3, 677) = 49.1, p <0.001. The 
Dutch-speaking group was significantly different from the other three groups, the Belgian 
Francophone group was also significantly different from the Romanian and the English 
group, and lastly, the Romanian group was significantly different from the English group. 
The last variable investigated was frequency of use of L4. In this case, the results showed 
again a significant difference between the four groups: F (3, 514) = 8.47, p < 0.001. The post-
hoc Tukey tests indicated that the Belgian Francophone and the Dutch-speaking groups 
were significantly different from the Romanian and the English groups.#
3.2.6.1.2. Linguistic variables 
One-way ANOVAs were also conducted to test the differences between the four groups on 
the following linguistic variables: anxiety and confidence in communicating in a foreign 
language, attitudes to multilingualism, motivational intensity and intention to continue 
studying a foreign language. The means of each group for each variable are presented in 
Figure 12, followed by a description of the results of the analysis.#
The results of the one-way ANOVAs investigating the differences between the four groups 
on the linguistic variables proved to be significant for all five variables. For the first 
variable, anxiety in communicating in a foreign language, F (3,715) = 20.73, p < 0.001, and 
the post-hoc Tukey tests showed that English and Belgian Francophone group scored 
significantly higher than the Dutch speakers and the Romanian group. There were no 
significant differences observed between the English and Belgian Francophone group, nor 
the Dutch speakers and the Romanian group.#
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Figure 12. Means of the linguistic variables for the four groups#
With regards to the confidence variables, F (3, 714) = 25.5, p < 0.001. In this case, post-hoc 
analysis indicated that the Romanian and the Dutch-speaking group scored significantly 
higher than the Belgian Francophone and the English group, and the difference between 
the Belgian Francophone and the English groups was also significant. The analysis of 
variance for the variable attitudes to multilingualism was significant, as well: F (3, 658) = 49. 
31, p < 0.001. As the graph and the post-hoc analyses clearly point out, the Romanian group 
was significantly different from all other three groups. Among these groups, no differences 
were observed. A smaller F value was observed for the variables motivational intensity to 
continue studying foreign languages: F (3, 639) = 8.62, p < 0.001. In this case, the Tukey 
post-hocs showed that the Romanian group was significantly different from the English and 
the Dutch-speaking group, but no other differences were observed. Lastly, the variable 
intention to continue studying a foreign language, was again significant: F (3, 647) = 5.17, p = 
0.002. In this case, the Dutch-speaking group scored significantly lower than the Belgian 
Francophone and the Romanian group, and no other differences were indicated by the 
post-hoc analysis. #
3.2.6.1.3. European identity variables 
In the analysis of the European identity variables, general European identity, the civic 
European identity, country, regional and city identity were included, as determined by the 
items of the scale developed by Bruter (2005). The cultural European identity was not 
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included in this analysis, since this variable proved to be unreliable for two of the four 
groups. The results of the one-way ANOVAs are presented below in Figure 13 and they are 
explained in more detail afterwards, using the post-hoc Tukey results. #
Figure 13. Means of the European and other identities variables for the four groups#
As mentioned before, all variables in this category showed significant differences between 
the groups. The first one to be analysed was the general European identity: F (3, 611) = 14.35, 
p < 0.001. In this case, the Romanian group indicated it was significantly different from the 
other three groups, and the Dutch-speaking group was significantly different from the 
English group, but no other significant differences were observed. The differences on the 
civic European identity variables between the four groups was analysed: F (3, 592) = 24.1, p < 
0.001. The post-hoc Tukey tests suggested that the differences observed were recorded 
between the English group and all the other three groups (the English groups scored 
significantly lower than all three). Another difference was observed between the Dutch 
speakers and the Romanian group. The one-way ANOVA for the feelings of identification 
with one’s country was also significant: F (3, 611) = 31.40, p < 0.001. The differences 
observed were recorded between the Romanian and the Belgian Francophone group when 
compared to the other two groups. The difference between the Romanian and the Belgian 
Francophone group was also significant, with the former scoring higher. A significant result 
was obtained for the variable investigating the feelings of identification with one’s region: F 
(3, 610) = 52.78, p < 0.001. The Romanian group was different from the other three groups. 
The last variable investigated in this section was the feelings of identification to the city: F 
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(3, 611) = 37.58, p < 0.001. The post-hoc Tukey tests showed again that the only significant 
difference was observed between the Romanian group when compared to the other three 
groups. #
3.2.6.1.4. Other identity variables 
The four groups were also compared on some other identity variables: European-ness, 
feelings towards their membership in the EU and being a world citizen. The results of the 
one-way ANOVAs were once again significant. The figure below represents the means of 
each group on these variables and below these differences are described in more depth, 
using the Tukey post-hoc tests. #
Figure 14. Means of other identities variables for the four groups.#
Participants rated their feelings of European identity and the results of the comparison 
between the four groups on this variable showed there were significant difference:               
F (3, 615) = 4.00, p = 0.008. The low F value indicated that although significant, the 
differences between the groups were quite small; the post-hoc Tukey tests showed that this 
difference was actually observed between the Dutch speakers and the English group only. 
With regards to feelings of world citizenship, again the results of the one-way ANOVAs 
showed significant results: F (3, 613) = 4.13, p = 0.007, but also indicated only small 
differences. These differences were recorded between the Romanian group, and the English 
and the Dutch-speaking group, with the former scoring significantly higher than the latter 
two. Lastly, the differences between feelings of being a member of the European Union 
were investigated. The results showed that F (3, 616) = 3.03, p = 0.03. Although the F value 
was low, the significant differences were identified using post-hoc Tukey tests and they 
indicated that the Dutch speakers and Romanian groups were significantly different from 
the English group.#
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3.2.6.1.5. BIOS variables 
One-way ANOVAs were performed in order to investigate the differences between the four 
groups on the five variables that together form the BIOS instrument: conflict, 
monoculture, alternation, compatibility and hybridity. Although sometimes small, the 
differences observed between the four groups on these variables were significant. The graph 
and the explanation below describe these differences in more detail.#
Figure 15. Means of BIOS variables for the four groups.#
The one-way ANOVAs for the five BIOS variables showed that the four groups were 
significantly different when compared on these variables, although the differences observed 
were not always very large. For conflict, F (3, 616) = 3.10, p = 0.03, he post-hoc Tukey tests 
showed that the only significant difference was recorded between the Dutch speakers and 
the English groups. The next variable investigated was monocultural orientation, that is, a 
desire to have only one identity. The F value in this case was slightly larger: F (3, 616) = 8.80, 
p < 0.001. The significant differences for this variable were observed between the English 
group, which scored significantly lower than all other groups. The variable alternation 
investigated the participants’ ability to switch between their national and European 
identities depending on the context. The results of the one-way ANOVA indicated an        
F (3, 616) = 4.01, p = 0.008. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the only significant difference 
observed was between the Dutch speakers and the Romanian group. With regards to 
compatibility between these two identities, F = (3, 614) = 13.03, p < 0.001. As the graph and 
the post-hoc Tukey tests reveal, the significant differences were observed between the 
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Belgian Francophone group and all the other three groups, and between the Romanian 
group and the Dutch and English ones. And lastly, scores for the hybridity variable were 
also significant: F (3, 616) = 8.64, with a p < 0.001. The post-hoc Tukey scores indicated that 
the English group scored significantly lower than the other three groups. The only other 
difference observed was recorded between the Romanian and the Belgian Francophone 
groups. #
The orientation most endorsed by the participants in all contexts was compatibility, 
followed by hybridity. This points out to the fact, that overall, European citizens might 
perceive their national identity to be compatible with their European identity, sometimes 
up to the point where they can fuse and blend to become one identity. The least endorsed 
orientation was the monocultural one, suggesting that the participants were not keen on 
feeling just national or just European, but that they prefer to be part  of both. A conflict 
between the national and the European identity was not a prevalent orientation for the 
participants in these studies, obtaining very low endorsement scores when compared to the 
compatibility and hybridity orientations. Lastly, alternation showed moderate to low levels 
of endorsement from all participants.#
The patterns of correlations between the BIOS variables and the linguistic variables for all 
contexts are presented in the graph below (Figure 16). These results have been discussed 
previously, for each context. This graphical representation aims to compare the values of 
the correlations between the contexts. When looking at the variable attitudes to 
multilingualism, it is clear that for the Dutch-speaking participants, more positive attitudes 
are strongly and positively related to a sense of complementarity and hybridity between the 
national and European identities. These results also apply to the UK sample, however in 
this case, the relationship between alternation between the two identities and positive 
attitudes to multilingualism was stronger. For the Romanian and Belgian Francophone 
participants, these relationships were not as powerful. #
The graphical representation of the patterns of correlations between the proficiency and 
frequency of use of L1, L2, L3 and L4 and the BIOS variables indicates that for the Romanian 
sample, the correlations were quite small in comparison to the other three contexts. The 
range of correlations is clearly narrower for the Romanian group. The Dutch-speaking 
group pattern of correlations suggests that the more proficient the participants were in 
their foreign languages, the more they perceived the national and European identities to be 
complementary or to form a hybrid. However, for the same group, the correlations between 
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frequency of use of these languages seems to be almost unrelated to the more positive 
BIOS variables. The Francophone Belgian sample and the English sample show a more 
disperse pattern. Interestingly, proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages seems 
to be quite strongly related to alternation between the national and European identity. #
Figure 16. Correlations between BIOS variables and linguistic variables for all contexts#
The pattern of correlations between the identity and the linguistic variables for the three 
contexts is presented in the graph below (Figure 17). The cultural European identity was not 
included for the two Belgian contexts. These results show clearly that positive attitudes to 
multilingualism are related to feeling more European, to stronger civic and cultural 
European identities (except for the Dutch speakers sample). However, strong regional and 
national identities do not seem to correlate with positive attitudes to multilingualism - and 
again, in this case, the Dutch-speaking participants are the exception. This graphical 
representation suggests that particularly for the UK sample, proficiency and frequency of 
use of foreign languages is strongly and positively related to a general and civic European 
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identity, however they have no relationship with the cultural European identity, nor the 
national and regional identity. #
 
Figure 17. Correlations between identity variables and linguistic variables for the four contexts.#
3.2.7. Conclusion 
These results suggest that proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages are 
particularly important for some contexts in the development of a stronger sense of 
European identity. They also seem to play a role in the integration of the national and 
European identities, and in the development of a feeling of complementarity and hybridity 
between the two. The emergence of the alternation variable as one strongly and positively 
correlated with proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, as well as positive 
attitudes to multilingualism is an interesting result. It might indicate that for some people 
the two identities, although quite strongly endorsed, are considered separate identities, and 
that some participants have no issues alternating or switching between them depending on 
the context. This suggests that unlike the relation between two cultural or ethnic 
identities, the link between national and European identity is construed differently, 
pointing to the supra-national characteristic of European identity. #
The endorsement of the various identities by the participants in the three contexts 
suggests that as expected, the UK sample was the least European, displaying lower levels of 
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general, civic and cultural European identity. A riveting result is that the Romanian 
participants scored significantly higher on all European identity scales, but they also 
showed stronger national, regional and local identities. These results were obtained using 
the European identity scale developed by Bruter (2005), which at least in the Belgian 
context proved to be unreliable for the cultural European identity variable. #
A promising result, consistent with the literature presented here, is that at least in the UK, 
the younger participants endorsed the European identity scales significantly more than the 
older participants. There were very few differences for the Belgian samples, while in 
Romania the pattern was reversed, with the older Romanians declaring they felt more 
European than the younger ones. This last result regarding the Romanian sample might be 
due to the fact that the older Romanians have witnessed the transformation of their 
country from a communist to a democratic one, and later a member of the European 
Union. In comparison, the older British participants might have witnessed the country’s 
shifting position towards the European Union, while the younger British participants might 
have had more opportunities to take advantage of the UK’s membership in the EU. For the 
Belgians however, the EU and Europe have always been a part of their political landscape, 
and this could explain the lack of generational differences in European identification.#
Another interesting and quite surprising result was that when asked to rate their feelings of 
European-ness, citizenship of the world and their identification as being a member of the 
EU, all participants showed strong positive feelings towards these items, regardless of the 
context. The statistical analysis pointed to significant differences between the contexts on 
these scales, but the differences were quite small. Also, the fact that the means for 
endorsing these items were higher than 4 on a 6-point Likert scale suggest that overall, all 
participants felt European, citizens of the EU and of the world. #
The results presented here shed light on many aspects of European identity and how it is 
constructed in relation to national identity, as well as attitudes and practices of 
multilingualism. The following section will present the results of the interviews conducted 
in the three contexts and will attempt to give some nuances and clarifications to the 
statistical analysis presented so far. 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4. Qualitative studies 
4.1. Methodology 
4.1.1. Procedure 
The participants were asked to fill out a short version of the questionnaire which included 
a background information section and Bruter’s (2005) instrument for assessing European 
identity. This component of the study investigated the content validity of the instrument in 
the three different contexts. This was deemed to be a good starting point for a discussion 
with the participants regarding their feelings of European identity and their attitudes to 
multilingualism. The second goal of the interviews was to better understand people’s 
attitudes towards multilingualism, and if and why it is important for them to be 
multilingual. Another goal was to give nuances to the concept of European identity by 
allowing the participants to describe how they understood the concept. And lastly, they 
were invited to discuss whether they perceived a link between attitudes to multilingualism 
and European identity. This component of the study aims also to counteract the potential 
self-selection bias of the survey data collected. Although the sample does not claim to be 
representative, the interviews might present views that differ or complement the survey 
results.#
Other topics discussed during the interviews included the perceived differences and 
similarities between being European and being a member of the European Union, whether 
speaking languages was useful for traveling, the importance of knowing more languages in 
the personal and professional life, the impact that travel in Europe and contact with other 
Europeans has on the participants’ feelings of European identity, and others. The 
interviews followed a semi-structured pattern, allowing the discussion to be directed by the 
participants. All participants volunteered to take part in the interviews. The interviews 
were conducted in Romanian in Romania and English in the other two contexts.#
All interviewees signed an informed consent form, which included consent for the audio 
recording of the conversation, and they were debriefed at the end of the session. The 
anonymity clause in the informed consent means that the participants will not be identified 
by name, but rather by codes. There were five interviews per country. The aim of the 
interviews was to talk to people of different ages and backgrounds about their views on 
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European identity and multilingualism. The interviews were recorded digitally and stored 
in a secure location, as per the Ethics Board approval received from Birkbeck College, 
University of London (for a list of the guiding questions for each context, see Appendix E).#
For each context, the ages of the participants had a wide range, since the study aimed to 
cover a wider range of attitudes towards European identity and multilingualism. Most of 
the participants were highly educated individuals, living either in the capital of their 
country or in a big city. All of the participants were multilingual to some extend. The 
recorded interviews lasted anywhere between half and hour and an hour and a half, 
depending on the willingness of the participants to discuss the topics presented. #
4.1.2. Participants 
4.1.2.1. Romania 
Five interviews were conducted in Romania. The language in which these interviews were 
conducted was Romanian and the excerpts presented in the Results section are presented 
both in Romanian and their English translation. Only one of the interviewees (Rom_4) was 
born in Cluj-Napoca, a city in the heart of Transylvania, while the others were born in other 
cities in Transylvania. All of them lived in Cluj-Napoca for most of their adult life. They 
rated their knowledge of foreign languages quite high, all of them able to speak, 
understand, read and write at least in their L2 and L3. Table 25 below presents the 
demographic information for these participants. #
Table 25. Background information for the participants in the interviews in Romania
ID Age Sex Education L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 / L5 / L6 Language spoken 
most frequently
Rom_1 24 F University Romanian / English / French / 
Spanish / German
Romanian
Rom_2 21 F University Romanian / English / French / 
Spanish / Hungarian
Romanian
Rom_3 67 F University Romanian / English / French /
Russian / Spanish / Japanese 
Romanian / English
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4.1.2.2. Belgium 
All five interviews conducted in Belgium took place in Brussels. The interviews were 
conducted in English, a language that all participants declared they knew very well. One 
interview was conducted with two participants (Bel_2 and Bel_3) due to circumstances. 
This did not hinder the discussion, on the contrary, since the two participants came from 
very different backgrounds, they had the opportunity to discuss and engage with each 
other. Two of the participants were from Brussels (one having French as L1 and the other 
Dutch, but declaring herself completely bilingual), one participant was born in Wallonia 
and the other three in Flanders. All six had been living in Brussels, either studying or 
working, for an extended period of time. All of them were multilingual and declaring high 
proficiency levels in at least two languages apart from their mother tongue. The 
demographic information is presented in Table 26 below.#
Rom_4 29 F Master Romanian / English / French / 
German / Italian
Romanian
Rom_5 70 F University Romanian / French / German / 
Russian / English
Romanian
ID Age Sex Education L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 / L5 / L6 Language spoken 
most frequently
Table 26. Background information for the participants in the interviews in Belgium
ID Age Sex Education L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 / L5 / L6 Language spoken 
most frequently
Bel_1 26 F Master Dutch / French / English / German Dutch
Bel_2 26 M Master Dutch / French / English / Danish / 
German / Swedish
Dutch
Bel_3 30 M Master French / English / Italian / Dutch French
Bel_4 28 M Master Dutch / English / French / German Dutch / English
Bel_5 30 M University French / Spanish / English / Dutch French
Bel_6 61 M Master Dutch / German / French / English Dutch
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4.1.2.3. United Kingdom 
The UK interviews were conducted in English and they all took place in London. A total of 
five interviews were conducted for the UK sample. The place of origin of the British 
participants was diverse: one was from the North-East of England, one was born in Cyprus, 
but had moved to the UK with her family at a very young age and identified herself as 
British Greek Cypriot, one was born in London, one in Hertfordshire, and another one in 
Wales. At the time of the interviews, they all lived in London. Their ages also covered a 
wide range. With regards to their multilingualism, four out of the five participants declared 
high proficiency in at least one other language apart from their L1. One participant on the 
other hand reported that although she attempts to use her L2 and L3 while on holidays, she 
has very little proficiency in either of them. Another participant reported fluency in seven 
languages. Table 27 below presents the demographic information for these participants.#
Table 27. Background information for the participants in the interviews in the United Kingdom
ID Age Sex Education L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 / L5 / L6 Language spoken 
most frequently
UK_1 26 F Master English / French / Spanish English
UK_2 62 F High-
school
Greek / English / French English / Greek
UK_3 58 M Master English / Portuguese / Spanish / 
Arabic
English
UK_4 43 F Master English / Portuguese / Spanish / 
French
English
UK_5 28 M Master English / Welsh / Italian / French / 
Spanish / Scottish Gaelic / Polish
English
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4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Romania 
4.2.1.1. RQ 7 - Content validity 
The content validity of the scale on European identity developed by Bruter (2005) was 
tested by discussing each question with the participants. The participants understood most 
of the questions as they were intended. The only question that seemed problematic for 
some of the participants was the sports question. The aim of the question was to see 
whether the participants tend to choose the European players when they knew little about 
the sport. One participant said:#
Eu sunt fan tenis de câmp, îmi place mai mult jucătoarea poloneză. 
Dacă ar fi volei sau alt sport despre care nu știu prea multe, aș alege 
după alt criteriu, aș alege după tară și oamenii de acolo. (Rom_1)#
[I am a fan of tennis, I like the Polish player more. If it would have 
been volleyball or another sport I knew little about, I would have 
chosen based on a different criteria, I would have chosen based on 
the country and its people. (Rom_1)]#
For this particular participant, the content validity was compromised because she seemed 
to be interested in the sport and had preferences regarding the players. Out of the 4 items 
on the question, she chose two European players and two non-European. Another 
participant said she chose based on the players, as well as their countries of origin:#
La propriu, dar cred că și după preferința de țară. (Rom_4)#
[Literally, but I think also by country preference (Rom_4)]#
Other participants chose mostly (but not entirely) European players, and declared that they 
chose thinking of whether the players were from Europe or not.#
Ca și nume nu cunosc, dar fiind din UE, m-aș simți mai mândră să 
câștige ai noștri. M-aș bucura mai mult să câstige cineva din familia 
noastră europeană. (Rom_2)#
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[By name, I don’t know any of them, but being from the EU, I’d feel 
prouder if ours won. I’d be happier to see someone from our 
European family win. (Rom_2)]#
One of the participants said that she did not think much about her European identity. In 
the Romanian media and public discourse, the concept and the term “European identity” 
and “identity” in general are not discussed extensively. Although national identity is used 
and discussed quite often, it is mostly in light of ideas of patriotism or nationalism. 
However, all participants in the interviews were able to understand and relate to the 
questions.#
Mă simt în egală masură cetățean al Europei ca și cetățean al 
României. E foarte ciudat să răspund la chestia asta, că nu m-am 
gândit niciodată; m-am gandit întotdeauna că mă simt, adică am 
aceleași libertăți, teoretic, am aceleași drepturi ca și alt cetățean al 
Europei. Oricunde mă duc nu mă simt doar cetățean al României, ci 
fac parte din întreg. (Rom_4)#
[I feel equally a citizen of Europe and a citizen of Romania. It is very 
weird to answer this, because I’ve never thought of it; I always 
thought that I feel, I mean, that I have the same freedoms, 
theoretically, that I have the same rights as any other European 
citizen. Anywhere I go, I don’t only feel I am a citizen of Romania, 
but that I am part of the whole (Rom_4)]#
Although Rom_4 briefly states that she has never thought about the question of her 
European identity, she quickly considered the question and came up with a coherent 
answer, which was maintained throughout the interview. #
It thus seems that the content validity of the European identity scale was quite high, with 
the only exception being the sports questions. Identity questions, although potentially 
unexamined in some cases, were easy to grasp and discuss for the participants, proving that 
it was not a matter of the validity of the scale, but of whether the question was something 
present in the thoughts of the participants to a high degree. #
4.2.1.2. RQ 8 - Attitudes to multilingualism 
Overall, all the participants in the interviews had very positive attitudes towards 
multilingualism. All of them said that people should speak at least two or three languages 
apart from their mother tongue. When asked whether they knew what the EU 
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recommendation was, only one participant, Rom_3, knew about the MT + 2 policy, which 
means that for the other four it was a personal opinion that each European should be able 
to speak two or three languages. The predominant view was that English was absolutely 
necessary, but also that it was a given that people were going to learn it. When discussing 
learning English, one participant brought up the generational differences between the 
younger and older people with regards to knowledge of English:#
Fiecare ar trebui să știe minim trei limbi, cu tot cu limba maternă. 
Sau minim trei pe lânga limba materna. Adică engleza oricum în 
generația noastră o învațam în școala, trebuie măcar să înceri, să îți 
dai interesul. (Rom_1)#
[Everybody should know a minimum of three languages, including 
their mother tongue. Or minimum three apart from it. I mean, in 
our generation, we learn English in school, you have to at least try, to 
show an interest. (Rom_1)]#
Other participants also mentioned the benefits of knowing English, suggesting that English 
was the language of tourism:#
Ca turist mi-ar fi greu să învat toate limbile, atunci cu engleza pot să 
mă descurc. (Rom_2)#
[As a tourist, it would be hard for me to learn all the languages, but 
knowing English, I can manage. (Rom_2)]#
For one of the older participants, English came as a second choice after French. Until the 
revolution in 1989, French and Russian were the most studied languages in Romania. 
Nonetheless, during the last couple of decades, English has gained a very important status 
in Romania, and most school children choose it as a first or second foreign language. 
French, however, is also a widely spoken language in Romania.#
Având in vedere că limba franceză in Europa prin tradiție era o limbă 
a culturii mi se pare normal ca un cetățean al UE să vorbească și 
limba franceză. Având în vedere circulația mondială a limbii engleze 
sau spaniole ar putea fi și astea un atu pentru un cetățean care circulă 
în Europa. Engleza în primul rând. Depinde de scopurile pe care le 
ai. Pentru tehnică în tinerețea mea era foarte importantă limba 
germană și limba rusă, acum importanța lor a scăzut prin faptul că 
limba engleză e mult mai vorbită. (Rom_3)#
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[Considering that traditionally French has been the language of 
culture in Europe, I find it obvious that every European citizen 
should speak French. Considering the worldwide importance of 
English or Spanish, these could also be an advantage for a citizen 
who moves in Europe. English in the first place. It all depends on 
your goals. When I was young, for technology, German and Russian 
were very important, now their importance has dropped because 
English is widely spoken. (Rom_3)]#
The views of the interviewees from Romania regarding the advantages of speaking English 
and any other foreign languages were extremely positive: access to information, access to 
the foreign mass-media, communication with foreigners, access to the culture and 
literature of another country, and even changes in identity. #
Orice limbă care o vorbești e de fapt o multiplicare a identității tale. 
Sigur, n-o s-o vorbești la nivel basic, ci la nivel bun. (Rom_3)#
[Any language you speak is in fact a multiplication of your identity. 
Of course, you have to speak it proficiently, not at a basic level. 
(Rom_3)]#
Most of the participants said that when they travel they prefer to learn at least a few 
phrases in the language of the country they are visiting. Some mentioned that this would 
make them feel closer to the people of the other country, while others said that they 
appreciated greatly when a foreigner in Romania is addressing them in Romanian, even if 
they later switch to speaking in another language. It seems that in Romania at least this is 
considered a sign of respect and politeness. One of the older participants said that she 
usually traveled with organised groups, and thus did not need to learn the language of the 
country she visits, because there was always a tour guide who could interpret and translate. 
She said she only tried to learn two or three words, to be polite. But she also maintained 
that it was important to speak three or four languages:#
Toată lumea ar trebui să știe trei-patru limbi maxim: limba lui, 
engleza, poate franceza și germana mai apoi. Ar folosi pentru 
comunicare, peste tot se vorbesc limbile astea de circulație. (Rom_5)#
[Everybody should know maximum three-four languages : his 
language, English, maybe later French and German. They would be 
useful for communication, these international languages are spoken 
everywhere. (Rom_5)] #
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The participants interviewed here had positive views on multilingualism. They considered 
it a normal and useful thing to be able to speak a few foreign languages, they found it useful 
for communication and interaction with others, but also for their own development. They 
all seemed happy to hear that the EU suggested policy was for every European to speak 
two European languages apart from the mother tongue, but they seemed to have arrived at 
the same conclusion on their own. English was considered useful, even essential in today’s 
world, but not necessarily enough. These views were also reflected in their proficiency in 
various languages. #
4.2.1.3. RQ 9 - Feeling European and European identity 
When the discussion reached topics related to feeling European and having a European 
identity, there were different points in time used as reference, either explicit or implicit, 
dividing the timeline in three periods: before the 1989 revolution against the Communist 
regime, between 1989 and 2007, and after 2007 when Romania joined the European Union. 
It seems that these time points are relevant for the interviewees’ feelings of European 
identity. It should be mentioned here that before the fall of the Communism, the 
Romanian people had to request permission from the Party to travel abroad and travel to 
Western countries, in Europe and outside of Europe, was very restricted. #
Pentru ca să te identifici cu o țară trebuie să traiești o perioadă în 
mijlocul cetățenilor ei. Inainte de revoluție am putut să circul doar în 
țările est-europene și asta cu restricții și după revoluție același statut 
mi s-a aplicat de către Germania în anul 2000 când nu mi-au dat 
viza. Acum când aș putea să calatoresc nu mai am suficienți bani ca 
să pot să stau în orice țară a UE pentru că macar să cunosc 
mentalitatea indivizilor și autoritatilor pe viu. Ceea ce citesti în ziare 
nu e suficient ca să te poti identifica cu cineva, cu o țară. (Rom_3)#
[In oder to identify with a country you need to live at least for a 
period of time amongst its people. Before the revolution I could 
only travel to the Eastern-European countries, and even then I had 
restrictions. And after the revolution I was given the same status by 
Germany in 2000 when they denied me a visa. Now when I could 
travel, I don’t have enough money anymore to afford to stay in any 
EU country so that I can at least get to know in person the 
mentality of the individual people and the authorities. What you 
read in the newspapers is not enough to allow you to identify with 
somebody, with a country. (Rom_3)]#
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The same participant said that although she did not know for sure, she thought that 
Romanians had a negative image in Europe. Others who have travelled or lived in other 
European countries declared that the situation changed radically for Romanians after 2007. 
One participant said:#
Nu mai stau la coadă la ambasadă, nu mai stau ore și zile întregi la 
coadă să iau o viza si, doi la mâna, când trec granița e foarte 
important, nu mai ești controlat, nu se mai uită lumea foarte urât la 
tine, nu se poartă urât. Libertatea de circulație e importantă. Dacă 
vreau să mă duc la Londra trebe doar să îmi iau un bilet de avion care 
nici nu mai e foarte scump. Inainte chestia asta era imposibilă. 
(Rom_4)#
[I don’t have to queue at the embassy, I don’t have to queue for 
hours or days to take out a visa, and secondly, and this is very 
important, when crossing the border, you are no longer checked, 
people don’t look at you suspiciously, they don’t treat you badly. The 
freedom of movement is important. If I want to go to London, all I 
need to do is buy a plane ticket, which is no longer expensive either. 
Before, this was impossible. (Rom_4)]#
It was common practice before 2007 for the Romanians who wanted to travel abroad to 
queue for hours and even days in front of the embassies in Bucharest since there was no 
system of appointments and most of the times, an interview was required for the visa. The 
perceptions of the changes that happened after 2007 were echoed by participant Rom_4, 
who had studied abroad in France and Belgium before and after 2007. She argues that these 
changes were also felt in the way foreigners perceived Romanians. #
Eu consider că atitudinea altor europeni față de noi s-a schimbat 
foarte mult după aderare. E drept că eu am trăit in Paris, dar eu așa 
cred (...) Eu am trăit in Franța și am simțit-o pe pielea mea. După 
2007, totul a fost mai ușor, cont in bancă, chirie, viza, nu mai ai 
nevoie de permis de sejur pentru care stai la cozi interminabile și se 
poată execrabil cu tine, și examene medicale, o intreagă bătaie de 
cap. Asta am simțit cel mai tare, e mult mai natural cumva. (Rom_4)#
[I think that the attitude of other Europeans towards us has 
changed very much after joining the EU. It’s true I lived in Paris, but 
that’s what I think (...) I lived in France and I felt it on my own skin. 
After 2007, everything was a lot easier, opening a bank account, 
finding a flat, visa, we no longer needed a residence permit for which 
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you had to queue endlessly and they would treat you miserably, 
medical exams, it was such a headache. This is what I felt the most, 
it is somehow a lot more natural now. (Rom_4)]#
Thus joining the EU for this participant meant that the process which allowed her to study 
abroad became much more natural and easier to handle. She experienced the changes that 
were implemented at a European level allowing Romanians freedom of movement in 
Europe and she was one of the Romanians who witnessed the change first-hand. Another 
participant said that apart from all the advantages that Romanians had from joining the 
EU, they also had responsibilities.#
Inseamnă și beneficii dar și responsabilități: libertatea de trecere 
foarte mare, libertatea de a ajunge la instituțiile din alte tari pentru 
că suntem europeni și avem dreptul să ne adresăm cuiva. Dar și 
responsabilități pentru că trebuie să te comporți ca atare, mie mi se 
pare că cetățean european e acelasi lucru cu civilizat, parcă e o relație 
de sinonimie între ele. Să fim toleranți fată de etniile minoritare, să 
ne ajutam între noi, să ne comportam ca și o comunitate. (Rom_2)#
[It means having some benefits, but also responsibilities: the 
freedom of movement, the freedom to reach institutions in other 
countries because we are Europeans and we have the right to address 
someone. But also responsibilities because you have to behave 
accordingly, for me being a European citizen is the same thing with 
being civilised, there is a synonymity between these two. Being 
tolerant to the ethnic minorities, helping each other, acting like a 
community. (Rom_2)]#
Joining the EU brought about new rights for the Romanians, allowing them freedom of 
movement within the EU, but for this participant, it also brought on new responsibilities, 
which she primarily understood as learning to be tolerant and acting according to the 
norms of the community joined. The idea of being part of a community or of the European 
family was expressed by other participants as well. Rom_1 talked about “our European 
family” while Rom_4 said:#
Să te simți european e să faci parte dintr-o echipă și intr-o echipă 
reusești să faci mai multe decât pe cont propriu. (Rom_4)#
[Feeling European is to be part of a team and in a team you always 
do more than on your own. (Rom_4)]#
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The relation between feeling Romanian and European was emphasised consistently 
throughout the interviews. Some participants described their identities as nested: town or 
city first, region, Romania and then Europe. They talked about the fact that because 
Romania was part of Europe geographically, they felt European. In line with the opening of 
the borders, being allowed to travel the continent increased the contact with other 
Europeans, which for some led to increased levels of European-ness. But feeling European 
also meant distancing from the wrong type of nationalism.#
Ne simțim mai bine acum, având în vedere peste ce a trecut 
România e important. Faptul că generatii întregi au avut un 
nationalism deșăntat ca pe vremea lui Ceaușescu. (Rom_5)#
[We feel better now, and considering what Romania had to go 
through, this is important. The fact is that for generations we had a 
kind of exaggerated and shameful nationalism, like in Ceaușescu’s 
time. (Rom_5)]#
Nonetheless, one of the participants appeared to be less enthusiastic about the European 
Union, although she still identified strongly as European. She said:#
Te poți simți european, dar are un drum dus și întors. Eu mă pot 
simți europeană, dar trebuie să primesc și un feed-back, nu pot să mă 
simt europeană dacă ei nu mă doresc. Pot să mă simt ca aparținând 
zonei Europa, dar nu pot să mă simt cetățean al Europei atâta timp 
cât unii nu doresc să mă vada așa. Asta nu ține numai de ceea ce 
doresc eu, ci de ceea ce doresc altii. Niciodată nu m-am simțit altfel 
decât european, și înante de a fi in UE. (Rom_3)#
[You can feel European, but it is a two-way road. I can feel 
European, but I need to receive some feed-back, I can’t feel 
European if they don’t want me. I can feel I belong to the area of 
Europe, but I can’t feel I am a citizen of Europe as long as there are 
some who don’t want to see me as such. This is not about what I 
want, but about what others want. I have never felt anything but 
European, even before the EU. (Rom_3)]#
There do seem to be slight differences between the three younger participants and the two 
older ones in their perceptions of European identity. For the younger ones, joining the EU 
brought about advantages (and responsibilities as mentioned earlier), freedom of 
movement and the possibility to explore and engage with the other European countries, as 
well as the feeling of being part of a team or a family. The other participants seemed to 
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focus more on the past and to compare the present situation with the two other periods of 
time: the one era before the fall of communism and the one before Romania joined the EU. 
They also seemed to be more preoccupied with what the rest of Europe thought about 
Romania, and felt that there was a cultural and financial divide between Romania and 
Europe. As one of them said: “Romania e țară de origine, iar Europa e dorința 
noastră” [Romania is our country of origin, while Europe is our desire]. Europe continued 
to appear to be something distant, which the Romanians needed to attract, they still had to 
convince the other Europeans to accept them and, at the same time, Europe was seen as 
the holy grail of culture. Two of the younger participants felt that there might be a 
generational divide with regards to European identity:#
E un curent relativ nou, nu au avut posibilitatea de a experimenta. 
Noi, tinerii, am avut privilegii să le zic așa, datorită vârstei și 
mediului în care am crescut și ne dezvoltăm acum, dar am impresia 
că e o chestie relativ nouă. (Rom_1)#
Noi, care suntem mai tineri, cam simțim acest lucru pentru că am 
fost și implicati în mai multe campanii de informare cel puțin, prin 
școli. (Rom_2)#
[It is a relatively recent trend, they didn’t have the chance to 
experiment. We, the young, we had privileges if I can call them that, 
because of our age and the environment we grew up in and where we 
develop now, but I have the feeling it is a relatively new thing. 
(Rom_1)#
[For us, who are younger, we feel this because we were more involved 
with the information campaigns at least in schools. (Rom_2)]#
Some participants thought that people in Romania felt quite European:#
Cred că e raspândit în România, poate în proporiție de 60%, se tot 
pluseaza pe chestia asta. (Rom_5)#
[I think it is a prevalent feeling in Romania, maybe about 60%, they 
keep emphasising this thing. (Rom_5)]#
Conversely, others thought the opposite:#
Oamenii din România nu se simt foarte europeni și nu cred că știu 
ce inseamnă. Eu vorbesc de oamenii care nu au călătorit sau nu au 
trăit într-o țară din Europa. (Rom_4)#
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[People in Romania don’t feel very European and I don’t think they 
know what it means. I am talking about people who didn’t travel or 
live in another country in Europe. (Rom_4)]#
When discussing the prevalence of the sentiment of European-ness in Romania, the 
participants touched on issues of as public opinion campaigns, being part of the younger 
generations, having travelled, having financial stability. One other aspect discussed was that 
people in the urban areas felt more European than people in the countryside. One of the 
participants illustrated clearly the difference between rural and urban areas:#
Pe badea Gheorghe din vârful muntelui nu-l doare capul de Europa, 
pe el îl doare capul de lucruri mult mai lumesti, vaca, pământul. 
(Rom_3)#
[Peasant John, who lives on the top of the mountain, doesn’t worry 
about Europe, he worries about more mundane things, like the cow, 
the land. (Rom_3)]#
All participants were eager to share their thoughts on European identity and it appears that 
although they do understood it in different ways, it was something that they could relate to 
and could discuss at length. The next section will look at whether these participants 
reported any connections between multilingualism and European identity.#
4.2.1.4. RQ 10 - Multilingualism and European identity 
Most of the participants in the interviews agreed that speaking more languages allowed one 
to get closer to other cultures while travelling, but also that it allowed one access to the 
identity and culture of other countries. Foreign language proficiency seemed to be a way in 
which people could connect with others, get to know them better and thus could make the 
world, or Europe, a more familiar place. Although all Romanian participants spoke a few 
foreign languages, most of them said they would like to learn more, and some were actively 
engaged in learning a language at the time of the interviews. The affinity to other countries 
brought about by foreign language proficiency was mentioned often:#
Dacă vorbești spaniolă te simți un pic mai apropiat de ei, dacă 
vorbești franceza sau germana la fel, de fiecare în parte. (Rom_3)#
[If you speak Spanish you feel closer to them, and same with French 
or German, you feel closer to each of them. (Rom_3)]#
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One participant talked about the importance of speaking a language in case one decided to 
move to another country. She also mentioned the easiness of integrating in Europe through 
foreign languages:#
Cunoașterea mai multor limbi mi se pare că ajută foarte mult la 
integrarea europeană pentru că e important să mergi într-o altă țară 
și să poți discuta cu oamenii de acolo. Dacă te muți într-o altă țară, 
mult mai ușor te poți integra dacă poti să vorbești cu cineva. Asta e 
firea noastră ca oameni. (Rom_2)#
[I think knowing more languages helps a great deal with European 
integration because it is important to go to another country and to 
be able to talk to the people from there. Once you move to another 
country, you can integrate a lot easier if you can talk to people. This 
is the way we, humans, are. (Rom_2)]#
Proximity and ability to communicate with others seem to be key factors in increasing 
levels of European identity. Travelling for pleasure, work, or study are all opportunities for 
people to interact and engage with other European citizens. Joining the EU conferred 
young Romanians the opportunity to enjoy freedom of movement in the EU. They have the 
advantage of learning languages from a young age and being allowed, and even encouraged 
to use them, while travelling abroad, or to interacting with other Europeans in Romania. As 
one interviewee said:#
Astăzi tinerii se identifică mai ușor cu Europa, știu limbi, circulă 
mult, studiază. Mai puțini vin, mai mulți pleacă. (Rom_5)#
[Today, the young people identify more easily with Europe, they 
know foreign languages, they travel a lot. They study. Some come 
back, but more of them leave. (Rom_5)]#
Although in a subtle tone, this participant brought up the issue of migration of young 
people from Romania and connected it to the European identity. Having the option to 
travel and study and learn languages means that some choose to leave the country and 
exercise their rights as European citizens to study, live and work in other countries in 
Europe. By ending this statement with “some come back, more leave”, the interviewee 
links these opportunities to the possible migration towards other European countries.#
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4.2.2. Belgium 
4.2.2.1. RQ 7 - Content validity 
Following the interviews in Romania, it was decided that the sports question on Bruter’s 
(2005) scale should be dropped both from the interviews and the surveys since it did not 
seem to be understood by all participants in the same way and some participants answered 
the question literally, being familiar with the sport. Also, the fact that the question was 
somewhat deceitful in that it tried to uncover underlying sentiments towards the European 
identity by favouring one player over another was not in line with the rest of the questions 
on the scale and seemed to create a schism in the flow of the interview and completion of 
the scale, as the participants would wonder about the purpose of the question within the 
short survey administered.#
The Belgian participants responded well to the scale and all had enough experience in 
filling out surveys to understand the purpose and aim of the questionnaire. There was one 
exception - a participant who refused to fill out the Bruter scale because of his views on 
using surveys for research. He said:#
I always have some issues with these scales. Like, what is 6? Well ok, 
let’s say that how I speak my mother tongue, that’s 6, that’s perfect 
and you measure everything according to that. I have problems with 
identification because it asks me about something I think about very 
often, but I am not so much of a … I don’t identify with so many 
things consciously or happily, I do notice that in some contexts I 
identify with things, but I am very conscious of what it means to 
identify with something and the political connotations and so on. 
There’s a political question behind these questions. (Bel_4)#
This is not an uncommon view when critiquing survey research and it is often used as an 
argument when discussing the bias of survey research. Potential participants might refuse 
to fill out a questionnaire if they have to rate their answers on a Likert scale. Also, it is 
sometimes argued, as this participant pointed out, that there is no way of knowing if 
people understand the questions in the same way or use the scales consistently. This is one 
of the reasons research projects should attempt to use various methods to study the same 
object (Duff, 2006; Blommaert & van de Vijver, in press) in order to arrive to valid and clear 
results. #
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Other participants also commented on the fact that the background questionnaire asked 
them to name their ethnic background. Although all of them could answer the question, 
some mentioned that they do not necessarily agree with the term ethnic. #
I am of no ethnicity. When I hear of ethnicity I think it refers to 
various ethnicities in Africa, for example. It refers to traditions, 
habits and cultural ceremonies and so on. I think this doesn’t exist in 
Europe anymore, at least not in Western Europe. In Belgium you can 
talk about Flemish or French speaking people, but it’s no ethnicity, 
it’s just the language. (Bel_5)#
I don’t think Flemish is an ethnic background; linguistic background 
definitely, cultural maybe. (Bel_4)#
It was compelling to observe that all interviews started with a discussion about how in 
Belgium there are no ethnic, but rather linguistic differences between the Flemish and the 
Walloons. One participant also mentioned that race and ethnicity had a negative 
connotation in Belgium, referring more to primitive ethnic groups. Nonetheless, all 
participants could identify their cultural and linguistic background.#
4.2.2.2. RQ 8 - Attitudes to multilingualism 
The Belgian interview participants regarded multilingualism very positively. This is also 
reflected in the fact that all of them were highly proficient multilinguals, speaking fluently 
at least three languages. Two of the participants mentioned that in their opinion speaking 
more languages made them smarter:#
I’d learn another language. It would make me smarter. [laughs] It 
would give me access to other cultures. I’d like to learn German 
because I think German literature is very good, I’d do it for the 
culture. (Bel_1)#
Speaking foreign languages is good for a lot of reasons, it helps you 
to understand someone else, you express things differently in 
different languages so you learn that people have a different look on 
things in the world. It makes you smarter, you become better as a 
person. All kinds of improvements if you study another language. 
And it’s fun of course. (Bel_2)#
One of the most predominant reasons to learn a language was for communicative purposes. 
Some of the participants were in multilingual relationships and at the time of the interview 
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they were learning the language of their partners. This is a reflection of an integrative 
motivation to learn a language - in order to gain access to another linguistic community. #
My girlfriend is Hungarian and I try to learn the language. It’s a lot 
easier when I’m there, visiting her family. We are the typical Euro-
couple, we are this mediocre English couple. (Bel_4) 
I am learning Dutch, it’s compulsory at secondary school, but the 
further you are from Brussels the worse the lessons are. My 
girlfriend is Dutch speaking, and she has a whole group of friends 
who speak Dutch,  so now I again have to listen to Dutch and I 
need to make some effort sometimes, it is my duty to make myself 
understood in their language. (Bel_5)#
In the first case, Bel_4 was attempting to learn a new language, Hungarian, in order to be 
able to communicate with his partner and her family in Hungary. Their language of 
communication at the time of the interview was however English. The other participant, 
Bel_5, had already studied Dutch in school, but since dating a native speaker of Dutch, he 
realised that he needed to improve his Dutch skills in order to better integrate in her circle 
of friends. These personal reasons for integration in the community of their partner were 
the main motivation for their language study. Language fluency allows access to linguistic 
communities and their cultures. One of the Belgian participants declared that she was 
bilingual French and Dutch, and that allowed her to enjoy the two cultures:#
It makes life very easy because I speak French and Dutch very well 
and I can mix in both communities, both worlds, everybody 
understands me. I like it because culturally speaking I can enjoy 
both cultures, literatures, pop culture. (Bel_1)#
I’m starting to speak better Dutch so I start to identify with that 
region more, I feel a part of the Flemish more and more. (Bel_3)#
Learning Dutch for Bel_3 meant also a change in identity. Although of Walloon origins, 
having spent much of his life in the Francophone region of Belgium, at the time of the 
interview he was living in Brussels and actively learning Dutch. The fact that learning 
Dutch allowed him to feel he was a “part of the Flemish” group, without actually being a 
native of that community pointed to the powerful influence that learning Dutch had on his 
life. It might be that a Francophone Belgian identifying with the Flemish community was 
mediated by the fact that he was living in Brussels, officially a bilingual city, and studying at 
the Dutch-speaking university.#
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The communicative purpose of language learning was also mentioned by the participants:#
When I travel to places I don’t speak the language, the first thing I 
do is try to learn a few words. I think it is very important. After I 
decided to go to Romania, the first thing I did was buy a dictionary 
with all the phrases and I would actually study, even on the plane, 
just the basic things. If you just drop a sentence you see people ‘Oh!’, 
they light up and it makes things a lot easier. (Bel_2)#
Every time you can speak to a person in their language it will be 
better for the experience, the cultural exchange. I also believe that 
English is the Esperanto of nowadays, it has been reduced to a very 
simple language. I’m ok with English imposing itself as the working 
language in Europe. (Bel_5)!
Being able to communicate with people of a different background in their language 
even at a basic level was seen to be beneficial for a successful interaction. However, the 
idea that English was necessary and was the practical lingua franca of Europe was 
discussed repeatedly in the interviews. !
Everybody should know English, you have to go along with your 
time and English is the world language. (Bel_1)#
English is a technical communicative language. (Bel_6)#
The specific characteristics of Belgium as a multilingual country were discussed and most 
participants believed that it was important to be able to speak the language of the other 
linguistic community. All of the participants declared at least basic knowledge of either 
French or Dutch. Most participants had a political reason for supporting knowledge of 
both languages for Belgians, saying often that they believed this to be the solution for the 
political impasse the country was in. #
I think we should learn both languages, it should be imposed at least 
on an administrative level. It would help a lot. (Bel_3)#
Politicians are proposing separatism from a linguistic point of view 
as a solution for the language problem in Belgium, but unitarism 
could be a solution as well. (Bel_2)#
It is also interesting to note that all of the participants, but especially the ones who had a 
Flemish background spoke against the Flemish nationalism. This should be seen in light of 
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the fact that they were all highly educated individuals, living and working in Brussels. It is 
nonetheless important to point out that they all expressed a sense of uneasiness towards 
the Flemish nationalistic movement and their way of using language to create a dichotomy 
between Flanders and Wallonia. #
People in Flanders learn French in school, do you think they ever 
speak it afterwards? No. Same with German. (...) In Flanders 
everything has to be in Dutch, those people in public services speak 
French and English, but they are not allowed to speak it in 
institutions. That is petty, what are you protecting? If Flemish and 
Flanders is so vulnerable that you can’t take speaking French to a 
Senegalese refugee, that’s ridiculous. (Bel_4)#
Some of the Flemish participants talked about the negative connotation that identification 
with Flanders had at this point in time and they blamed it on the political developments. #
I consider myself a Dutch speaking Belgian, it’s a matter of fact. I 
was born in Flanders, I don’t identify with being Flemish. From a 
factual point of view I am Flemish, but for political reasons it has a 
very negative connotation so I refuse to identify with it. I think it’s 
irrelevant. It’s just a region in my country, I identify with my 
nationality which is trilingual. (Bel_2)#
I always thought I was an exception because I considered myself a 
Dutch-speaking inhabitant of Brussels and part of the European 
construction, less Flemish. There is a kind of Flemish nationalism 
that is not mine (...) But I am not the exception, most of the Flemish 
people in Brussels are like me, we are not nationalists. (Bel_6)#
Although the Flemish nationalist politics had been growing steadily over the years, these 
participants were vehemently refusing to identify with the nationalistic politics to such a 
degree that some mentioned that they were Flemish just because of their origin, cultural 
and linguistic background, but that they associated negative meanings with the term and 
refused to identify with it politically. And, as Bel_6 pointed out, this was a prevalent feeling 
among all the Flemish participants in the interviews, and potentially among the Flemish 
population of Brussels.#
Overall, the attitudes to multilingualism among the Belgian participants were highly 
positive. They were all fluent multilinguals, living and working in multiple languages. 
English was regarded as a language of communication, a technical language, but also the 
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lingua franca of the world. All of them spoke French and Dutch to a certain extent, and 
many considered that it was crucial for them as Belgians to be able to speak both languages. 
Many spoke against the nationalistic politics in Flanders and some even rejected to self-
categorise as Flemish for that reason. But Brussels is not only a cosmopolitan, multilingual 
city, but also the capital of Europe. The following section will discuss participants’ 
identification with Europe and feelings of European identity. #
4.2.2.3. RQ 9 - Feeling European and European identity 
The topic of European identity was also discussed during the interviews. The interviewees 
seemed to have thought about their own European identity more than the Romanian 
participants. The answers were more elaborate, having reached a deeper level of 
examination. Living in Brussels, this is no surprise, as news and symbols related to Europe 
are probably more prevalent than in any other city in Europe. Due to the context in which 
the participants lived, European-ness and the European Union were significantly more 
salient in their everyday lives. #
As mentioned earlier, the Belgian participants insisted on distancing themselves from 
Flemish nationalism, but most of them seemed to identify themselves as Belgian without 
hesitation. There was one exception, and that was the participant who had declared that he 
was not comfortable with any kind of identifications because they all had political 
signification. #
The answer that I would like to give is that being Belgian or Flemish 
doesn’t mean anything. But that’s bullshit. That fact that we live in a 
country where Belgian or Flemish means something, it is very much 
politicised, this identity you do not escape from it however much 
you want to escape it. It’s not how much you identify, but how much 
you would like this identification to mean something politically for 
example. And then I don’t like that fact that Flanders means so 
much politically, so I would prefer to have Belgian as a structure, and 
not because I really feel Belgian but because it is a sort of a structure 
that doesn’t push any identification on its citizens, because it 
consists of different groups. No one really feels Belgian, and it 
doesn’t really mean anything. I wouldn’t dismiss the history either, I 
just think that today it is going in the wrong direction. (Bel_4)#
The complex nature of this response indicated that issues of identity were central to this 
participant. He rejected identification with any group by saying that the meaning attached 
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to that identification was always politically charged. In his opinion, being Belgian was less 
problematic than identifying as Flemish. He stated that feeling Belgian was not very 
prevalent, but the responses given by the other participants pointed in a different 
direction. #
Some of the participants said that they would first identify as Belgian, and then as 
European, denoting maybe to a type of nested identity. Some also included Brussels as the 
first identity, while others rejected any forms of regional identity.#
I prefer to describe myself as Belgian, not from that region, or 
Brussels (...) I am Belgian more than European, I don’t think Europe 
will ever be like the US. (Bel_5)#
 It’s not a regional identity, it’s very specific. It’s Brussels because 
Brussels embodies for me a mixture of two communities, the French 
speakers and the Dutch speakers, but it embodies more than that, 
it’s the capital of Europe, it embodies all the identities that I have. 
That’s why I’m so proud of living in Brussels, all the levels of identity 
that are in me are in Brussels: Europe, Flemish, French, you’ve got 
all the other European people that are living here, I can speak 
English every day if I want to. I really like Brussels as an idea. (Bel_1)#
These two answers reflect the different views on regional, national and European identity 
for the Belgian participants. The first quotation was evidence to a stronger national 
identity, followed by a European identity, but also a rejections of the regional identity. The 
second quotation expressed the idea that Brussels differed drastically from the rest of 
Belgium, and it was a unique place, because it brought together all the levels of 
identification that this participant considered central to her identity. It is maybe important 
to remember that Bel_5 had moved to Brussels from Wallonia, while Bel_1 was a Brusseler 
by birth, as well as being from a bilingual family. One other participant though gave an 
example of the perfect nested identity. He said:#
Belgian, European and then citizen of the world as my way to see the 
world. (Bel_5)#
Many of the participants spoke about the easiness that the European Union brought about: 
the ease of travel, not having to exchange money or pass through border control, and that 
these facilities made travelling more enjoyable and less stressful. They also talked about the 
Qualitative studies  194
fact that today not many remembered how difficult it was before all these measures were 
introduced in Europe. #
 The common currency, people were very sceptical about it, I was 
young when it happened, but i think it’s one of the best things they 
did. Imagine how ridiculous it must have been to pass through 
customs every time. (Bel_3)#
An interesting discussion arose about whether feeling European and being a member of the 
EU were the same thing. Some argued that it was:#
Being European is the same as approving of the EU, there’s no 
difference, no different identity between the two. (Bel_1)#
Other participants were a bit more reluctant towards the European Union:#
I am not convinced yet by the EU. I don’t … it seems to be very 
economically oriented. I am not convinced about the social aspect 
(...) the EU is very much economical. I feel more European than part 
of the EU. (Bel_3)#
One of the interviewees saw that there was a connection between the two, but they were 
still different entities:#
Feeling European and feeling like a member of the EU... the latter is 
being part of a bigger political organisational group and the other 
one is about culture and history. They are linked but still different. 
(Bel_5)#
Bel_4 who rejected identification with any political entity said that in his view, being 
European does not have any particular meaning, and that it was up to the Europeans to 
attribute the correct meanings to the term. In his opinion, if the European Union was 
active in protecting the rights of workers, the term European would gain a characteristic 
that would make him more eager to identify as European. Having a partner who worked for 
the EU, this participant suggested that he was well acquainted with the salaries paid to EU 
employees and considered it to be excessive. #
The EU has very good aspects, the pacification of Europe and so on 
but it is also fundamentally undemocratic in a lot of ways, the money 
spent on European institutions. (...) I have serious problems with 
how much money the EU clerks make, it is not alright. Europe in 
Brussels is that, they make a lot of money working 9 to 5 and I have 
Qualitative studies  195
very serious problems with that. I know these people who are there 
don’t care about the European project, but that they are there 
because they make a lot of money. (Bel_4)#
The presence of the EU institutions in Brussels was regarded as positive by some, who said 
that it gives Brussels an international, diverse and cosmopolitan atmosphere, but others 
mentioned that it had negative aspects, mainly because the employees of the EU in 
Brussels did not interact extensively with the other people in the city. #
Asked where the feeling of European-ness came from, some participants discussed the 
common culture and heritage, and on a couple of occasions the interviewees mentioned the 
differences between Eastern and Western Europe and the fact that together with the 
enlargement of the EU, it was becoming harder to build a common European identity for 
all its citizens because of the cultural differences between the countries. However, they all 
regarded the Eastern enlargement as a positive aspect of the EU. #
 Maybe there is Eastern and Western Europe and there are 
differences, but I think, what we all have in common is a history of 
wars, migration within Europe. (Bel_2)#
The EU is a big monster that doesn’t seem to move quite easily... in 
general we are moving in the right direction slowly. (Bel_5)#
One of the most important aspects of the EU mentioned by many of the participants was 
the same reason for which the EU won the Nobel Prize: the fact that it brought peace to a 
continent that had been struggling with conflicts for centuries. For the Belgian 
participants, this was a strong reason for identifying with Europe and for wanting to build a 
sense of European identity around the European integration project. #
I feel wise, we learned in this part of the world to talk, to negotiate, 
that we should not go for the army solution and I think that is 
something that can unify Europe but I think each country should 
have their own way of handling things. We are very different 
culturally but there are big similarities in the way we see the world, 
geo-politically we are united. What unites Europe is the rejection of 
conflict. (Bel_5)#
Some suggestions and solutions for building a stronger European identity were also 
discussed. One participant suggested that travelling was a viable option for an elite sector 
of the European population, but that the EU should design and implement programmes for 
Qualitative studies  196
other social classes and attempt to conceive them keeping in mind the various other 
identities of the Europeans.#
They should see people on other levels, not national. Farmers in 
England, Belgium, France they have a very common identity, so from 
other identities than the national identities. They should talk to 
people in the context of those identities and not the national ones. 
(Bel_1)#
She argued that by designing programmes aimed, for example, at bringing the European 
farmers together, the EU would foster feelings of European identification among the non-
elite Europeans who were not necessarily keen on travelling, learning foreign languages, 
working or studying abroad. Another interesting suggestion made by the same participant 
was the EU should impose the European Day as a holiday in all its member states, even if it 
had to come at the cost of a religious holiday. She argued that Europe would become more 
salient for every European person.#
When it comes to identity construction, Europe should be much 
more proactive like impose an official holiday on all the member 
countries. If you get a holiday for it you’ll think about Europe and 
they can just replace a church holiday. (Bel_1)#
And lastly, this participant proposed that the concept and meaning of European needed to 
become more appealing, in such a way as to encourage young people to want to identify 
with it. #
They should make it cool. It’s cool to say I’m from Brussels, it’s cool 
to say I’m Belgian, but it’s not cool to say I’m European. (Bel_1)#
The Belgian participants had elaborate and thought-out understandings of European 
identity. Although not explicit, their answers suggested that identity was a social construct, 
that it could be constructed according to some principles, it could be malleable and 
influenced by various factors. Unlike the Romanian participants who argued, possibly 
rather defensively, that they were European because Romania was part of Europe, the 
Belgian participants implied that European identity was an identity in constant change, 
that could be influenced and dissipated throughout the EU through various means. It was 
the difference between an almost essentialist view on European identity and a social 
constructivist one. The next section will attempt to investigate whether the Belgian 
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participants considered multilingualism to be an important factor in building a European 
identity. #
4.2.2.4. RQ 10 - Multilingualism and European identity 
Multilingualism was already regarded by most of the Belgian participants as a characteristic 
of feeling European and being a cosmopolitan person. Some of the participants talked 
about learning languages and multilingual education and the benefits it could bring to 
somebody’s life. #
 I’m a big proponent of multilingual education. I don’t care what 
your background is, if you’re a plumber in Belgium if you speak 
Dutch and French you double your market and your potential 
customers. It’s not just about feeling European, it’s about practical 
reasons. Social standards have improved, Even workers which a long 
time ago were lower social classes, they also travel so they see the 
benefits of speaking other languages as well. (Bel_2)#
In a multilingual country like Belgium, speaking more languages could have benefits on the 
every day life of the people, as exemplified here. One could have access a larger market for 
the trade they worked in, increasing their income and thus having the financial means to 
travel to other countries. Although in an indirect way, this was regarded as one process 
through which multilingualism could foster feelings of European-ness. The experience of 
learning a foreign language was also suggested to be a catalyst for feeling closer to others. #
If you learn just one other language you put yourself in the shoes of 
everybody else trying to learn another language and it makes you 
more more open and that can facilitate the European integration. At 
that point you feel on the same level. (Bel_3)#
Once again, language learning was an indirect way of connecting people who participated 
in the same activity. The relationship between multilingualism and European identity was 
seen as either a direct one - being multilingual was a characteristic of being European, or as 
an indirect one - it allowed one to feel closer to others through travelling and realising the 
commonalities between the cultures, either the national cultures or the social cultures. #
Knowing more languages helps feel more European, but only a little 
bit, it’s not the primary object (...) Travelling is nice to get to know 
your neighbours, but you feel the diversity much more. It’s more 
positive than negative though. When I go to London, Madrid, 
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Barcelona it feels like going to another city in my country, there’s the 
language difference of course but the culture is so similar in cities. 
There’s more a difference between cities and the countryside than 
between countries. I identify much more with a girl living in Berlin 
than with a 26 year old that lives 30 km away from here. (Bel_1)#
 Again, the similarities between the elite Europeans from various urban environments (as 
well as between farmers in different countries) were discussed. This participant could relate 
a lot better to a person from another city in Europe than somebody who spoke the same 
language as her and lived in the Belgian countryside. But some of the interviewees talked 
about the fact that European identity already incorporated or would soon incorporate the 
idea of multilingualism.#
 It will become part of European identity that we are all multilingual. 
(...) I think it is part of the European identity, the fact that we speak 
different languages, even though not all of us are multilingual, but I 
think it’s already there (Bel_2)#
Being multilingual will enhance feeling European, but we are 27 
countries now, there’s no way everybody is going to learn all the 
languages, they can promote learning languages, that’s a good idea I 
think. (Bel_3)#
For the Belgian participants, there seemed to be a connection between being multilingual 
and feeling European. Some participants regarded this relationship as a direct one, 
multilingualism fostering feeling of European identity, while others argued that the 
connection might be indirect. Nonetheless they all had positive views on being proficient 
in more languages and on the process of learning foreign languages and argued that by 
being able to communicate people realise the multitude of things they have in common:#
I don’t think speaking languages has a direct effect on European 
identity, but I do think it is important to speak languages, travelling 
helps a lot, speaking to somebody you realise that they are just like 
you and me. (Bel_4)#
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4.2.3. United Kingdom 
4.2.3.1. RQ 7 - Content validity 
The content validity of Bruter’s (2005) scale was assessed in the discussion with the 
participants with regards to their answers. The sports question was again dropped from the 
interviews. All the participants discussed their answers at length and had a very good grasp 
on the concepts. The scale was interpreted as it was intended and based on the discussions 
around the participants’ answers, a high content validity of the scale could be inferred. #
4.2.3.2. RQ 8 - Attitudes to multilingualism 
All of the participants from the UK declared they had at least some knowledge of other 
languages and regarded being multilingual as a positive trait. One of the interviewees, 
UK_1, had minimal knowledge of L2 and L3, another participant, UK_5, could be 
considered to be an autodidact polyglot, declaring fluency in seven languages, while the 
other three were bilinguals who used their first two languages on a regular basis, and had 
knowledge of other languages as well.#
A topic that came up in almost all of the interviews was the attitude British people have 
towards learning and speaking more languages. Most participants said that although 
personally for them being multilingual was a positive thing, the rest of the British people 
did not hold the same view:#
The British don’t like to learn another language, because they’ve 
never been put in that position, my husband says they are lazy. Well, 
English is spoken all over the world, wherever you go somebody will 
speak it, they can’t be bothered to learn another language. But again, 
it’s the educational system. Here children start learning languages a 
lot older than anywhere else in Europe. (UK_2)#
This participant was from a Greek Cypriot background and spoke Greek with her family. 
Her answer touched on the prevalence of English as a lingua franca in the world and her 
view was that most people in Britain did not learn languages because wherever they would 
go, they would always find English speakers. She blamed this fact on the educational system 
which did not require school children to start learning a foreign language at an early age. 
This view was reflected in the discussion with other participants:#
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What we are taught in English schools is not conversational, it’s 
useless for even a fleeting visit. (...) We only start learning foreign 
languages when we’re 12, stop at 16, it’s not enough to get an idea of 
a language or a culture. (UK_1)#
Although the general perception was the British people did not feel they needed to learn 
languages because English was spoken everywhere, some participants indicated that they 
believed there was a generational shift underway:#
The perception is that everyone speaks English and they don’t need 
it. The family background and experience make a lot of difference. 
Adolescents are waking up to the idea that the world is so 
competitive today, if you don’t have another language you will be at a 
disadvantage. The older you get the more you get to accept that 
idea, that in your workplace you are going to need it. (UK_4)#
The young generations would like their children to learn more 
languages, so these generations that are growing up now will be 
different, maybe more European. (UK_2)#
Younger generations growing up in Newcastle want to go travelling, 
want to have more opportunities, and I think people my age and 
older aren’t open to them and this needs to change. I think there’s a 
distinct generational difference and I am on the edge. The internet 
will open up everything to everyone, younger people are seeing there 
are options and it’s good to explore them. Particularly in Newcastle 
people were poor, didn’t go much on holiday, so the only experience 
was going on holiday there or to Cornwall and that limits your 
worldview. The internet has changed that. (UK_1)#
The generational shift was influenced by the developments in technology. As UK_1 argued, 
the younger British people were more informed and for that reason, more open to new 
experiences, such as travelling abroad. The internet is bringing the world closer together, 
and although English is spoken in other places as a second language, younger British people 
will potentially realise the importance of being able to communicate in other languages in 
securing a better job or for understanding other cultures. The same participant showed 
dissatisfaction for being fluent only in English. She argued that the little French and 
Spanish she spoke was not enough to have a basic conversation:#
I went inter-railing a few months ago, we went to France, Belgium 
and Holland and I was ashamed that I couldn’t communicate 
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properly, the fact that I knew English didn’t really help because if 
you’re in another country I feel you should make the effort to speak 
that language or try and involve yourself in that culture. But because 
I didn’t know the basic, the language and the culture, I felt 
incredibly isolated (...) My French is that bad that I couldn’t even 
order drinks in a restaurant because the waiters spoke so quickly. It’s 
horrible to feel that you can’t communicate and that you stick out. 
Maybe that’s just me. I would like to be able to merge in whatever 
culture I’m in and language is a huge part of that and if you can’t 
communicate how are you going to become immersed fully in an 
environment? (UK_1)#
Although the other participants spoke about the arrogance of British people who do not 
want to learn a foreign language and expect they will always find English speakers when 
they travel abroad, the only participant from the UK interviews sample who was more or 
less monolingual described a sense of shame and guilt and even frustration at not being able 
to communicate and immerse in a foreign culture. This might point out again to a flawed 
educational system that does not encourage children to learn foreign languages, but also to 
a potential shift in people’s opinion about the usefulness and importance of being 
multilingual. The same participant described how much she admired foreign students not 
only for leaving their families and friends and moving to another country, but also being 
able to build a life in another language, to work, study and socialise in a second language. 
Interestingly, she also mentioned that if the opportunity would arise for her to work 
abroad, she would take it and she would immerse herself in the language and culture, and 
attempt to build a life for herself there. Her willingness to move abroad to work was 
evidence of her open-mindedness and confidence that she could be successful in learning 
another languages if immersed in it.#
The participants all agreed that English was an international language, widely spoken in the 
world. But there are different types of English and two of the participants described their 
feeling towards British English compared to other world English-es. One of them lived in 
Brazil for a while and taught English there. She said:#
Being a British English speaker you were put on a pedestal as 
compared to Americans. I was proud to be British over there. The 
Brazilians were very interested in our heritage, our traditions and 
culture, so I was becoming more British as it were. (UK_4)#
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One of the participants considered himself Welsh Scottish, although his first language was 
English. He also spoke Welsh and Scottish Gaelic and grew up in Wales before moving to 
London with his family. He said:#
I love the queen. I love the way she speaks English and I try to 
emulate her English. (UK_5)#
Although he regarded being a monarchist and speaking the Queen’s English as a positive 
thing, he talked about the difficulties these attitudes brought about when he was growing 
up in Wales:#
I was beaten up once for having an English accent in Wales, I don’t 
really like admitting that too much, I used to get bullied for having 
an English name. (UK_5)#
The same participant, who was fluent in seven languages, also talked about the importance 
of learning a few words in the language of the country one visits:#
Wherever I go, I do try to learn a bit of the language and that’s how 
I try to show respect and the message behind that is: I’m not one of 
those awful English people who just come to get drunk in your 
country!  I’m not an ignorant lager-drinking lad, I respect your 
country. (UK_5)#
Through learning some phrases in the language of the country, this participant attempts to 
distance himself from the negative stereotypes that he perceived British people to have 
when travelling abroad. Learning a bit of the language is a sign of respect for the culture 
and openness to new experiences:#
The willingness to learn a few words when travelling is very 
important, that there are other languages out there to be learned 
and to communicate with them. If people try to learn a few words 
they are showing an openness that will encourage them to become 
more aware of multilingualism and of wanting to learn other 
languages. (UK_4)#
The UK interview participants had a positive attitude towards multilingualism, although 
they believed that this was not a prevalent attitude in the UK. They indicated that there 
may be a generational shift underway and that the younger British people would learn to 
value multilingualism and the advantages it could bring to one’s social and professional life. 
The monolingual interviewee expressed frustration and shame at not being able to 
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communicate in other languages, and suggested that the educational system and the social 
attitudes to language learning were to blame for it. #
4.2.3.3. RQ 9 - Feeling European and European identity 
During the interviews with the UK participants, European identity was discussed at length, 
covering the strength of identification with Europe, the hierarchy of identities, the 
comparison between British and continental European identification and other topics.#
Some participants discussed the feelings of European identity in light of the fact the the 
UK is an island, part of Europe and the European Union, but also detached from it. One of 
the participants when discussing this issue said:#
 I’m not sure if this is a predominant feeling, we consider ourselves 
to be part of an island and not connected to the continent. So I 
don’t really consider myself a citizen of Europe, I consider myself a 
citizen of England or Britain. And I don’t know if there are 
ideological reasons behind that, but it’s just how we were brought 
up, the idea that you’re British, and European people they’re a step 
away, there’s a sea in between and it’s there for a purpose. It’s not 
xenophobic or anything like that. If I’d say I was a citizen of Europe, 
I’d be cheating Europeans. (UK_1)#
The view expressed by this participant was that Britain is somewhat distant from Europe, 
geographically speaking, but also from an identity perspective. Interestingly, this 
participant considered that for her to identify entirely as a citizen of Europe would be 
detrimental to the other Europeans. The feeling expressed here was not necessarily one of 
inferiority; nonetheless, it seems there were a set of characteristics that the British did not 
possess in her opinion, and for this reason, they could not identify as European. By arguing 
“it’s just how we were brought up”, the responsibility was shifted to the educational and 
possibly societal factors, and away from the individual. Uk_1 went on to argue that:#
Someone who lives in Belgium will have more cultural connections 
to someone who lives in France or Germany and to the surrounding 
countries. In Britain we are only connected to France by the 
Eurostar so we don’t have any neighbours that can influence us. 
(UK_1)#
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Britain being an island and not having direct neighbours was discussed from different 
perspectives. The same topic yielded a different response from another participant who 
argued:#
The proximity, the shared historical, cultural things., we have all 
these things in common with other Europeans. Because we are so 
close geographically there has been a lot more contact and influence. 
I would consider myself part of that. We are kind of isolated as an 
island, but the influence between the countries is there. I was 
thinking how past history has connected us, be it through war or 
whatever, all that kind of things, that’s why I feel we are all 
connected. Because of the war, we all participated, and we are all 
part of that outcome today. (UK_4)#
Interestingly, these two participants proposed different views on the same topic. One of 
them argued that since Britain was an island, it was isolated, and therefore different from 
Europe, while the other participant perceived the distance between Britain and Europe to 
be small enough to be conducive to cultural exchange and political influences. Britain’s 
participation in the war was a factor that seemed to have brought a sense of closeness and 
camaraderie with other European countries. This stance was echoed by another 
participant, who declared that his European identity was influenced by his parents’ 
participation in the war:#
I do feel European actually but more importantly I feel it is 
important for Europe to be united, I have a strong sense of history, 
my father fought in the war, my mother lived in London during the 
Blitz and nobody wants that again, so I think the EU is a great thing 
and I feel very positive about Europe. (UK_3)#
The World War II in which Britain fought alongside other continental European countries 
brought a sense of closeness, a shared history, which was described as the basis for the 
present Europe. In the same manner as the Belgian sample, this UK participant brought up 
the pacifist European ideals and the fact that the EU was a safeguard against international 
conflicts in Europe. The same participant also talked about the importance of the EU with 
regards to different kinds of legislation, such as workers’ rights. #
Without being pretentious, I feel that there’s lots about the EU that 
people don’t realise, in terms of worker protection, human rights, all 
the European laws are all very positive and I do identify with these 
rights and world outlook.(...) One of the best things is the maximum 
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working hours, it’s 48 hours in Europe. That changed a lot of things 
for Britain. (UK_3)#
The understanding of the concept of identity varied among the UK participants. Some 
appeared to approach identity from a more essentialist perspective, while others 
understood it as a social construct, influenced by experiences and social context. Some of 
the UK interviewees expressed their perspectives on identity as a nested concept, based 
primarily on geography:#
I identify myself more with the regional identity, I am very much 
from the North East, I’m a Geordie, I have their norms and values, I 
have their dialect, and we have a very strong culture and the heritage 
of that is... See, I’m wearing the Angel of the North as a necklace, I 
have strong identifiers. (...) I’m a Geordie, I’m English, I’m British, 
I’m from the UK. (...) I don’t know what it means to be European 
and that is potentially one of the problems I have, I have no 
experience of what it is to be European so I couldn’t even try and 
explain it. It is very hard for me to accept that I have no idea. 
(UK_1)#
The concentrical circles of a nested identity were expressed clearly in this answer. This 
participant identified primarily with her regional identity, than three levels of national 
identity, followed by an extremely diffused European identity. The fact she did not have any 
experience with Europe precluded her from considering the last level of the nested 
identities. The notion that experience aided the creation of an identity resonated with 
another participant, as well:#
If you have a strong European identity, it must be that you support 
being part of a community of countries, and what that represents 
and what the EU is trying to do and you support it. And you 
understand what the EU is and what it means to be European 
citizen. (...) Because of our shared historical background I would like 
to think I am European. (UK_4)#
The understanding here is that identification with Europe comes with understanding and 
experience with European politics and ideals. This can be considered a social constructivist 
approach to identity. Nonetheless, the same participant when discussing her national 
identity took a more essentialist view on identity:#
I’m 100% English in terms of background, my parents, my 
grandparents, totally British and that was always something I saw as 
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a fact of life, in terms of what I speak, where I was born, my 
heritage, yes, I’m very very English in those terms, it’s my genetic 
makeup. (UK_4)#
Genetical background, place of birth, ancestors, native language were the primary factors 
which came into play for the formation of this participant’s identity. These characteristics 
pointed to an essentialist understanding of identity. She later described that although she 
lived for a long time in Brazil, married a Brazilian, raised her children there before moving 
back to the UK and spoke Portuguese fluently, she would never consider herself Brazilian. 
Similarly, she argued, her husband who had just received British citizenship would never 
consider himself British, because his heritage was Brazilian. Therefore, it appeared she 
considered regional and national identity to be fixed and hard to change, even when one 
acquired a symbol of that identity - the citizenship; however, this participant’s 
understanding of European identity had a more constructivist structure, being built around 
knowledge and experience of Europe, as well as a shared history and heritage. #
Most participants agreed that there is a common European history and a European 
heritage. With regard to whether they perceived Europe and the European Union to be the 
same thing or different entities, the responses were mixed. Some of the interviewees argued 
that the UK and Europe were fundamentally different from a political point of view:#
I do feel European to some extent, I feel we have a different culture 
and politics but I don’t think that makes us less European, I think 
that we just have to respect that. (...) So I feel European, but maybe 
not a member of the EU because politically I think we are quite 
separate, we have our own identity. I love the idea of unity, I think 
it’s wonderful, but we can work in different countries, work together 
for a peaceful world, I have a lot of respect for the EU, I think it is a 
peaceful organisation. (UK_5)#
The response presented here portrayed the participant’s understanding of the Europe from 
a political point of view as homogenous among European countries and quite unlike 
Britain’s political system. This interviewee had lived in two European countries prior to the 
interview and had extensive experience with Europe. Another participant declared that for 
her Europe and the EU were similar:#
Europe and the EU, they’re of the same thing, the EU might be 
more of the corporate term, in essence I think they’re the same, but 
again I don’t know. The more I talk about it the more I realise I’m 
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really stupid, I don’t like being ignorant. It’s really unfortunate. 
(UK_1)#
Although she started off arguing that Europe and the EU were similar, she went on to find 
a difference, and then expressed again her frustration at her lack of knowledge regarding 
Europe. This sentiment came up at various points in this interview and quite often, the 
participant prefaced or ended her answers saying that she was uncertain of her response 
and that this lack of knowledge was frustrating to her. Although she was assured that the 
questions did not require a correct answer, rather an opinion, she continued to display 
irritability towards her lack of familiarity with Europe. The participant who had been born 
in Cyprus but lived most of her life in England, when asked about whether she identifies 
more with Europe or the EU answered:#
I am an EU member and European, I don’t think there is a 
difference. (UK_2)#
When asked to describe why and how European she felt, she alternated inclusion in various 
communities: #
Cyprus is in Europe, I think we do belong to Europe geographically, 
we joined the EU (...) In Cyprus they feel European, they travel a lot, 
they are more travelled around the world than the people here. Our 
community here follow the old traditions. (UK_2)#
Initially, she responded to the question regarding feeling European by including herself in 
the Cypriot community in Cyprus, but then moved on to distance herself from this 
community and situated herself within the Cypriot community in the UK. When 
discussing feelings of European identity, this participant detached herself from her British 
identity and responded more from the perspective of being Cypriot either in the UK, or in 
Europe. It is possible that this was an unconscious attempt to rationalise her feelings of 
European identity. Although she perceived herself as more European than other British 
people, she felt less European than the Cypriots in Cyprus and argued that it was because 
the Cypriot community in the UK was more old-fashioned and more rooted in their 
traditions. This is a common occurrence in some immigrant communities, who attempt to 
defend and maintain their traditions by distancing themselves from the host community, 
but also from the home community which is probably evolving at a different speed and 
sometimes in a different direction. Speaking about the understanding of the relationship 
between Europe and the EU, another participant said:#
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Europe it’s the geographical space for me while EU is the 
institutions, the currency - I was very positive about the euro, until I 
realised what a big mistake it was. Originally I was upset we didn’t 
go in it, but I might have been wrong. (UK_3)#
The economic developments in recent years might have had an influence on people’s 
opinion about the eurozone. As this interviewee stated, he initially was in favour of the 
euro, but considering the financial crisis, he admitted he could have been mistaken about 
it. Other participants spoke about the ties between the British pound and the British 
identity:#
 I don’t think it’s a good idea that we join the euro, there’s the 
stressful economical side, but also that the pound has a really strong 
connection to the monarchy and the history of Britain. Potentially if 
we would have the euro, I would feel more of a connection, more 
European. Is that weird? (UK_1)#
Not only did this participant perceive the pound to be stronger from an economical point 
of view than the euro, but also as a symbol of the British Monarchy and the past. She asked 
rhetorically whether it was stranger for her to believe that having adopted the euro would 
have increased the feelings of European identity in the UK. In spite of the fact that she 
argued that she knew nothing or very little about Europe, her intuition was correct. Risse 
(2003) discussed how the introduction of the euro in Europe had a beneficial effect on the 
levels of European identity. #
Other factors that might influence a stronger European identity were also mentioned. 
Some participants talked about travelling as a positive experience and one that made them 
feel closer to other Europeans:#
Travelling helps with feeling European, I’ve been to some European 
countries, we went on some cruises with other people. (...) We might 
feel closer to other Europeans, but it might be because we travel 
more to Europe. (UK_2)#
One participant said that while travelling and living abroad in some European countries, he 
experienced some negative attitudes towards the UK and that brought down his levels of 
European identity:#
What brings me a bit down is the attitude towards Britain. When I 
lived in Poland and Italy they kept saying Britain is trying to be 
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different. We are not trying to be different, we are trying to continue 
as we are and be European at the same time. That’s what I think. I 
feel like Europe has more in common with each other, especially, 
Spain, France, Italy. (...) After travelling in Europe I feel a bit less 
European, I think to some extent it is the negative attitude towards 
Britain and that they are trying to be different. (UK_5)#
The interviewee here expressed a defensive attitude towards the things that made the UK 
different from Europe, which he earlier described as being the monarchy, driving on the left 
side of the road and the British pound. Again, the idea that European countries had more 
in common among themselves that with the UK came up. This idea was also reflected in 
another participant’s discourse, who thought that:#
The perception is that we have more in common with other English 
speaking nations than with European countries, but in essence 
everybody is the same everywhere. (UK_1)#
This was an intriguing idea, which had not been expressed by any other participants, but it 
suggested that a common language could potentially lead to the formation of a common 
identity between the native speakers of that language, even though they come from distinct 
cultural backgrounds. The internet, the media and the export of cultural material between 
countries which speak the same language was a well-known phenomenon and was discussed 
with some participants in the Belgian interviews as well. After proclaiming that she 
considered the British to have more in common with other native speakers of English than 
with Europeans, she toned down her statement, by adding that people were the same 
everywhere. #
Other factors that could influence European identity were discussed and one participant 
talked about the important role that the media played in the development of a stronger 
affiliation with Europe:#
The airfare is so cheap, it’s absurd, so people should travel. A more 
positive media would make people feel more European. A positive 
education. Also, there are things that are wrong with the EU, I 
remember a couple of years ago, there were scandals with 
corruptions and expenses of the MEPs, so this has to change. More 
knowledge about what the EU does, the fact that they invest in 
regional development for example. (UK_3)#
And he went on to say:#
Qualitative studies  210
Sadly Europe is quite fragmented now. If the media would portray it 
in a better light, in a year everybody would think that Europe is 
fantastic. One of the things I really hate about the media is the lies, 
they lie, it’s ridiculous. (...) Generally people are quite antsy here 
about Europe and that’s partly because of the press. Sadly there’s a 
negative attitude to Europe. My own view is that people don’t 
understand the things that Europe has given us. (UK_3)#
Travel, media, education and knowledge about the EU were the factors that could lead to a 
stronger sense of European identity. This participant expressed his anger at the media and 
the media’s portrayal of Europe and the EU, and argued that a positive media attitude to 
Europe would change the British perceptions in a short time. He blamed the current 
negative attitude of the British towards the EU on the press and the lack of knowledge 
regarding the European influence in the UK. Still, he expressed his discontent towards a 
media that could not be trusted. Apart from these factors, the interviewee also advocated 
for transparency on the part of the EU and its members of Parliament. Being able to trust 
the European institutions could also help in encouraging people to feel more European. 
Some interviewees discussed what they perceived to be the advantages and disadvantages 
of being a member of the EU. #
The advantages of being an EU citizen is access, being able to freely 
move, to work, to be able to get to know other cultures without any 
impediment, you’re not going to be stopped from going anywhere. 
Disadvantages, maybe in terms of... if the EU would stipulate some 
things whereby cultures would lose out. (UK_4)#
Freedom of movement, work and study, and having access to the market in other countries 
were perceived as important and an advantage for EU citizens. The only fear expressed by 
this participant was that by being part of the EU, the countries would have to obey 
potential EU regulations, which could be damaging to the culture. The fear of uniformity 
and eradication of the cultural diversity of Europe was expressed in a veiled manner. 
Although she was aware that the EU currently had no agenda that could be detrimental to 
the cultural diversity of Europe, and they also had programmes to help promote this 
diversity, there was the fear that ultimately the EU would be damaging to the cultural 
makeup of Europe. #
A common heritage, a common history, a shared geographical space and many other factors 
came into the creation and development of a sense of European identity. However, one 
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participant talked about the importance of the EU as an institution, together with its 
policies:#
I have to come back to the idea of the EU, only because there is one. 
If there wasn’t a European Union I think there would still be a 
European identity somehow, but I think of the EU when you say 
European identity. And within the EU, the policies and the attitudes 
put Europe in a positive light. Europe leads the way in terms of 
human rights. (UK_3)#
In his opinion, even without the EU there would be a sense of European identity, but 
because the EU and its institutions and policies existed, they influenced the way in which 
people saw themselves in light of European identity. The fact that the EU was a promoter 
of peace and human rights, and as he said, “leads the way” in these fields, made feeling 
European that much more important and relevant in this time and geographical space.#
The interviews with the UK participants revealed that to some extent, they identified with 
Europe. Only one participant who was also the only monolingual participant reported not 
identifying as European, and expressed feelings of frustration and shame for knowing very 
little about Europe and the EU. The general understanding was that European identity was 
not very widespread in the UK, and the primary reasons were identified as the UK being 
an island separate from Europe, the media’s negative portrayal of Europe, and the lack of 
knowledge and education regarding European issues. Nevertheless, for some participants 
travelling and learning about other cultures was important with regards to feeling more 
European.#
4.2.3.4. RQ 10 - Multilingualism and European identity 
Most of the participants in the interviews in the UK agreed that being multilingual was a 
significant factor for a stronger European identity. Knowledge of foreign languages was 
posed to provide insights into other cultures, and increase awareness and knowledge about 
that culture. Some participants also discussed the fact that together with proficiency in 
more languages came an increased tolerance to diversity and that in turn made people feel 
more European and even more as a citizen of the world. #
As discussed above, there was just one participant who considered herself monolingual, 
although she had limited knowledge of two European languages. While describing her 
language skills, she said:#
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Particularly the language issue is a big one, I can’t speak more than 
English. I claim to speak French and Spanish, but I speak them 
incredibly badly. We only start learning foreign languages when we’re 
12, stop at 16, it’s not enough to get an idea of a language or a 
culture. I don’t think I have enough knowledge to say I’m a citizen 
of Europe. (UK_1)#
After admitting to speaking the two foreign languages very poorly, she justified her 
monolingualism by saying that in the UK foreign languages were only taught in school for a 
brief period of time. In this context, she argued that she did not have enough knowledge, 
presumably of foreign languages and thus cultures, to consider herself to be European. The 
idea that knowledge of languages and experience abroad was related to being more 
European was expressed by another participant, as well:#
Having stayed abroad and speaking some languages, it made me feel 
more knowledgeable in front of my friends, more European, I 
suppose. (UK_4)#
Another participant blamed the educational system for failing to teach foreign languages, 
and thus providing a disservice to the people:#
Definitely if you speak more languages you’ll feel more European. 
That’s one obvious one. I think here in the UK we are poorer 
because we don’t speak anything but English. It never takes off, a few 
years ago they talked about teaching languages in junior school, but 
it never took off. (UK_3)#
The ease with which this participant proclaimed that it was obvious that speaking more 
languages would determine one to feel more European was dramatic. In the same way as 
the previous quotation described, this participant also criticised the educational system for 
failing to provide language learning at an early age. One of the participants was a teacher 
and among her duties she had to teach her students some French and Spanish. Being 
involved in the educational system that the other two participants criticised, she said:#
Being multilingual makes you more of a world citizen, you’ve 
probably experienced other cultures and societies and that can make 
you feel part of the bigger picture, you’re not isolated and turned in 
on yourself, which I think a lot of people in England are. I teach 
secondary school kids, they’re 14-15 and they keep saying ‘What’s the 
point of learning a foreign language, I’m never going to leave Britain’ 
and so on, and that’s very narrow minded, thinking that you don’t 
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need to learn another language and you are closing yourself off from 
all the richness and the experiences that you could have in a wider 
world. You have to learn all these things to be able to be tolerant, 
that’s what makes you a citizen of the world, and languages is the 
way. We, as teachers, need to do that at primary school, they don’t 
have any prejudice at this age. (UK_4)#
The interviewee was a teacher, and she felt directly responsible for providing children with 
some foreign language skills. She argued that at a young age people are more open-minded 
to learning languages, while later, in their teens, there was an attitude shift when they 
regarded language learning useless because they had no intention of leaving the country. 
The interviewee however insisted that access to a foreign language provided access to other 
cultures and even to the whole world. She considered that by refusing to become 
multilingual, the young people closed themselves from the experiences that the world could 
offer them. The isolation and egocentrism of the monolinguals was, in her opinion, 
prevalent in the UK. She went on to argue:#
Languages are a way forward towards European identity, but it has to 
be supported by the government. Having languages at primary 
school is the primary choice, but they have to be consistent. That 
would make people more accepting, more able to connect with other 
cultures and become more European in that way. (UK_4)#
In all these answers, the common theme was the responsibility that the educational system 
and the government had in providing foreign languages in school, from an early age. The 
participants quoted here all agree that by being exposed to languages from an early age, the 
British students would open up to new experiences and to the world, and that would 
eventually lead to feeling more European. There was just one participant who considered 
that foreign language learning was an indirect way of feeling more European, if it ever 
reached that point. This participant had taught himself most of the seven languages he was 
fluent in and he had lived abroad, in Europe, for several years:#
I think there’s more than language going on in terms of European 
identity and I don’t think Britain will end up feeling more European 
very soon, even if loads of kids are going to learn to speak French. I 
think though that learning languages will make people more tolerant 
towards European identity and other languages being used here in 
Britain. I think that will help Britain to engage more. I think British 
students now are taking the opportunity to study abroad more and 
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to travel. Britain is beginning to get on board with that. Promotion 
and tolerance will lead to a greater sense of cooperation and a closer 
relationship between Europeans. How to implement it, is another 
matter. (UK_5)#
He argued here that language competency led to more tolerance, which in turn could 
influence young people to study abroad and travel, which would lead to more interactions 
with Europeans and thus, potentially, to a stronger European identity. In his opinion, the 
relationship between multilingualism and European identity was complicated and indirect, 
and implementing the changes in the system necessary for the promotion of 
multilingualism was a complex issue. Travelling and studying abroad seemed to be in his 
opinion precursors of European identity. As expected, this perception was expressed by 
other interviewees, as well:#
Travelling would enhance people’s experiences, particularly if they 
don’t just spend their time in the hotel with other English people, 
they would realise the importance of languages. It would have to be 
an extended stay, that’s why I think exchange programmes are a 
valuable thing. (UK_4)#
Exchange programmes for school children, study abroad during university, travelling for 
extended periods of time and immersion in other cultures were deemed to be of great 
consequence for young British people. As discussed earlier, there was also an awareness that 
younger people were more interested in these experiences, that they were more open to 
explore and learn about new cultures. #
For the only speaker of minority and regional languages, the support that the EU provided 
for these languages played quite an important role in his identification with Europe and the 
EU, because he perceived the EU to provide a sort of safety net for these languages:#
The fact that the EU supports diversity ideologically does filter 
through and I feel that for the minority language speakers having 
something that is sort of above their sovereign state that is telling 
their state that the regional language is valid and has a right to exist, 
I think that can give a sense of security. The fact that we can 
communicate with the EU in Welsh and that there are Welsh 
speakers in the European Parliament kind of mutes Westminster. It’s 
not that they are against Welsh, they’re just indifferent. (UK_5)#
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From his perspective, being able to have a direct relationship with the EU and to use his 
language in the interaction with the EU was a valuable thing. Currently, Welsh has the 
status of co-official language in the EU, status that was requested and approved in 2008 
(Welsh Language in the EU, 2012). The EU functions as a buffer between the regional and 
minority languages and the sovereign state. In his opinion, it was not the case that the UK 
government did not want to support Welsh, rather that it was indifferent to the fate of 
Welsh. This indifference was countered by the involvement of the EU in this matter. #
The same participant when describing his identity, in general, offered proof that the 
European identity was context dependent and socially constructed. He argued:#
I can be very flexible with my identity, the order can change. I can 
also put my accents on quite easily, I don’t always do it on purpose. 
Maybe that confuses my identity a little, my accents. I’d say I’m 
Welsh first, Scottish, Londoner, British, European, but it would 
change because I consider myself to be all of them. If I’m speaking 
to my Polish friends about European issues, I would feel European 
first. (UK_5)#
The kaleidoscopic self (Deaux & Perkins, 2001) discussed earlier is clearly represented by 
this quotation. The interviewee revealed that he identified with various regional and 
national levels of identity, as well as with the European identity, but he emphasised that 
depending on the context one of the identities surfaced and took precedence over the 
other ones. He made a point of arguing that he considered himself to be all of these 
identities, but depending on the interaction he engaged in, he identified more with one 
than the others. Here, the identities were not understood as nested or concentric, rather, 
they were all present consistently, and the participant had agency in choosing the one that 
was most relevant at a specific point in time. #
The prevalence of English in the world has already been discussed in this chapter, but only 
one participant in the interviews in the UK mentioned the fact that English was not an 
ideologically neutral language. He advocated the use of Esperanto as a European language:#
I’ve always thought that it was a shame that a language like 
Esperanto never took off, I think that would have been a fantastic 
thing. And this is a perfect example of how that would work: you’ve 
got the EU, you have the euro, and then Esperanto. Brilliant! Maybe 
English is serving that purpose to an extent, but it does have a 
baggage with it, either the colonial thing, or the US. It’s not 
Qualitative studies  216
ideologically neutral.  It would be easily substituted for Esperanto. 
It’s designed to be easily learned, maybe it’s too Latin based, but 
Esperanto doesn’t have all these connotations attached to it. (UK_3)#
The EU, the euro and a common European language would help build a stronger European 
identity and a stronger Europe. For him, although English functioned as a lingua franca, it 
was still a language charged with its history - the colonial British past - or the influence of a 
powerful nation like the United States. Esperanto, an artificial language, was designed to be 
easily learned by speakers of Indo-European languages, like most of the EU citizens. 
Having the common institutions, the common currency and a common language would 
provide the framework for building a common European identity. #
Although the widespread feeling among the UK participants was that British people did 
not feel very European, most of the interviewees declared that at least to some extent they 
identified with Europe. Being able to communicate in more languages was considered to be 
essential in feeling more European. The view that the younger generations were more 
interested in travelling and exploring the world and that, consequently, they would 
understand the value of multilingualism came up repeatedly in the interviews. Most of the 
participants considered that it was the duty of the government to make changes to the 
educational system so that foreign languages were taught at a younger age and for a longer 
period of time in British schools. In spite of the fact the the UK was considered to be 
different from many points of view from other European countries, the interviewees 
displayed similar levels of European identity, as well as similar concerns and opinions with 
the other interviewees from Romania and Belgium. The following chapter will attempt to 
bring together the conclusions of the quantitative and qualitative results presented in these 
studies.  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5. Conclusion & discussion 
In recent decades, especially since the creation of the European Union, much has been 
written about Europe and European identity. Philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, 
psychologists and linguists have debated the existence and basis of European identity in a 
land so diverse and constantly changing like Europe. There are some who suggest that the 
European identity has had a different trajectory than the national identity, being a 
supranational (Delanty, 2006; Schlenker, 2013) or transnational identity (Hermann, Risse & 
Brewer, 2004; Risse, 2010), while others have argued that it forms around the same 
foundational principles as the national identity (Díez-Medrano, 2010). Although the 
research in the field of European identity to date has been quite extensive, there are 
surprisingly few empirical studies which aim at understanding the components of European 
identity, or the factors that influence its strengths or weaknesses. The ones that exist are 
mostly theoretical and philosophical in nature, or are based on interviews. A notable 
exception are the Eurobarometers, the public opinion surveys commissioned by the EU at 
regular time intervals to monitor Europeans’ attitudes towards a wide range of aspects of 
European life. Nonetheless, the research design of these surveys has been criticised 
frequently. The economic crisis that engulfed Europe and the rest of the world will most 
certainly have an effect on the relationships between the European nations and it will 
probably also influence European identity. Nevertheless, the forecasts have been 
contradictory: some suggested that a decline in economic prosperity will weaken the 
feelings of European identity (Guibernau, 2011), while others have argued that economic 
hardship will lead to increased cooperation between Europeans, and thus lead to a stronger 
European identity (Fligstein et al., 2012). #
In light of these matters, the aim of this dissertation was to explore the nuances of 
European identity and how it is understood and appropriated by European citizens from 
very diverse backgrounds. Based on research on national identity, some have argued that 
European identity might be understood in different ways in Western and Eastern Europe, 
the former employing a more civic understanding of this identity, while the latter would 
perceive it in a more ethnic way (Risse, 2010; Smith, 1992). Previous theoretical and 
empirical data has indicated that European identity is composed of two distinct 
components, a civic and a cultural one, but these findings had not been validated in many 
European contexts (Bruter, 2005). There have also been studies suggesting a wide variety of 
factors that can have an effect on the strength of European identity, such as age, 
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educational level, history of travelling and contact with other Europeans, or frequency of 
use and proficiency in foreign languages, and again these assumptions have not been 
extensively examined empirically (Fligstein, 2008). Lastly, Europe is a diverse environment, 
encompassing many languages, ethnicities, nationalities and cultures, and all throughout 
history this diversity was one of the causes of many conflicts and wars. A question that 
arises then is if the diversity, particularly the diversity of language, is an asset or a 
vulnerability in the creation and development of a European identity across all the nations 
of the EU. #
It was essential then to understand European identity in order to be able to identify and 
explore its link with multilingualism. The European identity is understood here from a 
social psychological perspective, as being both an individual and a collective identity, and 
one of the many facets of a person’s multiple identities, having a stable core, while at the 
same time being triggered by contextual cues. For a more in depth understanding, a mixed 
methodology approach was employed in three European contexts. Multilingualism is here 
understood not only as the proficiency and frequency of use of more languages, but also 
comprising attitudes towards being multilingual, anxiety when using a foreign language, 
intention to continue studying languages and the intensity of this drive. Previous studies 
have investigated the relationship between European identity and knowledge of other 
languages, but one of the objectives of this dissertation was to understand whether all these 
other linguistic factors are related and can predict higher levels of European identity. #
The relation between national and European identity is complex and intricate, and this 
study attempted to better understand if these identities were perceived as conflictual or 
harmonious. In order to understand this relation, instruments for bicultural identity were 
adapted to address the interaction between national and European identity. The contexts in 
which the studies were conducted were chosen in such a way as to provide a clearer 
understanding of the concepts and their relationship. Previous studies have considered data 
from the United Kingdom and Belgium, but little research has been carried out to date on 
these topics in Romania. Based on previous studies, Eastern Europe had a more cultural 
and ethnic understanding of European identity, while Western Europe endorsed more the 
civic elements of European identity. Studies that have been conducted in Belgium have 
rarely investigated the linguistic contexts separately (unless one of their aims was to look at 
linguistic differences). This dissertation separated the Francophone and Dutch-speaking 
Belgians, and investigated each linguistic context independently. Another aim was to 
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explore whether there are any differences between younger and older participants in the 
studies, since the literature suggests younger Europeans endorse European identity more 
than the older ones. #
The methodology was comprised of surveys and interviews; two methods that complement 
each other efficiently; one providing empirical data, and the other the nuances to better 
comprehend the topics of study (Dörnyei, 2007). This methodology addresses a void in the 
research to date with regards to empirical studies of European identity. The quantitative 
section was conducted using data obtained from online survey questionnaires, translated 
into the language of each context, an efficient method of involving large numbers of 
participants in the study, with a potential increased ecological validity than traditional pen 
and paper questionnaires (Dewaele & Wilson, 2010). The qualitative part consisted of 
interviews with participants about their understanding and attitudes towards linguistic and 
identity constructs. These two components of the study aimed to inform each other, and 
thus provide a more refined comprehension of the concepts. The statistical analysis fills a 
gap in the literature on European identity, which has traditionally been discussed using 
qualitative methods, such as interviews or political, philosophical and theoretical 
conceptualisations. To my knowledge, there is only one instrument (Bruter, 2005) to date 
assessing the European identity concept, an instrument that has not been consistently 
tested for validity and reliability in many international European contexts. This scale’s 
characteristics were assessed statistically in all contexts, and the items on the scale were 
discussed with the participants in the interviews in order to evaluate its content validity. 
The surveys also provided the means to test another scale, aimed at understanding the 
relationship between national and European identity. This scale has been previously used to 
discern the way in which bicultural individuals manage their two identities (Comănaru & 
Noels, in preparation). The results will be discussed in this section.#
5.1. National & European identity  
As discussed in the Introduction, the relationship between national and European identity 
is complex. The two might be nested, blend to form a hybrid or they might develop 
independently of each other. At least from an institutional level, efforts have been made to 
provide European citizens with European symbols in order to help the development of this 
identity: the anthem, the flag, the common currency, and even the European day. The 
emergence of these symbols has been linked to surges in the levels of European identity 
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Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012; Risse, 2003), however this does not reflect the 
nuances of the relationship between European and national identities, and the Europeans’ 
understanding of it. The present study attempted to provide a better understanding from a 
bottom-up perspective, that is, the Europeans’ understanding of this connection.#
In order to assess this relationship, I examined the literature on biculturalism, the 
association of two cultural identities of an individual. Previous studies conducted by Benet-
Martínez and her colleagues (2000, 2002, 2005) have identified two dimensions that were 
considered relevant for bicultural people: conflict-harmony and distance-overlap. These 
studies also found that the cultural frame-switching - the contextual priming cues - was 
relevant for biculturals. Combining these principles of biculturality, a new instrument 
called Bicultural Integration Orientation Scale (Comănaru & Noels, in preparation) was created 
and tested. This scale was used to assess the relationship between two identities in the case 
of bicultural individuals and has been adapted for the present study to investigate the 
relation between the participants’ national and European identity. These orientations have 
been discussed in the literature on the relationship between European and national identity 
(Fligstein et al., 2012; Risse, 2010) as forming a hybrid, or a marble cake, being nested or in 
conflict. Situational Europeans was also a term that originated from Fligstein and his 
colleagues’ work (2012), corresponding to the alternation orientation. Nonetheless, no 
empirical study investigated these concepts consistently in the field of European identity. 
Thus the BIOS, although it is an instrument developed for bicultural identity, had strong 
grounding in the European identity literature and was adapted to this context.#
The scale showed consistent correlations with a graphical representation of the European 
and national identities in all contexts (see Appendix A-D for the diagrams). The next step 
investigated the connections between the adapted BIOS dimensions and other concepts of 
interest to this study, related to linguistic and European identity. The five orientations of 
the scale were: conflict (perceiving national and European identities as incongruous), 
monoculture (preferring to identify with just one of the two identities), alternation 
(alternating between the national and the European identity, but keeping them separate), 
compatibility (perceiving the two identities as complementing each other), and hybridity 
(feeling that the national and the European identity are blending into one identity).#
The most endorsed orientations in all contexts were compatibility and hybridity, suggesting 
that Europeans consistently view these two identities in accord with each other and even 
blending. This finding is consistent with previous literature which suggests that at least in 
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some European contexts the civic ideals associated with Europe are also consistent with 
the national identity (Smith, 1992; Risse, 2010; Schlenker, 2013). Risse (2010) argues that in 
many cases, national identities are being Europeanised, incorporating values and ideals 
congruent with the European project into the national identity traits. These ideals can 
include respect for human rights, democracy, equality, cosmopolitanism, education, open-
mindedness and tolerance. The least supported views were that national and European 
identity were conflictual or that the participants would prefer to have only one of these 
identities. This dimension could be regarded as the national European identity (Risse, 
2010), which specifies that people who endorse this monocultural orientation effectively feel 
no relation to Europe, but rather prefer to consider themselves just nationals of their own 
country. Alternation was moderately endorsed in all contexts, with the Dutch-speaking 
Belgians recording slightly higher levels. This dimension taps in the concept of situational 
Europeans (Fligstein et al., 2012), implying that there are some Europeans who feel a strong 
allegiance to their nation and to Europe, but they consider these loyalties to be separate 
and alternate between them depending on the context.#
The pattern of correlations with European identity scales suggest that the more people 
perceived the relationship between the national and European identity compatible or 
blended, the stronger their identification with Europe, in general, but also with the cultural 
and civic components of this identity. The results varied slightly between the contexts, but 
overall, the pattern was similar: feeling European was in opposition to considering the two 
identities to be in conflict, or having a preference for only one, and was strongly related to 
believing that the two are compatible and even form a hybrid. Again, this finding lends 
support to the idea that national identities today are becoming Europeanised. This strategy 
is effective in creating a sense of collective European identity without imposing on an 
individual’s national identity. By not perceiving their national identity to be threatened by 
European identity, the latter one can potentially become the norm in a society. #
The pattern of correlations described above was also observed with some of the linguistic 
variables. Proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages showed consistently these 
same associations to the BIOS concepts, and so did confidence in using a foreign language. 
As expected, anxiety had an inverse relation. With regards to attitudes to multilingualism, 
in some contexts the relationship followed the same trend, but the statistical significance 
was not always present. Thus, the linguistic profile of a person who perceives their 
European identity to be compatible with national identity points to the importance of 
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foreign language proficiency and use. The participants in this study were highly educated 
Europeans, many of them declaring themselves as multilinguals. For them, multilingualism 
was an every day reality. Without attempting to generalise these results beyond the scope of 
this project, we can infer that multilingualism can become one of the important features of 
a Europeanised national identity and even a European identity.#
The relation between the national and European identities was also considered in the 
interviews. In each context, the nested-ness of the different levels of identities was 
mentioned by some participants, usually going from local, to regional, national and then 
European. This pattern was disrupted in a few cases when participants refused to identify 
with their local identities because they had relocated to other areas, which were more 
urban and cosmopolitan (such as London and Brussels); others also rejected the association 
with their regional identity if this identity was perceived to be supportive of nationalistic 
and even ethnocentric feelings (as in the case of the Flemish identity). #
For the Romanian participants, for example, the compatibility between the two identities 
was given by the rights that Romanians gained after joining the EU. This view was more 
endorsed by the younger participants. The older ones discussed the need to be accepted by 
the other European countries in order to perceive these identities as compatible. The 
Belgian interviewees spoke consistently of the relationship between Belgium and the EU, 
primarily because of the salience of the European identity in their daily lives, due to the 
presence of the EU institutions in Brussels. The fact that Belgium had been a member of 
the EU from the beginning of this institution meant that the Belgian and European ideals 
had blended and they were discussed interchangeably by Belgian participants. The 
statistical results showed that hybridity was significantly less endorsed by the British when 
compared to the other groups. Consistently, the UK interviews participants spoke of the 
distinct political and cultural aspects of the UK and Britain when compared to other 
European contexts. Some suggested that they would prefer to be closer to Europe, while 
other participants supported a certain distance between the British institution and way of 
life, and the European ones. These results were also consistent with Bruter’s (2005) 
interviews in the British context.#
The quantitative analysis suggests that the more educated people, who knew and used 
foreign languages, and who felt confident doing so, felt that their national and European 
identity were compatible and blended together. Although some differences were recorded 
among the contexts, overall they all showed a consistent pattern of agreement with the 
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orientations, supporting the positive ones significantly more than the negative ones. The 
qualitative component of the study provided a better understanding of this relationship 
and the effects of this contextualisation, depending on the salience of European 
institutions and symbols, as well as on the historical and political characteristics. #
5.2. Components of European identity 
The concept of European identity has been studied in light of the understanding of 
national identity. Smith (1991) suggested that national identity can be either civic or ethnic, 
the former being more prevalent in the Western European countries, while the latter being 
specific of Eastern countries. Risse (2010) adapted this theory to the European identity 
context and proposed that there are two types of European identity: a cosmopolitan one 
and a national European identity. Others (Bruter, 2005; Burgess, 2002) argued that these 
components are combined to form an individual’s understanding of European identity, as 
well, and should not be understood only at group level. Thus, Bruter (2005) developed an 
instrument to test the degree to which each of these components was supported at an 
individual level. As discussed earlier, his multi-method study was conducted in three 
Western European countries and proved to be a reliable and consistent measurement. #
In order to assess this instrument’s validity and reliability, it was included in the online 
survey and used as a starting point of the discussion with the interviewees. The aim was to 
improve our understanding of the way these components form a sense of European identity 
at an individual level and to test the scale’s validity. The pilot study conducted in Romania 
suggested that it was a reliable scale for this context, with one exception - the sports 
question. Even Bruter (2005) found in his study that this item was problematic and had its 
basis on “the assumption that if citizens feel closer to fellow Europeans than to non-
European they will unconsciously be prone to choose the European team against a variety 
of non-European challengers” (Bruter, 2005, p. 108). This question was part of the set of 
questions tapping at the cultural European identity. Its content validity was also discussed 
with the Romanian interviewees. These discussions indicated that many participants knew 
more than expected about the sport and thus chose their answer based on their preference 
for the athlete, rather than underlying feelings of solidarity with fellow Europeans. It was 
thus decided that the question be dropped from the analysis in all contexts. #
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Another issue with the scale was recoded in the two Belgian contexts. Although in 
Romania and in the UK, all components of the scale displayed suitable levels of reliability, 
in the two Belgian contexts the cultural European identity scale showed a lack of reliability. 
Consequently, this component was dropped from the analysis in the two Belgian contexts.. 
The question that arises then is whether the items on the instrument were unreliable, or 
whether the component of cultural European identity is not a valid construct in the Belgian 
context. Since the headquarters of the EU are in Brussels, Belgians are exposed to the civic 
elements of the European Union constantly.  As a result, they can identify more with the 
civic elements. Nonetheless, this unreliability of the cultural component does not imply a 
hierarchy between the components; rather, it points to its unsuitability in these contexts. 
Fortunately, these assumptions could be tested in the qualitative component of the study. 
The discussions with Belgian participants during the interviews found evidence for a 
somewhat strong identification with Europe from a cultural perspective - the beliefs that 
all Europeans have a common history, share a common European heritage, and have 
common ideals were prevalent among the interviewees, regardless of their linguistic 
background. Conclusively, the construct of cultural European identity appears pertinent for 
the Belgian context as well, however, the scale developed by Bruter (2005) is not the 
appropriate measurement to assess it. #
Although the instrument proposed by Bruter (2005) has reliability issues in the contexts 
studied, the results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis suggest that these are valid 
components of the European identity concept. Overall, participants endorsed the general 
European identity quite strongly in all contexts, but when comparing them the Romanian 
participants had significantly higher levels. This finding can be understood in light of 
Romania’s recent membership to the EU, a couple of years prior to the data collection. The 
changes brought about by joining the EU meant that Romanians could enjoy the freedom 
of movement within the EU, and many had taken advantage of these new rights to travel, 
study or work in other European countries. These changes were discussed in the interviews, 
and participants expressed their enthusiasm at being able to move freely in the EU. 
Another theme that emerged quite frequently in the Romanian interviews was Europe’s 
view of Romania and its place in the EU. Some participants talked about the way the 
‘others’ viewed Romanians, whole some talked about the European family in which 
Romania was now part of. #
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The civic European identity was least endorsed by the participants from the UK, a result 
consistent with previous data from Eurobarometers, but also with the findings presented 
by Bruter (2005) in the original study regarding the components of European identity. As 
previously discussed, the UK did not join the eurozone, nor the Schengen agreement, and 
thus many of the civic European identity symbols that are quite salient to other Europeans 
are not present in the UK. These differences were also registered in the interviews: the 
British participants seemed to know less about the EU, its institutions and regulations, and 
even about their rights as European citizens within the EU. However, it emerges that 
European identity is an aspirational identity for many of the British participants. They also 
presented numerous ways which, in their opinion, would foster a stronger European 
identity in the UK. Additionally, the younger participants seem to endorse European 
identity more than the older ones. Many of the interviewees discussed this generational 
shift, arguing that the younger British people travel more and are more exposed to 
European culture, and this in turn influences their identification with the continent and its 
values. In the UK quantitative study, impressive relationships were observed between the 
European identity variables and the linguistic variables. They all correlated strongly, 
indicating that in the case of the UK sample this relation was extremely important in 
defining a sense of European identity. This finding was again consistent with the interviews, 
where most participants argued that knowledge of more foreign languages would be 
beneficial for the development of a stronger sense of closeness to Europe. #
When investigating the participants’ understanding of the relationship between the 
components of European identity and the BIOS instrument, a strong association emerged 
between endorsing general and civic European identities, and perceiving that national and 
European identities were compatible or blended. Conversely, the more they identified with 
Europe, the less they believed that national and European identity were in a conflictual 
relationship. This pattern of correlations was consistent across the contexts. The Dutch-
speaking participants recorded the highest levels of alternation (only significant when 
compared to the Romanian group). For this group, alternation was  significantly related to 
higher endorsement of civic European identity. Thus, the stronger the identification with 
the institutional aspect of the European Union, the more Dutch-speaking Belgians 
preferred to keep their national and European identities separate and alternate between 
them depending on the context. #
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These outcomes suggest that the national and European values are rather consistent, at 
least in the case of the contexts discussed here. The cultural and civic components of 
European identity were also related to measures of linguistic identity. These results will be 
discussed next.#
5.3. Multilingualism & European identity 
Europe is not the most linguistically diverse area, but based on the Eurobarometer data, 
most Europeans have at least some knowledge of a language that is not their mother 
tongue (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012). At an institutional level, the EU acknowledges 
the importance of European languages, by conferring them official status in the EU and 
protecting the regional and minority languages. Within the European institutions, there are 
translation and interpreting services which are responsible not only for providing assistance 
to the EU employees, but also for translating the official EU documents so that they can be 
accessed by all Europeans in their native tongue (Grindheim & Lohndal, 2008; Grin, 2008). 
The EU also suggests, although it does not have the legislative power to enforce it, that all 
Europeans should be fluent in at least two European languages apart from their native 
language (The White Paper, 1995). The implementation of this directive is enforced 
differently in each European country.#
The participants in the present study were highly educated individuals, and can even be 
considered to be part of the elite (Risse, 2010) or in some cases, Eurostars (Favell, 2009). 
An overwhelming majority reported knowledge in at least one other language in all the 
contexts investigated. Following the example of Pascual Y Cabo and Rothman (2013), the 
term multilingual has been used in this study to include individuals who were at least 
bilingual. Apart from high proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, many 
participants reported extremely positive attitudes to multilingualism (Baker, 1992), in 
general, although the Romanian group showed significantly more positive attitudes than 
the participants in the other contexts. Other variables that composed the linguistic profile 
of the participants in these studies were motivational intensity and intention to continue 
studying foreign languages (Gardner, Tremblay and Masgoret, 1977). Again, the Romanians 
were more motivated than the other participants to further engage in language learning. At 
the other end of the scale were the Dutch-speaking Belgians who reported low levels of 
interest in learning more languages. This result should be understood in light of the high 
proficiency levels that the Dutch speakers had in at least two foreign languages. Lastly, 
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anxiety and confidence in using foreign languages (Clément, Gardner, & Smythe, 1977) were 
also investigated and the results suggest that the British group and the Francophone 
Belgians were significantly more anxious then the Romanians and the Dutch speakers. #
One of the most important components of national identity is considered to be language 
(Pascual Y Cabo & Rothman, 2013). Ever since the birth of the first nations in Europe, 
language has been used as a tool to create an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) 
within the geographical borders, a community that united around language and other 
common characteristics, and which used language to distinguish its members from 
members of other communities. One of the main goals of this dissertation has been to 
explore and assess whether multilingualism can have a similar function for the European 
identity as language has for the national identity. This section will present and discuss the 
findings of the quantitative and qualitative studies regarding multilingualism and European 
identity for the contexts studied. #
The first analyses conducted for each context aimed at assessing the relationship between 
multilingualism and European identity, and how they influence each other. At a bivariate 
level, many of the linguistic variables showed a strong positive association with European 
identity in general, but also with its components. These relationships were also positive and 
significant with the BIOS variables. Thus, more proficiency and frequency of use of foreign 
languages, less anxiety, more positive attitudes to multilingualism, motivational intensity 
and intention to continue studying languages were related on an individual level to stronger 
identification with Europe. These associations varied slightly between the contexts, but 
there was one consistent correlation across all contexts: the more positive attitudes one 
had towards multilingualism, the more that person identified with European identity and 
its components, the civic and the cultural European identity (this link could not be assessed 
in Belgium, where the cultural identity was not reliable). General European identity was 
also consistently related to other measures of linguistic identity, such as proficiency, 
motivational intensity, confidence or anxiety in using a foreign language. In the case of the 
British group, all linguistic variables correlated strongly and positively with measures of 
European identity, suggesting that in this particular context the more multilingual a person 
was, the more s/he would identify as European. British and English identities had exactly 
the opposite relation to the linguistic variables, suggesting the stronger feelings of 
identification with national identity in the UK was inversely proportional to 
multilingualism and the positive connotations it might bring to an individual’s life.#
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These strong relationships provided the grounds for assessing the predictive value of the 
linguistic identity variables for European identity. Two linguistic concepts proved to be of 
importance at the multivariate level: attitudes towards multilingualism and anxiety in using 
a foreign language. In all contexts, positive attitudes towards multilingualism was a good 
predictor for all the components of European identity. Lower levels of anxiety in using a 
foreign language predicted a stronger identification with general European identity in all 
contexts. The fact that these results were consistent across all the contexts suggest that 
positive attitudes to multilingualism are not only related to European identity, but they can 
actually anticipate it and influence its strength. Moreover, not feeling anxious when using a 
foreign language can also be beneficial in developing a stronger sense of European identity. 
There results point to the important role played by multilingualism in the European 
context for establishing a stronger European identity. Being consistent across the contexts 
studied, these results show a potential for generalizability across Europe, especially among 
the highly educated Europeans.#
The outcome of the quantitative analysis was congruous with the opinions presented by 
the interviewees in all contexts. The interviews presented the opportunity to discuss in 
greater depth the connection between multilingualism and European identity. Most of the 
people interviewed were multilingual and the majority used more than one language on a 
regular basis, be it for work, study or in the family environment. The interview data 
supported the connection between positive attitudes to multilingualism and European 
identity, either as a direct relationship or mediated by other factors, such as exposure and 
familiarity with foreign cultures and people, and travel. #
Consistently throughout the interviews, but particularly in the British context, 
interviewees suggested that multilingualism should be encouraged at an early age, in the 
educational institutions. Participants declared that this would encourage young people to 
become multilingual and thus feel more European, and it would open a range of 
opportunities for work and study abroad. Although currently English is the de facto lingua 
franca of Europe and possibly the whole world, the British interviewees advocated the 
benefits of language learning for personal development. The Romanian interviewees were 
aware of the fact that if they wanted to take advantage of the opportunities that came 
about when Romania joined the EU they needed to be able to communicate in a language 
other than Romanian. Travelling, studying or working in another European country was 
considered possible only if one was multilingual. The Belgian interviewees also discussed 
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the potential political advantages that could arise if all Belgians were fluent in both Dutch 
and French. The Belgian context is charged from a linguistic point of view, but the 
participants in the interviews declared that being able to speak the other official Belgian 
languages could have an impact on the political situation in Belgium. In all contexts, some 
interviewees talked about the cultural, economic and personal benefits of being 
multilingual in Europe. #
Multilingualism and European identity were consistently and strongly supported by the 
participants in the quantitative and qualitative studies in all the contexts investigated. 
Furthermore, there were significant associations between the various concepts that defined 
them and there is evidence that positive attitudes to multilingualism predicts higher levels 
of European identity. These results have potential implications at various levels. On an 
individual level, multilingualism has health benefits, as well as social and economical 
advantages, allowing Europeans to profit from the rights granted to all European Union 
citizens. On a national level, supporting multilingualism through educational institutions 
can lead to an increase in economical cooperation with other European countries. At a 
European level, multilingualism can foster a stronger European identity, which in turn will 
tighten the relationships between European citizens and countries, and lead to a stronger 
Europe. #
5.4. Future studies 
Future studies looking at European identity and multilingualism should continue to use 
mixed methodology, as this study provided evidence for the benefits of this approach. 
Triangulation of data, methods and theory (Duff, 2006; Dewaele, 2009) will provide 
valuable insight into the research questions. Duff (2006) also suggests that the same data 
should be investigated by different researchers in order to give an objective assessment of 
the results. Particularly in the case of qualitative data, this other dimension of triangulation 
should be employed in order to bypass the researcher’s bias when interpreting the findings. #
5.4.1. National & European identity 
The present study substantiated the assumption that there are generational differences in 
the understanding of national and European identity. Current ongoing projects (Ross, 2007; 
2012) are investigating the perceptions of young Europeans towards their local, regional, 
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national and European identities, by conducting focus groups in various current and 
potential future member states of the EU. The valuable insight that this extensive project 
will provide should be complemented by survey data and a quantitative component 
developed to test the findings of the focus groups. #
Other studies could focus on the development of these identities over time, by conducting 
longitudinal studies: interviews, focus groups and surveys with the same participants at 
different time intervals (before the country’s accession to the EU, immediately after, a few 
years later, once the country joins the eurozone and the Schengen area, and so on). 
Longitudinal and cross-sectional research studies can inform each other. They can provide 
an appreciation of the development and formation of the European identity in parallel with 
the national identity. These studies could identify the specific events leading to a change 
(either increase or decrease) in the European and national identity levels. #
Previous studies (Favell, 2009; Risse, 2010; Fligsteing et al. 2009; Duchesne, 2008 and 
others) found evidence that more educated Europeans have a stronger European identity 
and enjoy the benefits of the European citizenship more than non-elite or less educated 
Europeans. The level of education of the participants in this study was quite high in all 
contexts. While providing valuable information about this social stratum, the results 
cannot be generalised to all members of the countries were the data was collected. Future 
studies should aim at exploring the opinions and perceptions of the non-elite Europeans in 
order to complement the results presented here. Focus groups, interviews and survey data 
could be collected in order to better understand the European identity at all social levels. 
Other studies could focus on comparing the perceptions of Europeans from various 
countries, but who are part of the same profession. For example, as discussed in some of 
the interviews in the present study, it may be that farm workers from a particular country 
have more in common with other European farm workers than with people from their own 
country. Similarly, academics, students, engineers, blue-collar workers and so on could have 
more in common across European countries. These similarities could be investigated in 
cross-national studies.#
Understanding the relationship between national and European identity is vital for grasping  
the factors that influence European identity. The present study provides evidence that 
perceiving them as compatible and blended is related to other favourable variables, such as 
confidence in using another language or positive attitudes to multilingualism. The 
instrument used in this study to look at this relationship (the adapted BIOS) should be 
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further tested in other European contexts. It can be adapted and re-tested to ensure its 
validity and reliability across contexts. A future study should complement the quantitative 
data collected through surveys to date with a qualitative assessment of the items on the 
scale. #
The national and European identity embody a set of values and beliefs, some common 
among European counties, and some possibly specific to a particular region. It has been 
suggested that the belief in human rights, equality and democracy are not only European 
values, but also characteristic of the civic national identity specific to Western countries. 
Future studies should provide a more detailed taxonomy of these common values and 
beliefs, since they could be catalysts in creating a hybrid national-European identity. If it is 
uncovered that these values are more predominant in some parts of Europe and not in 
others, European projects could be designed to address this imbalance. #
5.4.2. Components of European identity 
The present study found evidence that the European identity has a civic and a cultural 
component, but as discussed previously, the scale provided by Bruter (2005) showed poor 
reliability in some contexts. I suggest then that future studies should employ a rigorous 
methodology to provide better instruments for assessing these components. The new scale 
will require testing and validation across European contexts to ensure its reliability. Since 
then, Bruter has refined the instrument for assessing European identity, and this 
instrument is currently being used in a large multinational study (Bruter, personal 
communication). The results of those studies should inform the next steps in developing 
and refining an instrument for European identity.#
The findings presented here indicate that there are some differences with regards to the 
endorsement of these components in various contexts. Further research should continue to 
assess these differences in other contexts, by comparing data from Western European 
countries with Eastern ones, and older EU member states with newer ones. These studies 
will also shed more light on the notion of institutional inertia proposed by Bruter (2005). 
The effects that these differences have on people’s endorsement of the European 
integration project should also be assessed. These results could have implication for 
European and national policy and projects. #
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Sassatelli (2009) discussed the impact of the European Capital of Culture project, however 
this is only one of the many projects supported by the European Union. The influence 
exerted by other Europe-wide cultural and civic initiatives should be investigated, and they 
could result in recommendations for future campaigns designed to increase the levels of 
awareness and understanding of the European Union, European identity and its 
components.#
5.4.3. Multilingualism & European identity 
This study has shown that positive attitudes to multilingualism and consistent practices of 
multilingualism can predict higher levels of European identity. There are theoretical 
indications, and this project found evidence for them, that multilingualism can have a 
direct effect on European identity. Nevertheless, it can also influence it through other 
mediating factors, such as exposure to other European citizens and their cultures, long 
stays abroad for study or work, short stays for travel, and so on. Future studies should 
attempt to investigate in-depth the direct and mediated effect of languages on European 
identity.#
Minority groups or people living on the borders between nations have been previously 
discussed as having transnational identities, and possibly feeling more European than 
people living in a more homogeneous environment. For the transnational people, the 
regional or ethnic identity might be stronger than their national identity. The measures put 
in place by the European Union to safeguard the languages and the cultures of these 
populations might be influential in their development of stronger ties to Europe. A special 
case of transnationality that should be investigated is that of the Romani minority. The 
Romani do not actually have a state of their own, but they have a minority status in various 
European countries. They have traditionally been a nomad minority, travelling through 
Europe even before the open borders of the EU. Currently however, the negative discourse 
which surrounds any appearances in the media of the Romani minority have led to 
increased levels of racism and xenophobia against this minority. The Romani are one of the 
most interesting cases of transnational Europeans. Other groups that could be assessed for 
their levels of European identity are different generations of immigrants from inside and 
outside Europe. #
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An interesting comparison could be made between the European countries and, for 
example, South America. The Union of South American Nations, or UNASUR, is an  
intergovernmental union aimed at the regional integration of South American countries, 
which has been steadily forming and gaining strength in the area since 2008 (UNASUR, 
2013). This union aims to model itself after the European Union, and provide in the future a 
common passport, currency and parliament for all its members. The South American 
continent is a linguistically diverse place, incorporating many indigenous cultures and 
languages. However, only very few of these languages have official status alongside Spanish 
and Portuguese, which have traditionally been the elite languages. Studies should be 
designed to monitor the development of a common South American identity together with 
the evolution of UNASUR, and the importance of the multilingualism for this context. 
The comparison with the European identity could provide insight into the intricate 
connection between language and supranational identities.#
Consistently across the contexts studied in this project, some participants declared that 
another layer of their identity (and in some cases a replacement layer for national or 
European identity) was world citizenship. The fast moving globalised world of today 
provides an opportunity for people to travel all over the world and experience diverse 
cultures and traditions. Although this identity has not been studied extensively yet, it 
seems to be gaining ground in recent years. Future studies should aim at understanding the 
development of this identity and its relation to European, national, regional and local 
identities. These studies should also look at the importance of multilingualism in 
identifying as a world citizen. #
5.5. Concluding remarks 
Using a mixed-method approach in three contexts, this study provided much needed 
empirical evidence for the existence and composition of the concept of European identity, 
and identified linguistic characteristics that are related and can even predict it. The study 
assessed the validity and reliability of the European identity scale developed by Bruter 
(2005) and found that although the constructs of the scale are valid and reliable, the 
instrument developed by Bruter (2005) is not consistently reliable across different contexts. 
The study also found evidence that for many Europeans, their national and European 
identities were compatible and even formed a hybrid identity. Furthermore, it presented 
and discussed the differences between the contexts with regards to European identity and 
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its components, and their relationship to measures of linguistic identity and 
multilingualism. #
The outcomes of this dissertation have implications for the theoretical conceptualisations 
of European identity, but also for the understanding of the role of multilingualism in the 
European context. Multilingualism is known to have beneficial effects for the cognitive 
health of individuals (Bialystok, Craik & Luk, 2012) and also to foster interethnic relations. 
In countries where there is a tradition for multilingualism, such as Belgium or Romania, 
learning foreign languages is part of the school curricula, and it is regarded as personally 
relevant. However, in the UK, more institutional efforts need to address multilingualism 
and foster language learning in schools. #
Multilingual education (Cenoz, 2009), maintenance of minority, regional and heritage 
languages (Comănaru & Noels, 2009; Pascual Y Cabo & Rothman, 2013), institutional 
support for multilingualism (Grindheim & Lohndal, 2008) will have significant influence on 
the attitudes to multilingualism in countries where the norm is not to be multilingual. In 
turn, these positive attitudes together with increased opportunities for contact, travel, 
study or work in other European countries will have positive effects on the European 
identity. Working together, the European Union and the national governments can devise a 
strategy for providing the European citizens with increased opportunities for language 
learning and contact. Once the European identity becomes stronger than the national 
identities, we can expect to find economic, political and social benefits. Especially now, 
when the economic crisis can decide the fate of the European Union, a strong sense of 
European identity and cooperation between the European countries can be determining 
factors for the future of Europe.  
Appendices  235
Appendices 
Appendix A   - Belgium - French Questionnaire 1
ACCORD PREALABLE#
Vous êtes cordialement invite à participer à une étude sur les opinions et attitudes envers 
l’apprentissage de langues étrangères dans l’Union Européenne et le sentiment d’identité. 
Cette étude s’inscrit dans un projet multinational portant sur différents groupes d’âge.  
L’auteur est Ruxandra Comanaru, étudiante de doctorat à Birkbeck, University of London.#
Votre participation à cette étude est extrêmement appréciée. Elle est entièrement 
volontaire, anonyme et confidentielle.  Les données obtenues à travers l’enquête seront 
traitées statistiquement et votre nom ne sera pas associé aux réponses.  Il n’y a pas de « 
bonnes » ni de mauvaises réponses, soyez donc le plus honnête possible. Nous vous prions 
également de répondre à toutes les questions, même si certaines sont assez similaires.#
Nous vous remercions sincèrement de votre participation.  Si vous êtes curieux de 
connaître les résultats de cette étude, ou si vous avez des questions, n’hésitez pas à 
contacter Ruxandra à l’adresse mentionnée ci-dessous.#
RUXANDRA COMANARU#
rcoman01@students.bbk.ac.uk#
!
Age_____________#
Sexe: M_____  F_______#
Dernière école graduée: lycée ____; école professionnelle ____; faculté     ____; maîtrise 
____; doctorat ____; d'autres (quelles?) _______#
Lieu de naissance (ville, pays):__________#
Lieu de résidence (ville, pays):__________#
   The questionnaires have been adapted to address the specific characteristics of each context, thus 1
they vary slightly.
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Nationalité :________________#
Comment définiriez-vous votre origine ethnique? __________________________#
Quel est le background ethnique de votre mère?___________________________#
Quelles langues est-ce que votre mère parle? ______________________________#
Quel est le background ethnique de votre père?____________________________#
Quelles langues est-ce que votre père parle? ______________________________#
S'il vous plaît indiquer les langues que vous connaissez, quel que soit le niveau de 
compétence:  
Première langue (L1)____________#
Deuxième langue (L2)____________ #
Troisième langue (L3) ____________#
Quatrième langue (L4) ____________#
Cinquième langue (L5)___________#
Sixième langue (L6) _________#
Autres (quelles?) ____________  
!
Quelle langue parlez-vous le plus fréquemment? ___________#
Sur une échelle de 1 à 6, indiquez votre niveau de compétence pour parler cette langue, 
pour la comprendre, la lire et l’écrire : #
Minimal# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Excellent  
Parler:  L1____________#
L2____________ #
L3 ____________#
L4 ____________#
Comprendre: L1____________#
L2____________ #
L3 ____________#
L4 ____________#
Lire: L1____________#
L2____________ #
L3 ____________#
L4 ____________#
Ecrire: L1____________#
L2____________ #
L3 ____________#
L4 ____________ 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Est-ce que vous suivez des classes de langue en ce moment? Oui_____ Non____#
Si oui, quelles langues? _____________________________________#
Si oui, combien d’heures par semaine avez-vous ces classes ? ___________#
Avec quelle fréquence utilisez-vous vos langues étrangères en dehors de la classe de langue? 
Indiquez l’option qui décrit le mieux votre situation:#
L1____________ 
L2____________  
L3 ____________ 
L4 ____________  !
Est-ce que vous parlez parfois à vos amis dans une langue qui n’est pas votre L1 ? #
Dans quelles situations utiliseriez-vous ces langues?  (réponse ouverte)#
Est-ce que vous utilisez des sites comme Facebook ? Messagerie instantanée? Est-ce que 
vous êtes susceptible d‘y utiliser une langue qui n’est pas votre L1 ? (likert) #
Minimal# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Excellent #
Pourquoi? (réponse ouverte)#
Combien désirez-vous apprendre une nouvelle langue? (likert)#
Minimal# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Excellent #
Quelle langue choisiriez-vous et pourquoi? (réponse ouverte)#
Comment voulez-vous apprendre une autre langue? (Cours? Livres? Internet? etc.)#
Pensez-vous qu’il est important d’être fluide dans plus d’une langue ?  Pourquoi ? #
Ci-dessous se trouvent un nombre de déclarations avec lesquelles certaines personnes sont 
d’accord alors que d’autres ne sont pas d’accord. Indiquez dans quelle mesure vous êtes 
personnellement d’accord avec ces déclarations, et dans quelle mesure elles reflètent ce que 
Moins qu’une fois 
par mois 
Une fois par #
mois
Toutes les 2-3#
semaines
Une fois par #
semaine
Tous les 2-3 #
jours
Tous les jours
1 2 3 4 5 6
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vous pensez. Si vous ne sont pas actuellement inscrits dans une classe de langue, de 
répondre aux questions réflexion sur le dernier cours de langue que vous avez pris. Utilisez 
l’échelle suivante :#
Pas du tout d’accord# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Tout à fait d’accord#
!
1. Je crois que je connais assez bien ma L2 pour la parler correctement.# #
2. Je crois que je suis capable de lire et comprendre la plupart des textes dans ma L2.##
3. Quand je dois passer un coup de fil, je suis confus/e si je dois parler ma L2.##
4. Je sens que je comprends assez bien quelqu'un qui parle ma L2.# #
5. Je ne me sens pas à l’aise quand je parle ma L2.# #
6. Dans un restaurant, je me sens calme quand je dois commander en parlant ma L2.##
7. Je deviens timide quand je dois parler ma L2 avec un superieur (chef, professeur etc).#
8. Chaque fois que je parle avec quelqu'un qui a comme langue maternelle ma L2, je ne me 
sens pas à l’aise.# #
9. Dans mon opinion je connais assez bien ma L2 pour écrire facilement.# #
10. Je me sens à l'aise quand je parle ma L2 avec mes amis parmis lesquelles il y'a des gens 
qui parlent ma langue native et des gens qui parlent ma L2.# #
11. Je me sens tres sûr/e de moi et détendu/e quand je demande des conseils dans ma L2.#
12. Je crois que la connaissance de ma L2 me permet de m'en sortir de la plupart des 
situations dans lesquelles je dois parler cette langue.# #
13. Je suis très sûr/e de ma capacité d'écrire dans ma L2 correctement.#
14. Parler plusieurs langues convient mieux aux gens plus âgés qu’aux plus jeunes.# #
15. Je sens de la pitié pour les gens monolingues.# #
16. Je n’essaie pas de comprendre les aspects les plus complexes des langues.# #
17. Parler plusieurs langues peut aider les gens à obtenir des promotions au travail.# #
18. Les gens sauraient plus s’ils parlaient plus de langues.# #
19. J’aimerais abandonner l’étude des langues.# #
20. Je travaille vraiment dur pour apprendre des langues.# #
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21. Les élèves devraient apprendre à parler au moins deux langues à l’école.# #
22. Je tends à ne pas vérifier les corrections de mes devoirs de cours de langues.# #
23. La connaissance de plusieurs langues peut créer des problèmes pour certaines 
personnes.# #
24. Il est suffisant de parler ma L1.# #
25. Les multilingues peuvent avoir plus d’amis que les monolingues.# #
26. Quand j’étudie les langues, j’ignore les distractions et je me concentre totalement.##
27. Je vais continuer l’étude des langues le plus longtemps possible.# #
28. Le multilinguisme devrait être important dans la région où j’habite.# #
29. Parler plusieurs langues n’est pas difficile.# #
30. Je compte reprendre l’étude des langues à l’avenir.# #
31. Les jeunes enfants peuvent facilement apprendre plusieurs langues simultanément.#
32. Si j’avais des enfants, j’aimerais qu’ils soient multilingues.# #
33. Il est important de parler plusieurs langues.# #
34. J’ai tendance à déconnecter quand notre prof de langue parle de choses qui ne font pas 
partie de la leçon.# #
35. Quand j’ai un problème de compréhension dans une classe de langue, je demande 
toujours de l’aide.# #
36. Je compte arrêter l’étude des langues.# #
37. Comme adulte, j’aimerais être considéré comme multilingue.# #
38. Les gens qui connaissent plus de langues peuvent gagner plus d’argent.# #
39. Je ne paie pas trop d’attention au feedback que je reçois dans ma classe de langue.##
40. Des locuteurs natifs de différentes langues peuvent cohabiter dans ma région.# #
41. La connaissance de plusieurs langues rend les gens plus intelligents.# #
42. Les enfants devraient apprendre à lire dans plusieurs langues.# #
43. Parler plusieurs langues permet d'obtenir un emploi# #
44. Il suffit aux gens de connaître une seule langue.# #
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45. Les enfants qui apprennent plusieurs langues simultanément sont confus.# #
46. Je travaille presque quotidiennement à mes langues pour rester à jour.# #
47. Je vais continuer l’étude des langues après l’achèvement de mon cours actuel.# #
48. Il est important de pouvoir écrire dans plusieurs langues.# #
49. Les signes routiers devraient être multilingues.# #
50. Je n’aimerais pas que le français soit la seule langue dans cette région.# #
51. Je tends à faire mes devoirs de langue de façon peu structurée et aléatoire.##
52. Je tente de comprendre toutes les langues que je vois et que j’entends.#
!
Voici une liste d’items (sur votre perception de vous-même). Indiquez, sur une échelle de 1 à 
6, dans quelle mesure vous vous identifiez avec chacun des items :  !
Bruxellois#
Wallon##
Flamand#
Belge# #
Européen  #
Ouest-Européen# #
Francophone# #
!
Citoyen du monde#
Membres de l'Union européenne#
Anglophone#
Citoyen de ma région# #
Citoyen de ma ville#
Locuteur/trice d’une autre langue (Quelle?)  
!
En répondant à ces questions, pensez à votre identité personnelle, (régionale : Bruxelloise, 
Wallonne ou Flamande) ? nationale (Belge) et transnationale (Européenne) et comment 
vous percevez la relation entre les différents niveaux#
Pas du tout d’accord# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Tout à fait d’accord#
1. Je me sens parfois confus sur mon identité ethnique.#
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2. Il y a un conflit en moi entre les cultures auxquelles j’appartiens (régionale, nationale, 
européenne).#
3. Mes identités bruxelloise/wallonne, belge et européenne sont en harmonie.#
4. Je sens qu’il faut être loyal envers son groupe régional.#
5. J’éprouve des difficultés à réconcilier les différences entre ma culture régionale, nationale 
et européenne.#
7. Mon identité ethnique varie en fonction d’avec qui je me trouve.#
8. J’ajuste mon identité suivant que je me trouve avec d’autres Bruxellois/Francophones ou 
autres Européens.#
9. Il est difficile d’appartenir à mon groupe régional, mon groupe national et le groupe 
européen à l' en même temps.#
10. Je passe d’une culture à une autre dans différentes situations#
11. Bien qu’ils soient différents, les différents groupes culturels (bruxellois/wallon, belge, 
européenne) vont bien ensemble.#
12. Je sens que mon identité est hybride (régional, national et européen).#
13. Mon identité bruxelloise/wallonne, belge est compatible avec la culture européenne.#
14. Je sens qu’il faut prendre une décision sur le choix d’une culture particulière (belge ou 
européenne).#
15. Je sens que je dois décider laquelle des cultures est plus centrale dans mon identité.#
16. Mon identité bruxellois/wallon, belge s’accorde bien avec mon identité européenne.#
16. Si je devais décrire la relation entre mes cultures (régional, national et européen), je les 
décrirais comme intégrées.#
17. Je sens que je ne peux pas être Belge et Européen en même temps.#
18. Je sens que mon identité est un mélange de cultures (régional, national et européen).#
19. La plupart des mes amis me perçoivent comme appartenant simultanément aux cultures 
(régional, national et européen)#
20. J’adapte mon identité ethnique suivant les circonstances.#
21. Je sens qu’il faut être loyal envers son groupe national.#
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!
Comme définiriez-vous votre identité ethnique? #
Regardez les images ci-dessous. Dans chaque diagramme, un des cercles représente votre 
identité nationale et européenne. Laquelle décrit le mieux la relation entre vos identités ?#
!  
L’image qui décrit le mieux la relation entre mes identités est  _____#
Regardez les images ci-dessous. Dans chaque diagramme, un des cercles représente votre 
identité régionale, nationale et européenne.  Laquelle décrit le mieux la relation entre vos 
identités ?#
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!
L’image qui décrit le mieux la relation entre mes identités est  _____#
1.# En général, diriez-vous que vous vous considérez comme un citoyen de l’Europe?#
a.# Oui, très fort.#
b.# Oui, à certaine mesure.#
c.# Je ne sais pas#
d.# Pas vraiment#
e.# Pas du tout#
2.# Depuis 1985, les citoyens de tous les pays de l’Union Européenne possèdent un 
passeport sur lequel se trouve le nom de leur pays et de l’Union Européenne. Pensez-vous 
que cela soit une bonne chose ?#
a.# Oui, une très bonne chose.#
b.# Oui, plutôt une bonne chose.#
c.# Ca n’a aucune importance.#
d.# Non, plutôt une mauvaise chose.#
e.# Non, une très mauvaise chose.#
3.# Comment décririez-vous votre réaction si vous voyiez quelqu’un brûler un drapeau 
européen ? #
a.# Je serais choqué et blessé.  #
b.# Je serais choqué mais pas blessé.  #
c.# Ca me laisserait indifférent.#
d.# Je serais heureux.#
4..# Comment décririez-vous votre réaction si vous voyiez quelqu’un brûler un drapeau 
du coq rouge sur fond jaune? #
a.# Je serais choqué et blessé.  #
b.# Je serais choqué mais pas blessé.  #
c.# Ca me laisserait indifférent.#
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d.# Je serais heureux.#
5.# Comment décririez-vous votre réaction si vous voyiez quelqu’un brûler un drapeau 
belge? #
a.# Je serais choqué et blessé.  #
b.# Je serais choqué mais pas blessé.  #
c.# Ca me laisserait indifférent.#
d.# Je serais heureux.#
6.# Sur une échelle de 1 à 6, 1 signifiant que vous ne vous identifiez pas du tout et 6 que 
vous vous identifiez très fort avec ces lieux, que diriez-vous ?#
M’identifie pas du tout#1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6    M’identifie très fort#
… l'Europe?# #
... la Belgique# #
... la région bruxelloise/la Wallonie# #
... votre ville#
7.# Certains disent que malgré les nombreuses différences, les Européens partagent un 
héritage commun qui les rend plus proches les uns des autres que, par exemple, les Japonais 
ou les Chiliens. Est-ce que vous êtes…(choisissez UN)#
a.# Tout à fait en désaccord#
b.# Plutôt pas d’accord#
c.# Ni l’un ni l’autre / Je ne sais pas#
d.# Plutôt d’accord#
e.# Tout à fait d’accord#
8.# Un groupe d’athlètes de tos les pays de L’Union Européenne ont proposé que lors 
des prochains Jeux Olympiques, chaque fois qu’un/e athlète gagne une médaille d’or, l’ “Ode 
à la joie”, l’hymne européen, devrait être joué après l’hymne national.  Pensez-vous que ce 
serait une bonne idée ? (choisissez UN)#
a.# Oui, une très bonne idée. #
b.# Oui, une très bonne idée. #
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c.# Ni bonne ni mauvaise idée. #
d.# Non, une mauvaise idée.#
e.# Non, une très mauvaise idée.#
9.# Quand les chefs d’état ou de gouvernement d’un pays de l’Union Européenne 
(comme la reine Elizabeth II, le roi Albert II ou le président français), font un discours à la 
TV, le drapeau national et le drapeau européen flag apparaissent derrière eux. Pensez-vous 
que c’est une bonne chose? (choisissez UN)#
a.# Oui, une très bonne chose. #
b.# Oui, une bonne chose. #
c.# Ni bonne ni mauvaise chose. #
d.# Non, une mauvaise chose.#
e.# Non, une très mauvaise chose.#
10.# Est-ce que le fait d’être citoyen/ne de l’Union Européenne signifie quelque chose 
pour vous ? (choisissez UN)#
a.# Oui, beaucoup.#
b.# Oui, quelque chose, #
c.# Non, rien du tout.#
11.# Si vous avez répondu OUI à la question précédente, diriez-vous que cela reflète …? 
(choisissez AUTANT QUE VOUS DESIREZ).#
a.# Un héritage européen commun#
b.# Le droit de voter dans les élections pour le parlement européen. #
c.# Des institutions communes.#
d.# Une histoire européenne commune.  #
e.# Une hymne européenne, un passeport européen, un drapeau européen. #
f.# Le droit de voyager dans un autre pays européen sans passer de contrôles de 
douane. #
g.# Le droit de voyager dans un autre pays européen sans passer devoir montrer son 
passeport ni sans care d’identité.#
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h.# Quelques idéaux communs.#
i.# Etre membre de la famille européenne.#
12.# Diriez-vous que vous vous sentez plus proche d’autres Européens plutôt que, par 
exemple, de Chinois, Russes ou Américains ? (choisissez UN)#
a.# Tout à fait d’accord  #
b.# Plutôt d’accord #
c.# Ni l’un ni l’autre / Je ne sais pas#
d. # Plutôt pas d’accord#
e. # Tout à fait en désaccord#
!
Je vous remercie !!! !
R.C. 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Appendix B - Belgium - Dutch Questionnaire 
TOESTEMMINGSFORMULIER#
Wij nodigen u uit om deel te nemen aan een studie over de meningen en attitudes ten 
opzichte van het leren van vreemde talen in de Europese Unie en het identiteitsgevoel. 
Deze studie maakt deel uit van een internationaal project met betrekking tot verschillende 
leeftijdsgroepen. De auteur is Ruxandra Comanaru, doctoraatstudente te Birkbeck, 
University of London.#
Uw deelname aan dit onderzoek wordt erg op prijs gesteld. Ze is volledig vrijwillig, anoniem 
en vertrouwelijk. De verzamelde gegevens worden statistisch verwerkt en uw naam wordt 
op geen enkel moment geassocieerd met de resultaten. Er zijn geen "goede" of slechte 
antwoorden, probeer dus zo eerlijk mogelijk te antwoorden. We vragen u ook om alle 
vragen te beantwoorden, ook al zijn sommige vragen zeer gelijkaardig. #
Alvast heel erg bedankt voor uw medewerking. Indien u nieuwsgierig bent naar de 
resultaten van dit onderzoek, aarzel dan niet om Ruxandra te contacteren op het 
onderstaande adres.#
RUXANDRA COMANARU#
rcoman01@students.bbk.ac.uk#
!
Leeftijd: _____________#
Geslacht: M_____  F_______#
Laatst behaalde diploma: Secundair onderwijs ____; Professionele bachelor/ korte type 
hoger onderwijs ____; Academische bachelor/ korte type hoger onderwijs     ____; Master 
____; Doctoraat ____; Andere (welke?) _______#
Geboorteplaats (stad, land):__________#
Woonplaats (stad, land):__________#
Nationaliteit :________________#
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Hoe zou u uw etnische identiteit omschrijven? __________________________#
Wat is de etnische achtergrond van uw moeder?_______________________________#
Welke taal/talen spreekt uw moeder? ________________________________#
Wat is de etnische achtergrond van uw vader?_____________________________#
Welke taal/talen spreekt uw vader? ________________________________#
Vul a.u.b. in welke talen u kent, ongeacht uw niveau: 
Eerste taal (L1)____________#
Tweede taal (L2)____________ #
Derde taal (L3) ____________#
Vierde taal  (L4) ____________#
Vijfde taal (L5)___________#
Zesde taal (L6) _________#
Andere (welke?) ____________#
Andere (welke?) ___________ !
Op een schaal van 1 tot 6, geef uw niveau van vaardigheid om die taal spreken, begrijpen, 
lezen en schrijven:#
Minimaal# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Uitstekend  !
SPREEKT:  L1____________#
# L2____________ #
# L3 ____________#
# L4 ____________#
BEGRIJPT: L1____________#
# L2____________ #
# L3 ____________#
# L4 ____________#
!
LEEST: L1____________#
# L2____________ #
# L3 ____________#
# L4 ____________#
SCHRIJFT: L1____________#
# L2____________ #
# L3 ____________#
# L4 ____________ !
Volgt u momenteel taallessen? Ja_____  Nee____#
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Indien ja, welke talen? _____________________________________#
Indien ja, hoeveel uren per week heeft u les ? ___________#
Hoe vaak gebruikt u uw verschillende talen buiten de taallessen?#
L1____________#
L2____________ #
L3 ____________#
L4 ____________ !
Praat u soms met vrienden een taal/talen die niet u L1 is/zijn? In welke situaties gebruikt u 
deze talen?#
Gebruikt u sites zoals Facebook, Hi5, MySpace ? Ja ____ Nee _____#
Gebruikt u chat? (bv. Yahoo Messenger, MSN/Hotmail, Gmail Talk enz.) Ja ____ Nee _____#
Indien u ja heeft geantwoord op een van de twee voorgaande vragen, bent u geneigd om een 
taal te gebruiken die niet uw L1 is in deze situaties?#
Nooit# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6   Heel vaak#
Waarom? ______________#
Zou u graag een nieuwe taal willen leren?#
Helemaal niet geïnteresseerd# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6  Heel erg 
geïnteresseerd#
Welke taal zou u kiezen en waarom? _______________#
Hoe wilt u een andere taal leren? (Lessen? boeken? Internet? enz.) ______________#
Denkt u dat het belangrijk is om een taal vaak te praten? Waarom? ______________#
Minder dan een #
keer per maand#  
Een keer per #
maand#
Om de 2-3 #
weken#
Een keer per #
week#
Om de 2-3 #
dagen#
Elke dag
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Hieronder staan een aantal verklaringen waarmee sommige mensen akkoord gaan en 
anderen niet. Geef aan in welke mate u het persoonlijk eens bent met deze verklaringen, en 
in welke mate ze aangeven wat u denkt. Als u momenteel niet ingeschreven in een taal die 
klasse, beantwoord de vragen na te denken over de laatste taalles je nam.#
Helemaal niet akkoord#1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6    Helemaal akkoord#
1. Ik voel me op mijn gemak wanneer ik mijn L2 praat met vrienden wanneer er mensen 
bijzijn die mijn moedertaal spreken en mensen die mijn L2 spreken.# #
2. Ik vind dat de kennis van mijn L2 me toelaat om mijn plan te trekken in de meeste 
situaties waarin ik deze taal moet praten.# #
3. Ik word verlegen wanneer ik mijn L2 moet praten met een overste (baas, professor, 
enz.).# #
4. Ik voel me niet op mijn gemak wanneer ik mijn L2 praat.# #
5. Ik voel me rustig wanneer ik in een restaurant moet bestellen in mijn L2.# #
6. Ik ben er erg zeker van dat ik mijn L2 correct kan schrijven.# #
7. Ik ben in de war wanneer ik mijn L2 moet gebruiken aan de telefoon.# #
8. Ik vind dat ik mijn L2 voldoende beheers om ze correct te kunnen praten.##
9. Ik voel me erg zelfzeker en ontspannen wanneer ik advies moet vragen in mijn L2.#
10. Volgens mij ken ik mijn L2 goed genoeg om ze makkelijk te kunnen schrijven.# #
11. Ik vind dat ik in staat ben om de meeste teksten in mijn L2 te lezen en begrijpen.# #
12. Ik voel dat ik iemand die mijn L2 praat redelijk goed begrijp.#
13. Ik zou liever stoppen met het leren van talen.# #
14. Als volwassene zou ik het belangrijk vinden om beschouwd te worden als meertalige.#
15. Ik wil in de toekomst de studie van talen hervatten.# #
16. Ik zou het niet leuk vinden mocht het Nederlands de enige taal zijn in deze regio.##
17. Het is voldoende dat mensen slechts een taal kennen.# #
18. Kinderen zouden moeten leren lezen in verschillende talen.# #
19. In mijn regio kunnen sprekers van verschillende talen samenleven.##
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20. Meerdere talen kennen zorgt ervoor dat mensen intelligenter zijn.##
21. Verkeersborden zouden meertalig moeten zijn.# #
22. Ik heb de neiging om mijn taken voor de taalvakken op een weinig gestructureerde en 
onzekere manier uit te voeren.# #
23. Wanneer ik tijdens de taalles iets niet begrijp, vraag ik altijd hulp.# #
24. Ik werk echt hard om talen te leren.# #
25. Meerdere talen spreken helpt bij het vinden van werk.# #
26. Ik wil stoppen met de studie van talen.# #
27. Kinderen die meerdere talen tegelijk leren, zijn verward.# #
28. Meertaligheid zou belangrijk moeten zijn in de regio waar ik woon.# #
29. Ik heb de neiging om de verbeteringen van mijn huiswerk van de talencursus niet na te 
kijken.# #
30. Ik besteed niet veel aandacht aan de feedback die ik krijg tijdens de taallessen.# #
31. Ik doe geen moeite om de moeilijkste aspecten van talen te begrijpen.# #
32. Ik werk bijna dagelijks aan mijn talenkennis om bij te kunnen blijven.# #
33. Het is belangrijk om meerdere talen te praten.# #
34. Het is belangrijk om in verschillende talen te kunnen schrijven.# #
35. Als ik kinderen heb, zou ik willen dat ze meertalig worden.# #
36. Ik heb medelijden met eentaligen.# #
37. Meerdere talen kennen kan bij sommige mensen problemen creëren.# #
38. Ik wil zo lang mogelijk talen blijven studeren.# #
39. Het is niet moeilijk om meerdere talen te spreken.##
40. Jonge kinderen kunnen makkelijk meerdere talen tegelijk leren.# #
41. Meerdere talen kunnen spreken, kan mensen helpen om promotie te maken op hun 
werk.Het is voldoende om mijn L1 te praten.# #
42. Ik probeer om alle talen die ik zie en hoor te begrijpen.# #
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43. Meerdere talen spreken is vanzelfsprekender voor oudere mensen dan voor jongere 
mensen.#
44. Mensen zouden meer weten, mochten ze meer talen kunnen spreken.# #
45. Wanneer ik met taalvakken bezig ben, negeer ik afleidingen en ben ik heel erg 
geconcentreerd.# #
46. Ik heb de neiging om afgeleid te zijn wanneer onze leraar talen praat over zaken die 
niets te maken hebben met de les.# #
47. Kinderen moeten op school minimum twee talen leren praten.# #
48. Wanneer ik klaar ben met mijn huidige cursussen, ga ik mijn talenstudie verderzetten.#
49. Meertaligen kunnen meer vrienden hebben dan eentaligen.# #
50. Mensen die verschillende talen kennen, verdienen meer geld.#
!
Hieronder vindt u een lijst van labels (over hoe u zichzelf ziet). Geef a.u.b. aan in welke 
mate u zich identificeert met elk van deze labels:#
Helemaal niet# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6   Helemaal  !
Brusselaar# #
Waals# #
Vlaams##
Belg# #
Europeaan# #
Oost-Europeaan# #
!
!
!
Franstalig# #
Wereldburger# #
Lid van de Europese Unie# #
Engelstalig# #
Burger van mijn regio# #
Burger van mijn stad# #
Spreker van een andere taal (Welke?)#
!
Wanneer u deze vragen beantwoordt, denk aan uw persoonlijke identiteit (regionaal: 
Brusselaar, Waals of Vlaams)? nationaal (Belg) en transnationaal (Europees) en hoe u de 
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relatie tussen deze verschillende niveaus ziet.#
Helemaal niet akkoord#1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6    Helemaal akkoord#
1. Hoewel ze verschillend zijn, gaan de verschillende culturele groepen (Brussels/Vlaams, 
Belg, Europees) goed samen.# #
2. Ik pas mijn identiteit aan afhankelijk van of ik in het gezelschap ben van andere 
Brusselaars/Vlamingen of andere Europeanen.# #
3. Mijn etnische identiteit varieert in functie van de mensen waarmee ik omga.# #
4. Mijn gevoel van tot een bepaalde cultuur te behoren varieert afhankelijk van de situatie.
# #
5. De meeste van mijn vrienden zien me als iemand die tegelijk tot verschillende culturen 
behoort (regionaal, nationaal en Europees).# #
6. Mijn Brusselse/Vlaamse, Belgische en Europese identiteit is in harmonie.# #
7. Ik vind dat ik moet kiezen welke cultuur het belangrijkst is voor mijn identiteit.# #
8. Ik voel me soms verward over mijn etnische identiteit.# #
9. Ik vind dat mijn identiteit hybride is (regionaal, nationaal en Europees).# #
10. Mijn Brusselse/Vlaamse, Belgische identiteit komt goed overeen met mijn Europese 
identiteit.#
11. Ik voel dat ik niet tegelijk Belg en Europeaan kan zijn.# #
12. Ik vind dat men trouw moet zijn tegenover zijn nationale groep.# #
13. Het is moeilijk om terzelfdertijd te behoren tot mijn regionale groep, mijn nationale 
groep en de Europese groep.# #
14. Mijn Brusselse/Vlaamse, Belgische identiteit is compatibel met de Europese cultuur.
# #
15. Er is een conflict tussen de culturen waartoe ik behoor (regionaal, nationaal, Europees).
# #
16. Als ik de relatie tussen mijn culturen moet beschrijven (regionaal, nationaal en 
Europees), dan zou ik ze geïntegreerd noemen.# #
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17. Ik ondervind moeilijkheden om de verschillen tussen mijn regionale, nationale en 
Europese cultuur met elkaar te verzoenen.# #
18. Ik vind dat men loyaal moet zijn ten opzichte van zijn regionale identiteit.#
19. Ik voel dat mijn identiteit een mengeling is van culturen (regionaal, nationaal en 
Europees).# #
20. Ik pas mijn etnische identiteit aan afhankelijk van de omstandigheden.# #
21. Ik vind dat men een keuze moet maken voor een bepaalde cultuur (Belg of Europees).#
Hoe definieert u uw etnische identiteit? ________________#
Bekijk de onderstaande diagrammen. De afzonderlijke cirkels stellen uw nationale en 
Europese identiteit voor. Welk diagram geeft het best weer hoe deze identiteiten zich tot 
elkaar verhouden?#
!
Het diagram dat de relatie tussen mijn identiteiten het best weergeeft is: _____#
Bekijk de onderstaande diagrammen. De afzonderlijke cirkels stellen uw regionale, 
nationale en Europese identiteit voor. Welk diagram geeft het best weer hoe deze 
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identiteiten zich tot elkaar verhouden?
  #
Het diagram dat de relatie tussen mijn identiteiten het best weergeeft is: _____#
!
1.# Zou u zich over het algemeen beschouwen als een Europees burger?#
# a. Ja, helemaal#
# b. Ja, in zekere zin#
# c. Ik weet het niet#
# d. Niet echt#
# e. Helemaal niet#
2.# Sinds 1985 beschikken alle burgers van de Europese Unie over een paspoort 
waarop zowel de naam van hun land staat als de Europese Unie. Vindt u dat een 
goede zaak?#
# a. Ja, een zeer goede zaak#
# b. Ja, een goede zaak#
# c. Dat heeft geen enkel belang#
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# d. Nee, eerder een slechte zaak#
# e. Nee, een zeer slechte zaak#
3.# Hoe zou u uw reactie beschrijven, mocht u iemand de vlag van de Europese 
Unie zien verbranden?#
# a.. Ik zou geshockeerd en gekwetst zijn#
# b. Ik zou geshockeerd zijn maar niet gekwetst#
# c. Dat laat me onverschillig#
# d. Ik zou tevreden zijn#
4.# Hoe zou u uw reactie beschrijven indien u iemand een Vlaamse vlag zou zien 
verbranden ?#
# a.. Ik zou geshockeerd en gekwetst zijn#
# b. Ik zou geshockeerd zijn maar niet gekwetst#
# c. Dat laat me onverschillig#
# d. Ik zou tevreden zijn#
5.# Hoe zou u uw reactie beschrijven, mocht u iemand een Belgische vlag zien 
verbranden ?#
# a.. Ik zou geshockeerd en gekwetst zijn#
# b. Ik zou geshockeerd zijn maar niet gekwetst#
# c. Dat laat me onverschillig#
# d. Ik zou tevreden zijn #
6. Geef a.u.b. aan in welke mate u zich identificeert met elk van de volgende 
plaatsen. U beschikt over een schaal gaande van 1 tot 6, waarbij 1 betekent dat u 
zich helemaal niet en 6 helemaal wel identificeert.#
Ik identificeer me helemaal niet# 1   2   3   4   5   6     Ik identificeer me helemaal 
wel#
# Europa# #
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# België# #
# het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest/Vlaanderen# #
# uw stad#
7.# Bepaalde mensen stellen dat ondanks alle verschillen, Europeanen toch een 
gemeenschappelijk erfgoed delen dat hen dichter bij elkaar brengt dan bv. bij 
Japanners of Chilenen. Bent u...#
# a. Helemaal niet akkoord#
# b. Eerder niet akkoord#
# c. Noch het ene noch het andere/ Ik weet het niet#
# d. Eerder akkoord#
# e. Helemaal akkoord#
8. # Een groep atleten uit alle landen van de Europese Unie heeft voorgesteld om 
tijdens de volgende Olympische Spelen, elke keer er iemand een gouden medaille 
wint, de Ode aan de Vreugde, de Europese hymne, af te spelen na de eigen nationale 
hymne. Vindt u dit een goed idee ?#
# a. Ja, een heel goed idee.#
# b. Ja, een goed idee.#
# c. Noch een goed, noch een slecht idee.#
# d. Nee, een slecht idee.#
# e. Nee, een heel slecht idee.#
9.# Wanneer staatshoofden van één van de landen van de Europese Unie een 
toespraak geven (zoals koningin Elisabeth II, koning Albert II of de Franse 
president), ziet u achter hen de nationale en de Europese vlag. Vindt u dit een 
goede zaak ?#
# a. Ja, een heel goed idee.#
# b. Ja, een goed idee.#
# c. Noch een goed, noch een slecht idee.#
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# d. Nee, een slecht idee.#
# e. Nee, een heel slecht idee.#
10.# Zou u zeggen dat u zich meer verbonden voelt met andere Europeanen dan 
met bv. Chinezen, Russen of Amerikanen ?#
# a. Helemaal akkoord#
# b. Eerder akkoord#
# c. Noch het ene, noch het andere/Ik weet het niet#
# d. Eerder niet akkoord#
# e. Helemaal niet akkoord#
11.# Betekent het feit dat u een Europese burger bent iets voor u ?#
# a. Ja, veel.#
# b. Ja, iets.#
# c. Nee, helemaal niets.#
12.# Indien u JA geantwoord heeft op de vorige vraag, zou u dan zeggen dat dit 
betekent...? (meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)#
# a. Een gemeenschappelijk Europees erfgoed#
# b. Stemrecht bij Europese verkiezingen#
# c. Gemeenschappelijke instellingen#
# d. Een gemeenschappelijke Europese geschiedenis#
# e. Een Europees volkslied, een Europees paspoort, een Europese vlag#
# f. Het recht naar andere Europese landen te reizen zonder via grenscontroles 
te moeten passeren#
# g. Het recht naar een ander Europees land te reizen zonder je paspoort of 
identiteitskaart te moeten tonen#
# h. Enkele gemeenschappelijke idealen#
# i. Lid zijn van de Europese familie#
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# j. Iets anders (wat?) ___________#
!!
Bij voorbaat dank!#
R.C.#
!
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Appendix C - Romania Questionnaire 
!
CONSIMTAMANT #
!
!
Va invitam sa luati parte la un studiu legat de parerea dumneavoastra fata de invatarea 
limbilor straine si atitudinile fata de identitatea dumneavoastra ca membru al Uniunii 
Europene. Acest studiu face parte dintr-un proiect multi-national, pe diferite grupe de 
varsta. Acest studiu este condus de Ruxandra Comanaru, doctorand la Birkbeck, University 
of London.#
Participarea dumneavoastra este foarte apreciata. Va informam ca aceasta participare este 
voluntara, anonima si confidentiala. Datele obtinute nu vor fi folosite ca atare, ci vor fi 
integrate in diverse analize statistice. Orice citat folosit va fi anonim, iar numele 
dumneavoastra nu va fi niciodata asociat cu raspunsurile. Nu exista raspunsuri corecte sau 
incorecte la aceste intrebari, asa ca va rugam sa fiti cat se poate de sinceri. Unele intrebari 
sunt asemanatoare, dar va rugam sa raspundeti la toate cu sinceritate. #
Va multumim pentru timpul si seriozitatea acordata acestui studiu. Daca sunteti interesati 
de rezultatele obtinute sau daca aveti intrebari, va rugam sa o contactati pe Ruxandra la 
adresa de email de mai jos dupa vara 2011.#
RUXANDRA COMANARU#
rcoman01@students.bbk.ac.uk#
!
!
!
!
!
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Varsta _____________# # # # # Sex: M_____  F_______#
Ocupatie  _____________#
Ultima scoala absolvita: liceu____; scoala profesionala_____; facultate ____; master ____; 
doctorat ____; alta ____#
Locul nasterii (oras, tara): ________#
Unde locuiti in momentul de fata? (oras, tara): __________#
De ce etnie sunteti?  __________________________#
De ce etnie este mama dumneavoastra? _______________________________#
Ce limbi vorbeste mama dumneavoastra? ________________________________#
De ce etnie este tatal dumneavoastra? ________________________________#
Ce limbi vorbeste tatal dumneavoastra? _________________________________#
Indicati limbile cunoscute, indiferent de nivel: 
Limba materna____________#
A doua limba____________ #
A treia limba ____________#
A patra limba ____________#
A cincea limba _____________#
A sasea limba _____________ !
Alta (va rugam specificati care): ____________#
Ce limba vorbiti cel mai frecvent? _______________#
Pe o scara de la 1 la 6, specificati cat de bine vorbiti, intelegeti, cititi si scrieti limbile 
mentionate mai sus:#
Foarte rau # 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Foarte bine  
VORBESC: Limba materna__________#
A doua limba ____________ #
A treia limba ____________#
A patra limba ____________#
INTELEG: Limba materna__________#
A doua limba___________ #
A treia limba ____________#
A patra limba ____________#
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CITESC: Limba maternal ___________#
A doua limba____________ #
A treia limba ____________#
A patra limba ____________#
SCRIU: Limba materna____________#
A doua limba____________ #
A treia limba ____________#
A patra limba ____________  !!!
Momentan sunteti inscris la vreun curs de limbi straine? Da_____ Nu____#
Daca da, ce limbi? _____________________________________#
Cate ore pe saptamana aveti cursuri de limbi straine? ___________#
Cat de des folositi limbile straine mentionate mai sus in afara salii de curs? Va rugam sa 
alegeti optiunea care se potriveste cel mai bine fiecarei limbi: #
!
!
Limba materna____________#
A doua limba____________ #
A treia limba ____________#
A patra limba ____________  !
Vorbiti vreodata cu prietenii dumneavoastra o limba care nu este limba dumneavoastra 
materna? In ce situatii ati folosi alta limba? #
Folositi vreo retea sociala pe Internet? (ex. Hi5, Facebook, MySpace etc.) Da____ Nu___#
Instant messenger? (ex. Yahoo, MSN/Hotmail, Gmail Talk etc.) Da ____ Nu ___#
Pe o scara de la 1 (deloc) la 6 (foarte des), cat de des folositi o limba diferita de limba 
dumneavoastra materna in aceste situatii? _____#
De ce credeti ca este asa?#
Pe o scara de la 1 la 6, 1 fiind “deloc interesat” si 6 fiind “foarte interesat”, cat de interesat/a 
sunteti sa invatati o noua limba straina? _______#
Mai putin de o #
data pe luna
Lunar La 2-3 #
saptamani
Saptamanal# La 2-3 #
zile
Zilnic
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Ce limba ati alege si de ce?#
Cum ati proceda ca sa invatati o noua limba straina? (ex. Cursuri? Singur/a? Pe internet? 
etc.)#
Credeti ca este important sa stiti mai multe limbi straine? De ce? De ce nu? #
Mai jos, sunt niste fraze cu care unii sunt complet de acord, iar altii deloc. Va rugam sa 
alegeti numarul de la 1 la 6 care vi se potriveste cel mai bine in fiecare caz, exprimand cu 
acest numar cat reflecta fiecare fraza situatia dumneavostra. Ganditi-va la limba pe care ati 
notat-o mai sus ca limba a doua.#
Deloc de acord # 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Total de acord#
!
1. Ma simt increzator si relaxat cand trebuie sa cer indicatii de mers in a doua mea limba.#
2. Cand vorbesc la telefon in a doua limba, ma simt incurcat. #
3. Ma simt nesigur de fiecare data cand intalnesc un vorbitor nativ al limbii mele a doua. #
4. Sunt convins ca sunt capabil sa citesc si sa inteleg majoritatea textelor in a doua mea 
limba. #
5. Intr-un restaurant, sunt calm cand trebuie sa comand mancarea in a doua mea limba. #
6. Ma simt confortabil daca trebuie sa vorbesc a doua mea limba intr-un grup de prieteni 
unde sunt si vorbitori ai limbii mele materne si vorbitori ai limbii mele a doua.#
7. Devin timid cand trebuie sa vorbesc in a doua mea limba cu un superior (sef, profesor 
etc.)#
8. Cred ca nivelul cunostintelor mele in limba a doua imi permite sa ma descurc in 
majoritatea situatiilor in care trebuie sa folosesc a doua mea limba. #
9. Ma simt incomod de fiecare data cand trebuie sa folosesc a doua mea limba.#
10. Stiu suficient de bine a doua mea limba incat sa pot sa scriu nestingherit.#
11. Cred ca stiu suficient de bine a doua mea limba incat sa vorbesc corect. #
12. Am incredere in abilitatile mele de a scrie in a doua mea limba.#
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13. Cred ca pot sa inteleg relativ bine pe cineva care vorbeste in a doua mea limba.#
14. Ma intimidez de fiecare data cand trebuie sa vorbesc in a doua mea limba cu un 
vanzator.#
15. Este important sa poti vorbi mai multe limbi.#
16. E destul sa vorbesti romana.#
17. Invatarea mai multor limbi ii face pe oameni mai destepti.#
18. Copiii se confunda cand invata mai multe limbi deodata.#
19. Vorbirea mai multor limbi ajuta cand doresti sa te angajezi.#
20. E important sa poti scrie in mai multe limbi.#
21. Scolile ar trebui sa invete elevii cel putin doua limbi straine.#
22. Semnele rutiere ar trebui sa fie multilingve. #
23. Nu este dificil sa vorbesti mai multe limbi straine.#
24. Cunosterea mai multor limbi creeaza oamenilor probleme.#
25. Imi pare rau de oamenii care nu pot vorbi mai multe limbi.#
26. Copiii ar trebui sa invete mai multe limbi.#
27. Oamenii stiu mai multe daca cunosc mai multe limbi.#
28. Oamenii care vorbesc mai multe limbi au mai multi preteni decat cei care vorbesc o 
singura limba.#
29. Cunoasterea mai multor limbi este mai importanta pentru cei mai in varsta decat 
pentru cei tineri.#
30. Cunosterea mai multor limbi poate sa fie folositoare pentru promovarea profesionala.#
31. Copiii mici invata usor mai multe limbi deodata.#
32. Cunosterea mai multor limbi este importanta in regiunea in care locuiesc eu. #
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33. Oamenii pot sa castige mai mult daca cunosc mai multe limbi. #
34. Nu mi-ar placea ca romana sa fie singura limba din aceasta zona.#
35. Mi-ar placea sa fiu vazut ca un vorbitor de mai multe limbi.#
36. Daca as avea copii, mi-ar placea sa vorbesca mai multe limbi.#
37. Vorbitorii nativi de limbi difereite pot trai impreuna in aceasta regiune. #
38. Oamenii au nevoie sa cunosca o singura limba.#
39. As dori sa ma las de invatarea limbilor straine.#
40. Intentionez sa studiez limbi straine pe viitor.#
41. Intentionez sa nu mai invat limbi straine. #
42. Imi doresc sa continui sa invat limbi straine atat timp cat este posibil.#
43. Doresc sa continui sa invat limbi straine dupa ce termin cursul la care sunt inscris acum#
44. Nu ma intereseaza sa depun efort in plus ca sa intelelg aspectele mai complexe ale 
limbilor straine.#
45. Intentionat, incerc sa intelelg toate limbile care le vad si le aud.#
46. Am tendinta sa imi fac temele la limba straina intr-un mod neplanificat si aleatoriu. #
47. Ma stradui cat pot sa invat limbi straine.#
48. Sunt la zi cu temele la limbile straine tot timpul.#
49. Nu sunt foarte atent cand profesorul imi da sugestii legate de performantele mele la 
limbile straine.#
50. Daca nu inteleg ceva la cursul meu de limbi straine, intotdeauna cer ajutor.#
51. Nu ma intereseaza sa verific temele corectate de profesor la limbile straine.#
52. Am tendinta sa nu fiu atent cand profesorul vorbeste de lucruri care nu sunt direct 
relationate cu limba straina care o invat.#
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53. Cand invat limbi straine, ignor ce se intampla in jurul meu si incerc sa ma concentrez pe 
ceea ce fac.#
Cat de tare va identificati dumneavoastra cu urmatorii termeni:#
Deloc# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6 # Foarte tare  !
roman____# #
european____ # # #
est-european____# #
vorbitor de romana____#
cetatean al lumii____ #
membru al Uniunii Europene____ #
!
vorbitor de a doua limba a mea___#
locuitor al regiunii mele (ex. ardelean, 
banatean etc.) ______#
locuitor al orasului meu (ex. clujean, 
satmarean etc.) ______#
vorbitor al altei limbi (care?) ________  
!!
Pentru urmatoarele intrebari, va rugam sa va ganditi la identitatea dumneavostra, si 
nationala (romana) si trans-nationala (europeana) si cum percepeti relatia intre cele doua. 
Folosind scara de mai jos, raspundeti cat de bine se potriveste fiecare fraza cu sentimentele 
dumneavoastra:#
Deloc de acord # 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Total de acord#
!
1.# Nu pot sa ma simt si european si roman in acelasi timp.#
2.# Cred ca fiecare trebuie sa aleaga o cultura sau alta (fie roman, fie european)#
3.# Cred ca fiecare trebuie sa fie leal unui singur grup cultural.#
4.# Cred ca trebuie sa decid care dintre cele doua culturi (romana sau europeana) este 
mai importanta pentru identitatea mea.#
5.# Identitatea mea etnica depinde de persoana cu care sunt in acel moment.#
6.# Deseori, imi dau seama ca oscilez intre diverse culturi in functie de situatie.#
7.# Imi adaptez identitatea in functie de etnia celor cu care sunt, daca sunt din 
Romania sau alta tara europeana.#
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8.# Identitatea mea culturala se adapteaza circumstantelor. #
9.# Identitatea mea romana e compatibila cu identitatea mea europeana.#
10.# Chiar daca sunt diferite, aceste doua culturi, cea romana si cea europeana, sunt 
compatibile.#
11.# Identitatea mea romana merge bine cu identitatea mea europeana.#
12.# Identitatea mea romana si cea europeana sunt in armonie.#
13.# Exista o stare conflictuala intre cele doua culturi de care apartin (cea romana si cea 
europeana)#
14.# Cateodata sunt confuz cand e vorba de identitatea mea etnica.#
15.# Cred ca e dificil sa faci parte din doua grupuri culturale.#
16.# Cu greu pot sa reconciliez diferentele dintre cultura mea romana si cea europeana.#
17.# Cred ca identitatea mea e un hibrid intre cultura romana si cea europeana.#
18.# Cred ca identitatea mea e un amestec de doua culturi, cea romana si cea europeana. #
19.# Daca ar trebui sa descriu relatia intre cultura mea romana si cea europeana in cazul 
meu, as spune ca sunt integrate.#
20.# Majoritatea prietenilor mei considra ca sunt un membru al culturii romane si al 
celei europene.#
!
Cum ati defini prin cuvintele dumneavoastra identitatea dumneavoastra etnica si culturala?#
In fiecare diagrama de mai jos, un cerc reprezinta identitatea dumneavoastra romana si 
celalalt cerc reprezinta identitatea europeana. Care dintre diagramele de mai jos descriu cel 
mai bine relatia intre aceste doua identitati pentru dumneavoastra?#
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Imaginea care reperezinta cel mai bine aceasta relatie este: _____#
In fiecare diagrama de mai jos, un cerc reprezinta identitatea dumneavoastra regionala, alt 
cerc reprezinta identitatea dumneavoastra romana si celalalt cerc reprezinta identitatea 
europeana. Care dintre diagramele de mai jos descriu cel mai bine relatia intre aceste trei 
identitati pentru dumneavoastra?#
!
Imaginea care reperezinta cel mai bine aceasta relatie este: _____#
!
1.# In general, ati spune ca va considerati un cetatean al Europei?#
a.# Da, intr-o oarecare masura.#
b.# Nu stiu.#
c.# Nu chiar.#
d.# Deloc#
2.# Din 1985, cetatenii din toate tarile Uninunii Europene au un pasaport european pe 
care este scris si numele tarii lor si Uniunea Europeana. Credeti ca este un lucru bun?#
a.# Da, foarte bun.#
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b.# Da, relativ bun.#
c.# Nu conteaza deloc.#
d.# Nu, e relativ rau.#
e.# Nu, e foarte rau.#
3.# Cum ati reactiona daca ai vedea pe cineva arzand ateagul Uniunii Europene?#
a.# As fi socat si ranit.#
b.# As fi socat, dar nu ranit.#
c.# Nu mi-ar pasa. #
d.# M-as bucura. #
4.# Cum ati reactiona daca ai vedea pe cineva arzand steagul Romaniei?#
a.# As fi socat si ranit.#
b.# As fi socat, dar nu ranit.#
c.# Nu mi-ar pasa. #
d.# M-as bucura. #
5.# Cat de tare va identificati cu...#
Nu ma identific deloc# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6     Ma identific foarte tare#
# Europa?# #
# Romania?# #
# regiunea din care sunteti? (ex. Transilvania, Banat etc.)##
# orasul in care traiti?#
6..# Unii spun ca in ciuda numeroaselor deosebiri, europenii au un "patrimoniu comun" 
care ii face sa fie mai apropiati unii de altii comparativ cu altii, sa zicem, japonezi sau 
peruani. Domuneavoastra...?#
a.# Nu sunt deloc de acord cu aceasta parere. #
b.# Nu sunt chiar de acord cu aceasta parere. #
c.# Nici de acord, nici impotriva / Nu stiu. #
d.# Sunt relativ de acord cu aceasta parere.#
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e.# Sunt foarte tare de acord cu aceasta parere.#
7..# Un grup de atleti din Uniunea Europeana a propus ca la urmatoarele jocuri 
olimpice, de fiecare data cand un atlet sau o echipa din Uniunea Europeana castiga o 
medalie de aur, "Oda Bucuriei", imnul Uminunii Europene, ar trebui sa fie cantat pe langa 
imnul national al tarii de origine. Credeti ca e o idee buna? #
a.# Da, foarte buna.#
b.# Da, relativ buna.#
c.# Nici buna, nici rea.#
d.# Nu, relativ rea.#
e.# Nu, foarte rea.#
8.# Cand capul unui stat european (regina Elisabeta II, presedintele Romaniei sau 
cancelarul german) tin un discurs televizat, steagul national si steagul european apar in 
spatele lor. Credeti ca e un lucru bun?#
a.# Da, un lucru foarte bun.#
b.# Da, un lucru relativ bun.#
c.# Nici bun, nici rau. / Nu conteaza. #
d.# Nu, relativ rau.#
e.# Nu, foarte rau.#
9.# Faptul ca sunteti cetatean european inseamna ceva pentru dumneavoastra?#
a.# Da, inseamna foarte mult.#
b.# Da inseamna ceva.#
c.# Nu, nu inseamna nimic.#
10.# Daca ati raspuns Da la Intrebarea anterioara. ce ati spune ca inseamna? (alegeti 
toate raspunsurile care se potrivesc)____________________#
a.# Un patrimoniu european comun.#
b.# Dreptul la vot in alegerile parlamentare europene.#
c.# Institutii comune.#
d.# O istorie europeana comuna#
Appendices  271
e.# Un imn comun european, un pasaport european, un steag european.#
f.# Dreptul de a calatori in alte tari UE fara sa trecem prin vama.#
g.# Dreptul de a calatori in alte tari UE fara sa fie neaparata nevoie sa aratm un 
pasaport/carte de identitate.#
h.# Niste idealuri comune.#
i.# Sa fiu un membru al familiei europene.#
11.# Ati spune ca va simiti mai apropiat de alti europeni decat de, sa zicem, chinezi, rusi 
sau americani? _____#
a.# Da, mult mai apropiat.#
b.# Da, ceva mai apropiat.#
c.# Nu stiu.#
d.# Nu, nu chiar.#
e.# Nu, deloc.#
!
Va multumesc!#
R.C.#
!!
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Appendix D - UK Questionnaire 
INFORMED CONSENT#
You are cordially invited to participate in a study that looks at your opinion about learning 
foreign languages and your attitudes towards your identity as a member of the European 
Union. This study is part of a multi-national project, looking at different age groups. The 
project is being conducted by Ruxandra Comanaru, PhD student at Birkbeck, university of 
London.#
Your participation is extremely appreciated. We would like to take this opportunity to 
inform you that your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, anonymous and 
confidential. The data obtained from this survey will not be used as such; rather, it will be 
integrated in various statistical analyses. If we use any quotes, they will be anonymous, and 
your name will never be associated with your responses. There are no right or wrong 
answers, so please be as honest as you can. Please answer all the questions, even if some of 
them sound very similar to one another. #
We would like to thank you for the time you dedicated to this study. Should you be 
interested in the results of this study or if you have any questions related to it, please don’t 
hesitate to contact Ruxandra at the contact information listed below.#
RUXANDRA COMANARU#
rcoman01@students.bbk.ac.uk#
!
Age _____________# # # # # Gender: M_____  F_______#
Occupation  _____________#
Last school you graduated: high-school_____; technical school_____; university ____; 
Master ____; PhD ____; Other ____#
Place of birth (town, country) ________#
Where do you currently live? (town, country) ________#
How would you define your ethnic background? __________________________#
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What is your mother’s ethnic background?_______________________________#
What languages does your mother speak? ________________________________#
What is your father’s ethnic background? ________________________________#
What languages does your father speak? _________________________________#
Please, indicate below the languages you know, regardless of your level of knowledge: 
# First language____________#
# Second language____________ #
# Third language ____________#
# Fourth language ____________#
# Fifth language___________#
# Sixth language ___________#
# Other (please specify) __________  
!
Which language do you speak most frequently?#
On a scale from 1 to 6, rate how well you speak, understand, read and write the languages 
you mentioned above:#
Very poorly # 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Excellent  !
SPEAK: First language____________#
Second language___________ #
Third language ____________#
Fourth language ___________#
UNDERSTAND: First language_____#
Second language___________ #
Third language ____________#
Fourth language ___________#
!
READ: First language____________#
Second language___________ #
Third language ____________#
Fourth language ___________#
WRITE: First language____________#
Second language___________ #
Third language ____________#
Fourth language ___________ !
Are you currently enrolled in any language classes? Yes_____ No____#
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If yes, what languages? _____________________________________#
How many hours a week do your have language classes? ___________#
How often do you use foreign languages outside of the classroom? Please choose the option 
that best applies to your situation:#
First language____________#
Second language___________ #
Third language ____________#
Fourth language ___________ !
Are you currently enrolled in any language classes? Yes _____ No_____#
If yes, what languages? _____________#
How many hours a week do you have language classes? _____#
Do you ever speak to your friends in a language that is not your first language? In what 
situations would you use another language? _______#
Do you use any social networking sites? (e.g., Hi5, Facebook, MySpace etc.) Yes _____ 
No______#
Do you use Instant Messenger? (ex. Yahoo Messenger, MSN/Hotmail, Gmail Talk etc.) Yes 
_____ No ______#
If you answered yes for any of the two previous questions, how likely are you to use a 
language that is not your first language in these situations, 1 being Never and 6 being Very 
often? #
How interested are you in learning another language? (1 being Not at all and 6 being Very 
much)#
Which language would you choose and why?#
Which language would you choose and why?#
Less than once#
a month#
Monthly Every 2-3#
weeks
Weekly Every 2-3#
days
Daily
1 2 3 4 5 6
Appendices  275
Do you think it is important to be fluent in more than one language? Why?#
Below are a number of statements with which some people agree and others disagree. 
Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with these statements-how much 
they reflect how you feel or think personally. Use the following scale:#
Strongly disagree# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Strongly agree#
1. I feel confident and relaxed when I have to ask for directions in my second language.#
2. When I make a telephone call, I get mixed up if I have to speak my second language.#
3. Every time that I meet a native speaker of my second language and I speak with him/
her in this language, I feel uneasy.#
4. I really believe that I am capable of reading and understanding most texts in my second 
language.#
5. In a restaurant, I feel calm when I have to order a meal in my second language.#
6. I feel comfortable when I speak my second language among friends where there are 
people who speak my native language and people who speak my second language.#
7. I get shy speaking my second language with a superior (boss, teacher etc.).#
8. I believe that my knowledge of my second language allows me to cope with most 
situations where I have to use that language.#
9. I feel uneasy whenever I speak my second language.#
10. In my opinion, I know well enough my second language to be able to write comfortably.#
11. I believe that I know well enough my second language to speak correctly.#
12. I am very confident in my ability to write in my second language correctly.#
13. I feel that I can understand someone speaking my second language quite well.#
14. I get nervous every time I have to speak in my second language to a salesclerk.#
15. People who speak more languages can have more friends than those who speak just one 
language.#
16. I don’t bother checking my corrected assignments in my language courses.#
17. It is important to be able to speak more languages.#
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18. If I have children, I would like them to speak more languages.#
19. When I am studying languages, I ignore distractions and stick to the job at hand.#
20. People know more if they speak more languages.#
21. People can earn more money if they speak more languages.#
22. Knowing more languages creates problems for people.#
23. To speak Romanian is all that is needed.#
24. I tend to approach my language homework in a random and unplanned manner.#
25. Speaker of different languages can live together in this region.#
26. Children get confused when learning more languages at once.#
27. I should not like Romanian to be the only language in this area.#
28. Speaking more languages is more for older than younger people.#
29. I would like to be considered as a speaker of more languages.#
30. Speaking more languages is not difficult.#
31. I feel sorry for people who cannot speak more languages.#
32. When I have a problem understanding something we are learning in my language class, 
I always ask for help.#
33. I want to keep on learning languages as long as possible.#
34. Children should learn to read in more languages.#
35. I can’t be bothered trying to understand the more complex aspects of languages.#
36. Being able to write in more languages is important.#
37. Schools should teach students to speak in at least two languages.#
38. I would like to give up learning languages.#
39. Knowing more languages should be important in the region where I live.#
40. Speaking more languages can help people get promotions in their job.#
41. Speaking more languages helps to get a job.#
42. Knowing more languages makes people cleverer.#
43. I intend to study languages again in the future.#
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44. I really work hard to learn languages.#
45. I make a point of trying to understand all of the languages I see and hear.#
46. I keep up to date with languages by working on it almost every day.#
47. People only need to know one language.#
48. I intend to stop learning languages.#
49. I have a tendency to give up when our language instructor talks about things that are 
not part of our lesson.#
50. Young children learn to speak more languages at the same time with ease.#
51. I want to continue to learn languages after I finish this course.#
52. I don’t pay too much attention to the feedback I receive in my language class.#
53. Road signs should be multilingual.#
!
Here is a list of items. Please rate, on a scale from 1 to 6, how much you identify with each 
one of the items:#
Not at all # 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Very much  !
English _____#
British _____#
European _____#
Western-European _____#
English speaker _____#
World citizen _____#
!
!
Member of the European Union _____ 
Speaker of my second language _____#
Citizen of my geographic region (e.g., 
Midlander, Northerner etc.) _____#
Citizen of my town/city (e.g., Londonder, 
Geordie etc.) _____#
Speaker of another language (which?) _____
#  
When answering these questions, please think about your personal identity, both national 
(British) and trans-national (European) and how you perceive the relationship between the 
two.#
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1. I have difficulty reconciling the differences between my British culture and the 
European culture.#
2. I adapt my ethnic identity according to the circumstances.# #
3. My British identity is compatible with the European culture.# #
4. I adjust my identity depending on whether I am with people from the UK or other 
European countries.# #
5. I feel one cannot feel both British and European at the same time.# #
6. I feel my identity is a mix of two cultures (British and European).#
7. My British identity pairs nicely with my European identity.#
8. I often find myself switching between cultures in different situations.#
9. Most of my friends see me as belonging to both the British culture and the European 
culture.#
10. My British and European identities are in harmony.# #
11. If I were to describe the relationship between the two cultures (British and European) 
within myself, I’d depict them as integrated.# #
12. Although they are different, the two cultural groups (British and European) go well 
together.#
13. There is a conflict within myself between the two cultures I belong to (British and 
European).#
14. I feel it is hard to belong to two cultural groups.#
15. I feel that I must decide which of the two cultures is more central to my identity.#
16. Sometimes I am confused about my ethnic identity.# #
17. I feel one has to make a decision of choosing a particular culture over the other (either 
British or European).#
18. I feel my identity is a hybrid of two cultures (British and European).#
19. I feel one should be loyal to only one cultural group.#
20. My ethnic identity varies depending on whom I am with.#
!
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In your own words, how would you define your (ethnic and cultural) identity?#
!
Please consider the images below. In each diagram, one of the circles is meant to represent 
your British identity and the other one your European identity. Which one of the images 
best describes how you see the relation between the two within yourself?#
!  !
The image that best describes the relation between my British and European identity is 
____ .#
!
Please consider the images below. In each diagram, one of the circles is meant to represent 
your regional identity, another one your British identity and the other one your European 
identity. Which one of the images best describes how you see the relation between the 
three identities within yourself?#
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!
The image that best describes the relation between my regional, British and European 
identity is _____ .#
!!
1.# In general, would you say you consider yourself a citizen of Europe? #
a.# Yes, very much.#
b.# Yes, to some extent.#
c.# I don’t know#
d.# Not really.#
e.# Not at all.#
!
2.# Since 1985, citizens from all the countries of the European Union have had a 
common European passport on which both the name of their country and the European 
Union is written. Do you think this is a good thing? #
a.# Yes, a very good thing.#
b.# Yes, a rather good thing.#
c.# It doesn’t matter at all.#
d.# No, a rather bad thing.#
e.# No, a very bad thing.#
3.# What would best describe your reaction if you saw someone burning a European 
flag? #
a.# I would be shocked and hurt.#
b.# I would be shocked but not hurt.#
c.# I would not mind.#
d.# I would be happy.#
4.# What would best describe your reaction if you saw someone burning a UK  flag?#
a.# I would be shocked and hurt.#
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b.# I would be shocked but not hurt.#
c.# I would not mind.#
d.# I would be happy.#
5.# How much do you identify with …#
# Not at all# 1# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6 # Very much#
Europe?# #
United Kingdom?# #
the region where you are from? (ex. Midlands, North etc.)# #
the town/city you live in?# #
6. Some say that in spite of their numerous differences, European share a “common 
heritage” that makes them slightly closer to one another than they are to, say, Japanese or 
Chilean people. Do you…?#
a.# Strongly disagree with this view#
b.# Somewhat disagree with this view#
c.# Neither agree nor disagree / I don’t know#
d.# Somewhat agree with this view#
e.# Strongly agree with this view#
7. A group of athletes from all the countries of the European Union have proposed that at 
the next Olympics, whenever an athlete/team from the European Union wins a gold medal, 
the “Ode to Joy”, the European anthem, should be played after, and in addition to their 
national anthem. Do you think this would be a good idea?#
a.# Yes, a very good idea.#
b.# Yes, a rather good idea,#
c.# Neither a good idea, not a bad idea.#
d.# No, a rather bad idea.#
e.# No, a very bad idea.#
8..  When the heads of state/government of a European Union country (such as Queen 
Elizabeth II, the Romanian president or the German Chancellor), make a speech on TV, 
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both the national flag and the European flag appear behind them. Do you think this is a 
good thing?#
a.# Yes, a very good thing,#
b.# Yes, a rather good thing.#
c.# Neither good nor bad / It doesn’t matter at all.#
d.# No, a rather bad thing#
e.# No, a very bad thing.#
9. Does being a citizen of the European Union mean anything to you?#
a.# Yes, it means a lot.#
b.# Yes, it means something.#
c.# No, it does not mean anything.#
10. If you answered yes to the previous question, would you say that, among other things, it 
means…? (choose AS MANY AS APPLY). #
a.# A shared European heritage#
b.# The right to vote in the European parliament elections.#
c.# Common institutions.#
d.# A common European history#
e.# A common European anthem, European passport, European flag.#
f.# The right to travel to another EU country without passing through customs.#
g.# The right to travel to another EU country without having to show your passport/
ID.#
h.# Some common ideals.#
i.# To be a member of the European family.#
11. Would you say that you feel closer to fellow Europeans than, say, to Chinese, Russian, or 
American people?#
a.# Yes, strongly.#
b.# Yes, to some extent.#
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c.# I don’t know.#
d.# No, not really.#
e.# No, not at all.#
!
Thank you!#
R.C.#
!
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Appendix E - Guiding interview questions 
1. What icons symbolise the EU for you? What connotations do you associate with these 
symbols? #
2. The motto of the EU is United in Diversity. What does this mean to you? Do you think 
this is an achievable goal? #
3. What is your experience with the EU? What is its meaning in your every day like?#
4. What are the factors which could make people feel more European? (travelling - has 
this made you feel more European? contact with others, contact with non-Europeans?)#
5. What does it mean to feel European? How would you describe it? How about British? 
English? Scottish? etc#
6. What is the last trip you took abroad? Have you tried to learn a few words in the 
language of the country you visited? Why? Why not?#
7. Have you ever lived in another EU country? For how long? Details.#
8. Do you feel European? part of the EU or more in a geographic sense? #
9. Do you think feeling European is the same thing as approving of the EU?#
10. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of being an EU citizen?#
11. Do you think there is such a thing as the European heritage? What does it mean for 
you? Do you feel closer to other Europeans than to people from other backgrounds?#
12. Do you know what the official language of the EU is? #
13. How many languages do you think a EU citizen should speak? How about a nationality 
person? Is any one more important than others within the EU space?#
14. Do you think that knowing more languages is beneficial for an individual? Could help 
in any way the personal and national integration into the EU? #
15. Would you be interested in learning any other language? Why?#
16. What does a foreign language mean to you? What do you think it brings to your 
personality, if anything?#
17. How would you define European identity? Do you think it is a prevalent feeling here in 
the nation? In city? In Europe in general? What could influence this European identity? 
Do you think the European identity has more to do with the geographic space of 
Europe or with the EU? 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Appendix F - Cronbach alpha values for all scales 
!
Romania Belgium - French Belgium - Dutch UK
Confidence 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.97
Anxiety 0.82 0.85 0.83 0.94
Motivational intensity 0.63 0.74 0.78 0.75
Intention to continue 0.86 0.82 0.86 0.83
Attitudes 0.78 0.84 0.85 0.88
Hybridity 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.79
Compatibility 0.85 0.79 0.79 0.88
Alternation 0.80 0.78 0.88 0.84
Monocultural orientation 0.67 0.45 0.66 0.73
Conflict 0.69 0.85 0.70 0.64
Eur civic 0.62 0.54 0.63 0.77
Eur cultural 0.58 -0.04 -0.09 0.63
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